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Beyond the Migration Divide in Burkina Faso:
The role of migration management by sending states

Au-dela de la fracture migratoire au Burkina Faso :
Le role de la gestion de migration dans les etats d'origine.

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Resume: This thesis adds to the research conducted on the nexus between migration and development, by introducing an analysis of migration management by sending states and its link with poverty reduction and inclusive growth. Sending country initiatives for equal access to migration, or how structures impact agency, have been largely overlooked. The thesis hence revisits the so-called migration divide, which has been analyzed as a consequence of restrictive immigration control in the global north, by adding i) regional dimensions, ii) an inclusive growth approach and iii) a sending state perspective. It seeks to explore how poor high-emigration countries are attempting to leverage migration for development, with a case study on Burkina Faso. This means investigating policy-making throughout time and more particularly policy gaps in discourse and implementation, both at the national and regional level across Africa. While many of the legislative and policy building blocks for facilitating intra-regional mobility in Africa are in place, their ratification and implementation have been limited during the last decade. When analyzing the 'failure' of migration policies, it is thus important to consider both the 'capabilities' and 'aspirations' of policy-makers in sending states, reinscribing migration within the wider phenomena of social change. This research reveals a general change in the policy landscape in Africa in regard to migration and development, however we still have a long way to go before migration becomes 'high' politics in sending states.

Resumé : Cette thèse s'ajoute aux recherches menées sur le lien entre migration et développement, en introduisant une analyse de la gestion de la migration des États d'origine et de son lien avec la réduction de la pauvreté et la croissance inclusive. Les initiatives des pays d'origine pour l'égalité d'accès à la migration, ou comment les structures impactent l'agence, ont été largement négligées. La thèse propose revenir sur la "fracture migratoire", qui a été analysée comme une conséquence des restrictions de l'immigration dans le grand nord, en ajoutant i) dimensions régionales, ii) une approche de croissance inclusive et iii) perspectives des États d'origine. La thèse cherche à comprendre comment les pays pauvres à forte émigration tentent de tirer parti de la migration pour favoriser le développement, a travers d'une étude de cas sur le Burkina Faso. Cela implique d'enquêter sur l'élaboration des politiques au fil du temps, et sur les lacunes en matière de discours et d'application, tant au niveau national que régional en Afrique. Si de nombreux éléments constitutifs des politiques visant à faciliter la mobilité intrarégionale sont en place, aucun progrès substantiel n'a été accompli pour leur ratification et mise en œuvre au cours de la dernière décennie. Lors de l'analyse de "l'échec" des politiques migratoires, il est important de prendre en compte à la fois les 'capacités' et 'aspirations' des décideurs, en réinscrivant la migration dans le phénomène plus général du changement social. Cette recherche révèle un changement du paysage politique en Afrique, mais qu'il y du chemin à parcourir avant que la migration ne devienne une politique «élevée» dans les États d'origine.

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1. Introduction

This thesis adds to the migration literature, especially as regards the so-called "migration and development nexus" (Nyberg-Sorensen, Van Hear, and Engberg-Pedersen, 2002), which has generally focused on receiving states in the global north. "Migration and development" theories are mainly based on the correlation between negative economic development and migration on one hand, and between migration and positive economic development on the other. Most of these theories, however, assume that migration is a possibility and that it is a possibility for all individuals. The few theories that do attend to restrictions of migration mainly focus on the fact that possibilities to migrate are dictated more strongly by the receiving states through its policies on immigration than by the sending state. I argue that this theoretical disregard of migration management[1] by the sending state that includes would-be migrants - and its link with development - has implications for our understanding of migration as a vector of poverty reduction and inclusive growth.

Migration scholars have tended to focus on north-south flows rather than south-south or intra-regional flows when it comes to examining the nexus between international migration and development. It is interesting to note that the term "migration divide" (Carling and Åkesson, 2009) was mainly introduced to describe those who are not able to migrate to the global north which has led to a theoretical approach looking at "involuntary immobility" (Carling, 2002), whereas the majority of people instead migrate within their own sub-region (Ratha et al, 2011). However, because migration studies as well as international statistics generally tend to obtain data from national census reports, which are respectively outdated or by definition exclude migrants without official papers, they generate inaccurate findings based on partial data. For a continent like Africa, south-south migration flows (understood as migration between developing countries) represent the most common international flows, but they are at the same time the most difficult to document for statistical calculations due to lack of border management and weak data collection measures. Therefore, the empirical gap of migration

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[1] When I started this research in 2009, 'International migration management' was a relatively new concept for understanding and rethinking migration flows. This led to a surge of actors, such as governments and intergovernmental organizations (in particular the International Organization for Migration) starting to develop new approaches aimed at renewing migration policy-making (Geiger and Pecoud, 2010). In general, this goes beyond the idea of 'controlling' migration to managing migration proactively in the goal of promoting holistic approaches to migration, not only centered on security or labor, but also on development and human rights. In this thesis, the concept of migration management has been used in the sense of what they actually mean in the African policies themselves and from the perspective of how they are used in negotiations between receiving and sending states.

studies is especially great for poor countries that lack accurate datasets such as Sub-Saharan African countries. At present, south-south migration is for the most part not managed to engender development.

With limited data from sending states, this research presents new methodological approaches through introducing qualitative interviewing of migration policy-makers from sending states, rather than of migrants. Furthermore, through mixed qualitative methods the research presents an original analysis of the implementation of policies from the sending perspective. The previous neglect of sending states' migration management by both theoretical and empirical migration literature matters, since it has excluded would-be migrants from the analysis and has therefore made it difficult to sufficiently focus on differences between groups in terms of both migration possibilities as well as possibilities to maximize their personal benefits from migration. This represents a gap in the literature since it leads to question the nexus between migration and 'development' understood as poverty reduction and inclusive growth.

My thesis seeks to resolve this issue by exploring how a poor landlocked high-emigration country with mainly intra-regional migration, such as Burkina Faso, has attempted to leverage migration for development, hence by "bringing the (sending) state back in" (Skocpol, 1985). I do so by investigating policy making and more particularly policy gaps in discourse and implementation. Through interviews with more than 50 policy-makers across Africa, combined with biographic research and extensive field-observations, I was able to determine the correlation between policy discourse and implementation. First, I used interviews with policy makers to analyze policy discourse; secondly, I used documentation acquired from these interviews to study policy design; thirdly I triangulated data to verify the implementation of policies. The interviews enabled me to access undisclosed original documentation that permits me to analyze current trends in policy design. By looking at the implementation gaps of African regional policies, this thesis provides crucial lessons learnt to consider for the national migration policies currently under elaboration across Africa as well as new knowledge about intra-regional migration management in Africa.

My research introduces a case-study on Burkina Faso, which has the highest intra-African migratory flows. While current academic research and political discussion has largely ignored history when analyzing the relationship between migration and development (Geiger and Pecoud, 2013), I go into depth with analyzing migration and corresponding policies throughout

time. Burkina Faso particularly represents an interesting case of migration management in comparison to global and African policy trends over time, since it was one of the first sub-Saharan African states to pursue a proactive policy on labor mobility in order to ensure the link between migration and development (RGPH, 2009). Being a poor country with few natural resources and low human development, migration was indeed "high politics" (Hollifield, 2007) following independence from France in 1960.

Few scholars have measured the efficiency of African policies on migration management and on development impact. Literature shows that most migration leads to higher incomes, better access to education and health for migrants, and improved prospects for their children (UNDP, 2009). However, only few studies measure these gains against policy changes. When scholars have addressed the question of whether or not high skilled migration in itself is positive or negative for development[2], they have often put the weight of development on the shoulders of migrants' agency instead of on structures in place to support development. *"The assumption that the return of some of the highly skilled to Ghana, Chad, or Burkina Faso will automatically bring development is again assigning a primacy to migrant agency that seems totally misplaced. The underlying structures need first to be in place in order for the agency of migrants to function."* (Skeldon, 2008; 13). Both the design and implementation of policies are hence crucial to empower migrants and for building a framework under which people can perform agency (De Haan, 2013); policies can for example play a role in enhancing the security of migrants and their contribution to broader society by guaranteeing access to basic rights and services.

Therefore, through looking at one of the world's poorest countries, I would like to gain insight into the following research questions:

    a) Contextual, identifying the nature of the phenomena; *How is migration – in particular intra-regional – embedded into societal and development trends in (West) Africa?* Chapters 2 and 3 on "Reexamining the nexus between migration and development" and "Theoretical and methodological considerations of the migration divide" lay out the contextual foundation of the migration divide. This supports the trend in migration

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[2] See – amongst others - Stark, O. 2004, "Rethinking the brain drain", *World Development,* 32(1): 15-22. Clemens, M. A. 2007, "Do visas kill? Health effects of African health professional emigration", Washington, Center for Global Development, Working Paper No. 114. And Skeldon, Ronald. 2008. International Migration as a Tool in Development Policy: A Passing Phase? Population and development review 34 (1).

literature towards reinscribing migration within the wider phenomena of social change (Castles, 2010; Faist, 2010; Portes, 2010), and in this case looking at how migration interacts with the current trends of non-inclusive growth leading to increasing inequality within and between countries and limited opportunities for inter-generational social mobility (OECD, 2011; OECD, 2018). My analysis shows that whether there is positive or negative development benefits from migration depends largely on the perspective applied ranging from the individual agency level, to households and receiving and sending states. When perceiving development as inclusive growth, sending country initiatives for equal access to migration in Limited Access Orders (North, 2007) are crucial but have been largely overlooked. Furthermore, while scholars have underlined the need to include the prevalent domestic migration flows in the discussion of migration and development (King and Skeldon, 2010), most theoretical work has neglected intra-regional flows. Indeed, internal versus international migration have a different body of literature, concepts, methods, and policy agendas associated to each separate aspect. However, the relationship between intra-regional migration and development remains understudied even though research suggest that intra-regional migration may have a greater impact on poverty reduction and equality than intercontinental migration (Adams and Page, 2005; Wouterse, 2008). This has meant that the information both theoretically and empirically on managed migration's effect on development may not capture the whole picture.

b) Diagnostic, examining the reasons for what exists (and does not exist); *To what extent is migration a vector of inclusive growth in Burkina Faso?* In Chapter 4, "Historical perspectives on the migration divide" we examine the history of the migration divide in Burkina Faso and the relationship between migration and inclusive growth over time. Historians have underlined the lack of correlation between poverty and migration among the pioneer migrants (Manchuelle, 2004; Gaibazzi, 2012), instead the most prosperous migration patterns have been practiced by the elites (Dia, 2010; Gaibazzi, 2012); from navigation to railroad construction, and from diamond trading to today's Western academic migration. Since the 19th century, migration represented a power strategy for certain tribes such as the Soninke. To present a historical analysis of the migration divide in Burkina Faso, it was important to look at migration patterns of the governing elite in Burkina Faso over time. Wheras migration was previously a vector of social mobility, I found that there is today a 'breakdown of the social elevator' (Dia, 2010).

c) Evaluative, understanding barriers and appraising the effectiveness of what exists, and to a certain extent also strategic, identifying new policies and actions; *Does migration policymaking of the West African states interact with development processes?* Chapter 5 "Apprehending the 'failure' of emigration policies" provides an evaluative analysis of policy making and revisits the 'failure' of migration policies through the analysis of respective discourse and implementation gaps. The research reveals that while there is a large discourse gap from receiving countries it is rather the implementation gap that is a problem in sending countries. Furthemore, the thesis demonstrates that Burkinabe migrants have found themselves in between 'high' and 'low' (Hollifield, 2007) politics at home and abroad since independence. Burkina Faso has tried alternative policies to ensure the link between migration and development over time, however migration flows from Burkina Faso have remained dominanted by low-skilled labor to neigboing Cote d'Ivoire. At the same time, Cote d'Ivoire led an open immigration scheme from 1960-1993 during the so-called 'Ivorian miracle' (Boone, 1998; Mitchell, 2011), while the country has since then been restricting immigration. The case of Burkina Faso's migration policy-making is until 2001 very much in line with international trends: From actively trying to manage migration following independence in 1960; to introducing an anti-migration policy in the socialist 1980's; and subsequent 'laissez-faire' in the 1990's. However, while migration and development was introduced on the international agendas from 2001, Burkina Faso only from 2013 considered the elaboration of a migration policy which is still not vigilent. Chapter 6 "Migration unmanaged" looks at alternative policy-solutions for the short- medium- and long-term based on both the "capabilities" and "aspirations" (de Haas and Vezzoli, 2011) of policy-makers in order to move from the current situation of unmanaged migration to proactively establishing structures that enhance development benefits of migrant agency.

This thesis therefore provides a valuable addition to the literature on migration and development policy, especially on managed migration and development from a sending state perspective. It adds to the trend in migration literature towards reinserting migration within the wider phenomena of social mobility and development, so that migration is not studied and theorized in isolation. More specifically, I argue why and how we should nuance our understanding of the migration divide. The mentioned theoretical neglect also affects empirical literature which again has serious implications for our understanding about the link between migration and development understood in the sense of poverty reduction and inclusive growth

and can hence create conceptual and empirical problems. More to the point, the concept of the "migration divide" can be further aggregated to include the perspective of poor African sending states:

First, the concept of the migration divide was introduced in order to explain the increasing difficulty for the average African to migrate outside the continent (Carling and Åkesson, 2009). Contrary to general perception, the analysis of would-be migrants conducted during this research reveals that for the most part those that cannot access the global north are not victims of "involuntary immobility" (Carling, 2002). Instead, it would be important to also look at the large majority of people that opt for a middle-way; south-south or intra-regional migration (or domestic migration).

Secondly, it should in that regard be noted that while most international African migrants move intra-regionally, most efforts to leverage migration as a resource for development are made in a south-north context. Such attempts towards poverty reduction and development are unlikely to have broad implications since this leads to a further divide between those with the necessary capital (human, social, financial) to migrate to the global North versus those who stay in Africa – which again implies different opportunities for social mobility and negatively affect inclusive growth. The migrants that have the resources not to be affected by the so-called migration divide would subsequently further benefit from higher opportunities for economic growth as opposed to those that have limited options for geographic and hence social mobility.

Thirdly, most research points to the responsibility of receiving states in creating the migration divide, however the situation is far more complex and starts within the national context prior to departure. The lack of efficient migration management from sending states migration constitutes less of a vector for inclusive growth. In attempting to add the mentioned nuances to the understanding of the migration divide, I could then narrow down my focus to the supply side, or migration policymaking. The main approach of this thesis is thus mixed qualitative research, with the state as the main unit of analysis. The dependent variable would then be policies, while the independent variable is their outcomes measured through institutions, rights, and interests.

1.1 Revisiting the migration divide

Theories linking migration to development are fairly new, and generally assume that there is both an economic imperative for migrating, as well as inherent economic benefits to be gained from migrating. Many theories have continued to analyze migration as individual rational choice driven by broader development inequalities as initially developed by Ernest Ravenstein (1885; 1889) in his seven 'laws' of migration. These, amongst other, claim that the root causes of migration are economic. This thinking formed the basis of mechanical models of gravity in the 1940's (Zipf, 1946) and subsequently led to theories of wage differentials (Harris and Todaro, 1970) based on push-pull mechanisms, mainly examining the economics of migration and measuring the benefits of migration for the individual. Political, economic, and social factors - such as poverty and unemployment - in the sending countries push the individuals to leave, and also pull them toward the receiving states.

These theories were generally based on four assumptions: First, that the developmental causes and consequences of migration occur at individual or household level. While the neoclassical model works at both the macro and the micro level (Massey et al., 1998), migration is basically seen as a result of decisions made by individual "rational actors" that move from low-wage to high-wage economies. Secondly, that economic aspects were more important than political or social aspects in determining decisions or opportunities to migrating. Push-pull models reflect the neoclassical economic paradigms based on principles of utility maximization, rational choice, factor-price differentials between regions and countries, and labor mobility (King, 2012). Third, that low economic development at individual level was a prime cause of migration. Initially, poverty was perceived as a root cause of migration, and migration has traditionally been perceived to be caused by underdevelopment (Skeldon, 2002). Fourth, that migration would lead to positive developmental outcomes.

However, these theories over time have been proven to be flawed: First, Samers (2010: 55-56) has resumed Rawenstein's laws as "methodologically individualist", "economically deterministic" and "dreadfully antiquated". Migration is not only individual-level rational-choice decision-making of "neoclassical" migrants, but one must also consider aspects such as historical and structural causes of international migration as underlined in three theoretical models: dual and segmented labor markets, dependency theory, and world systems theory (Frank, 1966, 1969; Wallerstein, 1974, 1980). Furthermore, networks play a role in driving

migration (Hugo, 1981; Gurak and Caces, 1992).

Secondly, recent theories furthermore include factors that go beyond economic explanations such as social capital (Faist, 1997, 2000). Indeed, the failure of including personal and family as well as socio-political and historical factors, led to the introduction of theories built on Marxist political economy, historical developmentalism, systems theory and the "new economics of labor" (Stark and Lucas, 1988; Adelman et al, 1988).

Thirdly, it was discovered that low economic development (poverty) does not always lead to migration because the poor cannot afford to migrate. Literature has thus moved beyond an equilibrium model that presumes that if development levels were to even out, people would stay put. Research has instead come to conclude that some determinants of migration stem from development itself, or the integration of a society into the global market (Massey, 2009).

Fourth, the assumption that migration leads to positive economic development is questionable. Theories arguing that migration leads to more inequality are "structuralist" social theory, neo-Marxist, dependency and world systems theory (Frank, 1966, 1969; Wallerstein, 1974, 1980). Migration is seen as increasing spatial disparities, since migration is perceived as an outflow of processes of capitalist expansion, underlining the unequal distribution of the economic and political power between wealthy and poor countries, and unequal access to resources. Neo-Marxist dependency theory for example argues that migration reproduces inequality through the mechanism of "cumulative causation" (Myrdal 1957; Petras 1981). Inequality is reinforced by migration since underdeveloped countries are trapped in their disadvantaged position within the global geopolitical structure.

Most of these theories, however, assume that migration is a possibility, and that it is a possibility for all individuals. Theories of migration were mainly built on the assumption that people would and should migrate. Indeed, most theories of migration rest on the assumption that migrants have a level of choice over their decisions to move (Bakewell, 2010). As one of the few, Lee (1966) included "intervening obstacles" - such as distance, cost as well as cultural barriers and political obstacles - in his analysis of the push pull model. What Gunnar Malmerg (1997) calls the "immobility paradox" questions why the vast majority of people do not migrate despite these economic models based on "push" and "pull" factors of wage and unemployment differentials. There is also a contradiction between the optimism in the link between migration and development while the parallel policy trend is towards controlling or 'managing' migration

(Geiger and Pecoud, 2013).

More recent works have shown that possibilities to migrate are not equally open to everyone, or that there is a "migration divide" (Carling and Åkesson, 2009). Jørgen Carling notes that for Cap Verdean's who aspire to migrate, this period rather seems like one of "involuntary immobility" (Carling, 2002) and not an "age of migration" (Castles and Miller, 2009). Migration is the combined result of two factors: the aspiration to migrate and the ability to migrate (Carling and Schewel, 2018). The notions of class and different capitals must be transmitted into the migration arena, since migrating demands different forms of capital. This includes financial capital, but also cultural and social capital (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Someone without the necessary financial resources might be able to convert his/her cultural and social or symbolic capital into the volume of economic capital needed (Van Hear, 2004; 129). The economic, social, or symbolic capital of a person or group to a large extent shapes the migration strategies that can be pursued (Bourdieu, 1987). In *"I went as far as my money would take me: conflict, forced migration and class"*, Van Hear (2004) notes that class in a broad sense shapes migration. It would seem that only for people who have a combination of capital at disposal, migration leads to "*the expansion of "capacities" ... to lead the kinds of life they value – and have reason to value"* (Sen, 1999a; 18). Sen's capability approach has guided literature on the nexus between migration and development, notably in the Human Development Report conducted by UNDP (2009). However, there has been less attention to the distinction between "resources" (what possibilities people have on paper – or the current policies) and "functionings" (what the reality presents – the implementation of these policies), which is also central to Sen's capability approach, thus looking beyond the resource of migration itself and instead understanding the conditions or constraints – such as policy – that determine whether movement is in fact a possibility.

With increasing border management and restrictions to migration, it is crucial to "brings the state back in" (Skocpol, 1985) to the equation by looking at agency versus structure. There are certain key features that individuals must have in order to experience easier migration possibilities: Individuals in sending countries may have easier possibilities for migration if they benefit from political, social, or economic capital. Political issues could include legal recognition by the state and passports, social capital such as education as well as economic wealth. The situation in receiving countries also matters in terms of, for example, access to visas, economic wealth and social capital such as language skills or networks.

In current theories, the possibilities to migrate are dictated more strongly by the receiving states through its policies on immigration than by the sending state (Tanner, 2006; IOM, 2008; Philips, 2011; Duncan 2012). Theories thus generally describe the inequality of migration as a consequence of restrictive immigration policies in receiving countries (Carling and Åkesson, 2009; Pécoud and Guchteneire, 2007). Almost all literature on the politics of control is focused on the receiving countries (except Sadiq, 2005) under the three major themes of control, security, and incorporation. Indeed, theories that started to "bring the state back in" to social scientific analyses of migration (Skocpol, 1985; Rueschemeyer and Evans, 1985; Freeman, 1998; Weil, 1998; Zolberg, 1999; Brettel and Hollifield, 2008) largely attend to the role of receiving states in managing migration (Dowty, 1987; Fitzgerald, 1996; Massey, 1998; Zolberg, 1999; Meyers, 2000; Cornelius, 2004). This coincided with the agenda of migration moving from "low politics'" to "high politics" in the United States in the 1980's and 1990's. The "Migration Without Borders scenario" (Pecoud and de Guchteneire, 2007) has confirmed that people from developing countries depend on visas and residence permits to a larger extent than citizens of the developed world.

Even though the "migration divide" has grown larger since OECD countries have increasingly been closing their borders, most literature still focuses on the benefits that can accrue from migrants *already* in the receiving countries in the global north. The theoretical literature connecting migration to development tends to focus on three main aspects: remittances, diaspora and skilled migration, or the so-called brain drain (Skeldon, 2010). Migration studies have in that regard mainly looked at three groups of migrants; temporary labor migrants, settler-migrants, and refugees (King, 2012). While this "age of migration" has seen a proliferation of new types of increasingly complex movements (King, 2002; King et al., 2010; Martiniello and Rath, 2012), scholars have mainly examined the effect of migration on development by looking at south-north migration. This generally spurs higher levels of development (e.g. higher wages) than intra-African or intra-regional migration. While the initial assessment of the Migration-Development Nexus underlined that; "*Poverty reduction is not in itself a migration-reducing strategy*" (Nyberg-Sorensen, Van Hear, and Engberg-Pedersen, 2002; 2), one should also ask whether *migration is in itself a poverty-reducing strategy?* This would support the trend in migration literature – amongst other led by Stephen Castles (2010), Thomas Faist (2010) and Alejandro Portes (2010) - towards reinscribing migration within the wider phenomena of social change and social transformation.

While scholars have shown concern with the efficiency of new immigration policies (Brochmann and Hammer, 1999; Striwerda, 1999; Collyer, 2006), they have paid less attention to how such changes in the migration regimes affect relations between different forms of migration and development. Paradoxally, even though most scholars agree that receiving countries (in the global north) mainly dictate possibilities to migrate – they have also broadly contested the efficiency of immigration policies (Castles, 2004; de Haas, 2007). Some underline the deficiency in exporting European immigration control, mainly by looking at the externalization of European borders in North Africa (Paoletti, 2010; Betts and Milner, 2006; Boswell, 2003; de Haas, 2011).

The "failure" of restrictive immigration policies to control flows has been measured through spatial, categorical, inter-temporal and reverse substitution effects of flows. Basically, instead of reducing migration, migrants rather change destination, channels, or limit returns (de Haas, 2011). "*New questions for innovative migration research*" (Berriane and de Haas, 2012) should be less dominated by Northern immigration agendas and would need to instead focus on how the corresponding sending states and intra-African regimes have adapted and responded to global changes, such as the increasingly closed European borders. Nick Van Hear underlines the need to look at *"how changes in the migration regime affect relations between different forms of migration – what could be called the political economy of a given migration order"* (Van Hear, 2004; 32).

In summary, the term "migration divide" (Carling, 2002; Carling and Åkesson, 2009) could therefore be revisited to include three additional dimensions: First, the concept of a "migration divide" was initially introduced in order to explain the increasing difficulty for the average African to migrate outside the continent (Carling and Åkesson, 2009), but it does not address the majority of people that instead migrate within Africa. Secondly, development has mainly been analyzed as increased individual human capacity for south-north migrants (already arrived) and the possible benefits on macro-economic growth in sending countries. The relationship between migration and development in the sending countries merits more research, through examining migration as a means of reducing poverty and inequality and generating inclusive growth. Thirdly, the divide is mainly described as being a consequence of restrictive immigration policies in receiving countries. Hence while there is brought attention to the structure-agency nexus, bringing the African sending state into the equation is important in order to examine the role of emigration policies in leveraging migration for development.

1.2 Bringing the (sending) state back in

In Africa, increasing rural and urban poverty has amongst other led to further in-country inequalities (IFAD, 2011). Recent reports underline how extreme poverty is decreasing but more inequality is rising, and that growth has mainly benefited the elites (OECD, 2011; Oxfam, 2014). This leads to question the agency-based approach of migration being a personal choice and opportunity (Sen, 1999). Indeed, *"… the differentiation of migrants between privileged possessors of human capital credentials and disadvantaged groups with weak legal status who can be easily exploited casts doubt on this positive view"* (Castles, 2012; 30). It is therefore important to investigate the human agency of migrants, and the way this interacts with macro-level and societal structures in the sending state. This in-country approach would demand looking inside Burkina Faso; more specifically at elite formation and how the population can access the resource of migration, or how in-country factors enhance the migration divide.

While migrant agency might not necessarily be sufficient to generate development benefits, scholars have underlined that there is a "structure-agency impasse" (Bakewell, 2010) in migration research. Additionally, migration management has previously mainly been analyzed from the perspective of receiving states, which has theoretical and empirical limitations. While the theoretical literature connecting migration to development has begun incorporating the perspective of sending countries *(*Appleyard 1999; Martin and Weil, 2006; Adepujo, 2008; Agunias, 2009), it does not attend to the need to increase possibilities for migration for groups that have not yet migrated. Excluding would-be migrants from the analysis makes it difficult to sufficiently focus on differences between groups in terms of both migration possibilities as well as governments propensities to prioritize increasing political, economic, and social benefits for vulnerable groups. This would in turn increase their potential, not simply to migrate but also to maximize their personal benefits from migration. This is a major gap in the literature.

Introducing an agency versus structure dichotomy allows for the inclusion of structural accounts of migration drivers and constraints to explore the role of African migration management in producing a framework under which people have the opportunity to expand their "capabilities" (Sen, 1999a). This distinction between "resources" (what possibilities people have on paper – or the current policies) and "functionings" (what the reality presents – the implementation of these policies) is central to Sen's (1991) capability approach. In this case, it would mean understanding the constraints – such as policy – that determine whether

people are able to migrate, and under which conditions. The thesis presents an analysis of both discourse and implementation gaps when it comes to migration policy in Africa. Despite of the existence of formal conventions and protocols on migration in the Regional Economic Commities, the free movement of persons in Africa remains the least developed policy area of regional integration with large implementation gaps. Intra-regional migration thus remains largely unmanaged today.

One must therefore also look at the role that sending states play in easing certain migration possibilities for individuals in order to develop their political, economic and social capital. A migration divide can spring as a consequence of preferential and limited access (North, 2007) to the resource of migration by citizens from sending countries. This has been overlooked even though there is increasing recognition of the importance of sending state initiatives to ensure the link between migration and development (Zolberg et al., 1989; Iredale, 2000; Lowell and Findlay, 2001; Crush and McDonald, 2002). The latter has mainly been looked at through ensuring ties between those that have *already* migrated and their countries of origin; through developing ties with the diaspora, improving the costs and usages of remittances, extending political and economic rights, and exercising pressure in the destination countries (Itzigsohn, 2000; Guarnizo, 2003; Smith, 2003a, 2003b; Levitt and de la Dehesa, 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004; Fitzgerald, 2006; Gamlen, 2006; Agunias, 2009).

Sending states can in some situations be at the mercy of receiving countries and have reduced "capabilities" to manage migration (de Haas and Vezzoli, 2011), although this does not imply that "weaker" states cannot overcome power asymmetries in the politics of migration. There is an intricate relationship between immigration and emigration policies, which are affected by foreign policy considerations and bilateral relations, with conflicts often translating into inter-state problems. Sending countries are indeed often in asymmetric relationships with the often more powerful and wealthier host states. Several studies point to the sending states' structurally disadvantaged position in the international system, which is a key factor defining policy options (Levitt and de la Dehesa, 2003; Fitzgerald, 2006). However, the Global Migration Governance project (Betts, 2011) has, amongst others, examined the position of African countries in relation to migration governance and the conditions under which 'weaker' states can overcome power

asymmetries in the politics of migration[3]. *"Sending countries are certainly not pawns at the weaker end of asymmetric relations with the host countries despite their usually peripheral position in the world economy"* (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003: 209). Indeed, *"Although sending countries may continue to measure the potential costs of their policies vis-a-vis responses from host states, they can explore possibilities for action within this generally asymmetrical structure as the dynamic of the bilateral relationship evolves, particularly in a context of economic or regional integration."* (Délano, 2009:807).

My research contributes to the work undertaken by a limited number of scholars that have analyzed migration policy from sub-Saharan African sending countries (for example Appleyard, 1998; Adepujo et al., 2008). While migration studies have largely analyzed aspirations of migrants (Carling and Schewel, 2018), it remains un-explored what motivates policy-makers in this field. One should therefore both look at the "capabilities" as well as the "aspirations" of the sending state (de Haas and Vezzoli, 2011). Hence, before asserting the "failure" of emigration policies, we need to close the "sending-country gap" (de Haas, 2012) in migration policy research.

Few scholars underline the lack of attention of African policymakers to migration issues, both when it comes to policies and research. Where theorists have covered the nexus between migration and development, they have often neglected the information on south-south and particularly intra-regional migration, amongst other due to lack of access to acurrate datasets. Many scholars, on the other hand, criticize policymakers in northern countries of influencing research, which hampers proper analysis and instead reflects donor interests (Scalettaris, 2007; Bakewell, 2008a). Scholars have underlined that research has been trapped in north-south policy categories and concerns, which has *"tended to reproduce and justify northern preoccupations"* (de Haas, 2012) thus producing a "*sedentary bias*" (Bakewell, 2008a). *"International migration literature tends to underplay the fact that most migration remains within the global South*" (De Haan, 2013). Instead of looking at intra-African flows, research has been dominated by northern preoccupations such as trafficking, smuggling and illegal

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[3] The Global Migration Governance research project (Betts, 2011) has underlined the emerging formal and informal mechanisms through which Europe is increasingly structuring the norms and practices of migration policy in Sub-Saharan Africa. While the Global Migration Governance is based on comparative research in three Sub-Saharan African regions: SADC (Southern African Development Community), EAC (East African Community) and IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development), this thesis will look at the missing region of West Africa.

migration to Europe (de Haas, 2012). Hein de Haas has even come to term the reasons for further European securitization and closing of borders as being based on a "*Myth of Invasion*" (de Haas, 2008). Chimni (2009) also suggests that the rise of refugee studies was caused by the concerns of western states related to the increasing refugee flows from the global south.

This biased focus has meant that the information both theoretically and empirically on managed migration's effect on development may not capture the whole picture. Indeed, the relationship between intra-regional migration and development remains understudied. This is in spite of the fact that some studies suggest that intra-regional migration may have a greater impact on poverty reduction and equality than intercontinental migration. Since intra-regional migration is more accessible for the poor - the most affected by the migration divide - even small increases in income can have significant impacts on their human development and that of their family (Wouterse, 2008),

1.3 Focusing on poor landlocked countries; the most affected by the migration divide

We have limited empirical knowledge of how policies can best be used by sending states as a tool for poverty alleviation, human capital development and labor market integration, especially in the case of countries with intra-regional migration. Africans only account for about 10% of the foreign-born in countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), less than any other region in the world (UNDESA, 2013a). However, Africans are among the most mobile people on earth, mainly migrating within the African sub-regions. In that regard, it is crucial to gather new information about intra-regional migration management in Africa, as well as about the current elaboration of policies and incorporation of migration in National Poverty Reduction Strategies across Africa. While an increasing number of scholars are looking at south-south migration flows, knowledge is very limited regarding regional integration processes and of how a south-south sending country perceives the opportunities and challenges presented by migration. More importantly, for some of the world's poorest countries - that are landlocked high-emigration countries with mainly intra-regional migration - limited information is available as to how they attempt to leverage migration for development.

The countries most affected by this migration divide are the poorest African countries, with migration flows mainly limited to cross-border flows. "Divided we stand" (OECD, 2011), both within and between countries, and migration is a key strategy for income diversification in the least developed and poorest countries in the world with "*broken social elevators*" (OECD, 2018). However, even though Burkina Faso has the highest bilateral flows on the African continent to Cote d'Ivoire - followed by Zimbabwe-South Africa and Mozambique-South Africa (UNDESA, 2013a) - only few international policy studies have focused on this country[4] (mainly Wouterse, 2008 and Broekhuis, 2007). Similar characteristics describe neighboring landlocked Niger– with migration to Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal. Similarly, migrants from Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Mozambique mainly migrate to South Africa and Botswana. At a global level, comparative south-south migration countries are Paraguay and Bolivia in Latin America - with Argentina a key destination - and Nicaragua with migration to

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[4] Beyond the fact that countries with intra-regional migration get less international attention, this can to some extent also be attributed to the linguistic divide between the Francophone and Anglophone, which has "*traditionally obstructed African migration research*" (Berriane and de Haas, 2012; 5).

Costa Rica, as well as Honduras with migration to Mexico. In Asia, such characteristics include Indonesians that migrate to Myanmar, and Myanmar with migration mainly to Thailand.

Much like Cape Verde - which has the highest emigration rates in Africa – Burkina Faso is a country "*moulded by migration*" (Carling & Åkesson, 2009: 123). Burkina Faso is a low-income landlocked sub-Saharan country with few natural resources, a harsh climate and political instability. With high poverty rates and low human development indicators, migration is – and always has been - a key livelihood strategy in Burkina Faso (Somé, 1991; Ratha et al, 2011). The World Bank data bank indicators show that Burkina Faso has a rapidly increasing population of 19 million – of which almost half are below the age of 15 - and almost half live in extreme poverty, with high youth unemployment and lack of income generating opportunities nationally. While the population has doubled over the last decades, migrants have more than tripled, for example from 3.9% to 6.4% of the population in the decade between 1990 and 2010 (UNDESA, 2008). For most households, migration is thus a primary strategy and almost 10% of its population lives abroad (UNDESA, 2013a).

With high cross-border migration flows Burkina Faso does not stand out in an African context, since in Africa 80% of south-south migration occurs between countries with a common border (Ratha and Shaw, 2007). When using a combination of World Bank and OECD datasets, one can conclude that Burkina Faso nonetheless has the highest bilateral migration flows on the African continent towards neighboring Cote d'Ivoire. Burkina Faso is also an interesting case since it is both one of the key migrant sending and receiving countries in Africa. This is linked to the migration pattern from Burkina Faso to Côte d'Ivoire (and back). The migration inflow to Burkina Faso is, to a large extent, due to the high numbers of returning/expelled Burkinabe from Côte d'Ivoire. The numbers of the Burkinabe in the world are not that impressive, however most European countries today have a small Burkinabe diaspora (UNDESA, 2013a). Intercontinental migration from Burkina Faso hence includes a largely diversified number of destinations, which is quite the opposite to neighboring Mali and Senegal where the absolute majority of migrants that leave Africa go to France. However, mobility outside Africa merely represents a small share of the overall migration, which is mainly intra-African.

Burkina Faso nonetheless represents an interesting case of migration management. In the following analysis, we will show that Burkinabe migrants have found themselves in between "high" and "low" politics of migration since Independence in 1960. Burkina Faso was one of

the first sub-Saharan African states to pursue a proactive policy on labor mobility in order to ensure the link between migration and development (RGPH, 2009). Being a poor country with few natural resources and low human development, migration was indeed "high politics" (Hollifield, 2007) following independence from France in 1960. The attempts to manage migration were mainly based on the export of cheap labor to Côte d'Ivoire. Burkina Faso (called Upper Volta until 1984) tried to regulate labor mobility by bilateral conventions with Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, and Gabon (RGPH, 2009). Nonetheless, most conventions, treaties and agreements were not ratified by national parliaments or translated into national laws in the neighboring African countries (Soulama, 2005).

When comparing the policy scenario in Burkina Faso to the global trends of perceptions on the link between migration and development, one can underline several policy similarities in keeping with developmentalist optimism in the 1950s and 1960s, and a general change to neo-Marxist pessimism during the 1970s and 1980s (de Haas, 2010a). With a developmentalist optimism in the 1950s and 1960s, Burkina Faso pursued a proactive policy on labor mobility based on the export of cheap labor to Côte d'Ivoire after independence (RGPH, 2009). Similarly, the authoritarian governments of Japan, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Yugoslavia encouraged migration for economic reasons through institutionalizing emigration and negotiating recruitment agreements with destination countries (Cannistraro and Rosoli 1979; Schierup 1995; OECD 1986). Similar efforts of managing migration spurred in the Philippines during the same period (Martin et al, 2004). This trend was substituted by a general change to pessimism in regard to the efficiency of emigration policies and towards neo-Marxism during the 1970s and 1980s (de Haas, 2010). The Mexican federal government, for example, adopted a "policy of no policy" in 1974 after it had failed to regulate emigration for most of the twentieth century (Fitzgerald, 2006).

In the case of Burkina Faso, the efforts on bilateral agreements showed to be unsuccessful - with several neighboring countries not abiding by the regional conventions - and Burkina Faso instead applied what has been termed as an "anti-migration policy" in 1980 (Broekhuis, 2007). This reflected a global trend of governments around the world attempting to control emigration through a large set of incentives (Lowell and Findlay, 2001; IOM, 2003). In that period, authoritarian states used instruments such as registration and passport requirements to prevent or control exit, such as in the former Soviet Union (Matthews 1993). As a result of the poor treatment of Burkinabe migrants, amongst other through the abuse of labor rights, the Military

Committee of Recovery for National Progress (CMRPN) adopted a Decree on 11 March 1981 imposing exit visas, including to Côte d'Ivoire (Wilkins, 1989; RGPH, 2009). This was coupled by countermeasures for the retention of potential migrants through political incentives by the development of the Volta valleys in the early 1970s. Migration was thus also high on the political agenda in the 1980s and during the presidency of Thomas Sankara. For Thomas Sankara, who was a Marxist and an iconic former Burkinabe president from 1984 until his assassination in 1987, poverty was essentially a consequence of two factors: the state system and bureaucracy brought by the French, and the forced-labor phenomenon which he perceived as draining the country's work-force to Côte d'Ivoire and other more prosperous nations (Wilkins, 1989). Similar to other countries around the world, Burkina Faso therefore applied the so-called "anti-migration policy" in 1980 (Broekhuis, 2007).

This trend of trying to control emigration ended in Burkina Faso - as well as in many other countries around the world - in 1989, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent liberalization of emigration from the socialist world. After this so-called "exit revolution"[5] (Zolberg, 2007; 55), Aristide Zolberg instead outlined immigration policies as barriers to movement as one of the major topics for *'migration in a changing world'* (Zolberg, 1989). For example, the agenda of Cote d'Ivoire (which has throughout time been the main destination country for Burkinabe migrants), presents a classic focus on control, security, and incorporation from a receiving state perspective. Controlling immigration has been "high politics" since the economic downfall and the death of Ivorian President Houphouet-Boigny in 1993. Emigration policies, on the other hand, shifted focus toward supporting the development effects of migration.

In 2001, similarities to global trends stopped. Despite the resurgence of optimism in the international community regarding the benefits of migration on development, there were few actual policy measures in Burkina Faso to support this endeavor. The approach to international migration can rather be characterized as "laissez faire" (Broekhuis, 2007) during the rule of Blaise Compaore which lasted from 1987 until the uprisings in late October 2014. Even though Burkinabe migrants are increasingly reaching new destinations (RGPH, 2009), the relationship with Côte d'Ivoire influenced policy initiatives during the last decade and has – amongst others

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[5] However, it should be noted that in 2011 permissions to exit a country were still necessary in authoritarian states such as Afghanistan, Burma, China, Cuba, Israel, Jordan, North Korea, Saudi Arabia and Turkmenistan.

– created a delay in placing international migration on the development agenda (Broekhuis, 2007). During the past decade, the development benefits of migration have mainly been associated with remittances and diaspora involvement (de Haas, 2012), but there has been little progress on these issues in Burkina Faso; in fact, remittances have declined since 2000. Additionally, the UN database on International migration policies (UNDESA, 2013b) shows how sub-Saharan African migration policies are among the least developed in the world, for example far behind the Colombo Process countries[6] which are proactively using migration policies as a means to compete in the global political economy.

Currently, Burkina Faso as well as 15 other sub-Saharan African countries (nine of which are West African) are abiding by the global trend that the elaboration of migration policies is the silver bullet to ensure the link between migration and development. Diaspora policies have previously been developed in Burkina Faso, similar to efforts undertaken in other African countries (de Wenden, 2011). This includes dual citizenship and the right to vote in an attempt to encourage remittances and diaspora investments. My case therefore sheds light on the current trend towards the formulation of such policies across African countries. My research started in Burkina Faso in 2009, when only one West African country – Cape Verde – had a migration policy. In 2014, countries developing migration policies across Africa included:

- Benin[7];
- Burkina Faso[8];
- Côte d'Ivoire[9];
- Ghana[10];
- Guinea[11];
- Kenya[12];
- Lesotho[13];
- Liberia[14];

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[6] Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam
[7] confirmed by Blandine Wetohossou from Benin Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interview 1
[8] confirmed by Viviane Zoure from Burkina Faso Ministry of Foreign Affairs Interview 2
[9] confirmed by Siaka Kone from Cote d'Ivoire Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interview 11
[10] confirmed by Adam Osman from Ghana Immigration Service, Interview 16
[11] confirmed by Raynato Bangoura from Guinea Ministry of International Cooperation, Interview 18
[12] confirmed by Gervais Appaye Director of International Organization for Migration (IOM), Interview 41
[13] confirmed by Gervais Appaye Director of International Organization for Migration (IOM), Interview 41
[14] confirmed by Peter K. Nango from Liberia's Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, Interview 19

- Libya[15];
- Mali[16];
- Niger[17];
- Nigeria[18];
- Senegal[19];
- South Africa[20];
- Tanzania[21];
- Uganda[22];
- Zimbabwe[23];

And two regional policies:

- ECOWAS[24];
- SADC[25];

This thesis contains the following claims: The majority of sub-Saharan African migrants stay within their own sub-region; however, the principle efforts to leverage the resource of migration for development are being made in a south-north context. Such attempts towards poverty reduction and development are unlikely to meet significant success. Migration and development must be seen as an integrated part of global power, wealth, and inequality (Castles, 2009). This amongst other implies analyzing migration as a result and not a cause of social transformation, while placing research on migration in a broader context of societal change. The following section underlines this theoretical approach, arguing that the lack of intra-African migration management enhances the current migration divide. I additionally pay attention to policy making in the sending countries, arguing that the so-called "nexus" between migration and development requires structures in place to support migrant agency.

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[15] confirmed by Michael Newson from the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Interview 40
[16] confirmed by Abdoulaye Konate from the Mali Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interview 20
[17] confirmed by Moussa Sidikou Gade from the NGO EPAD in Niger, Interview 24
[18] confirmed by Abdoulaziz Dankano from the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interview 25
[19] confirmed by Papa Damba Fall from the University of Senghor in Dakar, Interview 30
[20] confirmed by Gervais Appaye Director of International Organization for Migration (IOM), Interview 41
[21] confirmed by Gervais Appaye Director of International Organization for Migration (IOM), Interview 41
[22] confirmed by Gervais Appaye Director of International Organization for Migration (IOM), Interview 41
[23] confirmed by Gervais Appaye Director of International Organization for Migration (IOM), Interview 41
[24] confirmed by respectively Sanoh N'Fally from ECOWAS, Interview 12
[25] confirmed by Ali Mansour former Chair of the Global Forum on Migration and Development in Africa, Interview 21

2. Reexamining the nexus between migration and development

During the past decade, there has been a resurgence of optimism over the benefits of migration for development, or the so-called "migration and development nexus" (Nyberg-Sorensen, Van Hear, and Engberg-Pedersen, 2002). Numerous scholars have even referred to migration a win-win-win scenario for development, since it supposedly benefits both the individual as well as the receiving and sending states.

However, while we seem to live in an "age of migration" (Castles and Miller, 2009), countries have increasingly been closing their borders to poor migrants from poor countries. This has led to inacceptable amounts of deaths by young hopeful Africans attempting to reach Europe "illegally", such as Yaguine Koïta and Fodé Tounkara, the two Guinean boys of 14 and 15 years old that in 1999 jumped onboard a plane by the landing wheels before take-off from Guinea to Belgium (Humanité, 1999).

Carens (1987) underlines that every argument for movement within the state also applies to situations beyond borders. Christopher Bertram (2011), in that regard, underlines that the poor who lack valuable skills are those whom rich states have no right to exclude, which according to Arash Abizadeh would imply open borders (Abizadeh, 2006). Neoliberal economists are also generally in favor of relaxing restrictions on immigration, since the liberalized movement of workers could increase world GDP and lead to a more equitable distribution of wealth (Clemens, 2011; Rodrik, 2005; Pritchett, 2006; Tabarrok, 2006). Sending country initiatives for equal access to migration have nonetheless been largely overlooked. While this predicament has mainly been studies from the receiving state perspective, the focus of this thesis is instead on the limited access order that has led to unequal access to migration for people from an African sending country. Migration will therefore be analyzed both through the capability approach by Sen (1999), while looking at 'habitus' or forms of domination and 'capital' introduced by Bourdieu (1984; 1991). When theoretically combining agency and structure, the role of states in facilitating access to opportunities becomes important.

To answer whether migration leads to development, one needs to examine to what extent people are able to exercise agency and improve their life conditions through migration. Growing global inequality, rising unemployment rates, and the increasing gap between poor and rich means that 'Divided we stand' (OECD, 2011; OECD, 2018). In light of such

increasing inequalities, a focus on inclusive growth means looking at societal structures to understand forms of domination and constraints to social mobility – or to 'move beyond the migration divide'.

Should we be optimistic about the role of migration as agency and as a means to addressing (or escaping) structural constraints? Mobility and migration have always been an intrinsic part of human capital development, and migration can be considered as a capability-enhancing act in it-self, in the search for better or more secure livelihoods (de Haan, 1999; Ellis, 2000). In 2009, the Human Development Report on 'Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development' applied Sen's capability approach as a lens to understand migration. Movement is *"one of the basic actions that individuals can choose to take in order to realize life plans"* (UNDP, 2009; 15). This is deemed to be a part of freedom with intrinsic value, as well as potential instrumental value. In that regard, Martha Nussbaum (2000) argues that mobility is one of a set of basic functional capabilities that can be used to assess the effective freedom that individuals have to carry out their life plans.

Optimists that believe migration leads to less inequality are mainly neo-classical and developmentalists. They argue that the mobility of people from labor-scarce areas to productive areas both enhances the human and economic capital of the migrant, but also benefits the economy as a whole. Development benefits are mainly underlined through human development acquired during migration and remittances flows (UNDP, 2009). Neoliberal economists are also generally in favor of reducing restrictions on mobility, since the liberalized movement of workers could increase world GDP and lead to a more equitable distribution of wealth (Pritchett, 2006; Tabarrok, 2006; Clemens, 2011). This would mainly be achieved through an income increase for migrants as well as an increase of remittances. The gains to the global economy are in the order of 100% of GDP – running from 50-150% depending on the skill-sets of migrants (Iregui, 2005; Clemens, 2011). Hence, from this perspective labor mobility has both benefited receiving and sending countries by facilitating labor market integration and thereby closing skills gaps in national labor markets.

Indeed, recent empirical literature shows that most migration, whether domestic or international, leads to higher incomes for the migrants, better access to education and health, and improved prospects for migrants' children (UNDP, 2009). Studies have proven the positive

labor market effects of migration, especially from international migration. Migration surveys conducted in Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Senegal in 2009 show that migration facilitated social mobility from self-employment (often in farming) to wage employment (Shimeles, 2010). In Senegal, for example, the shift in labor market status was significant for students migrating. Furthermore, migration provides opportunities for demographic transition and increased labor market participation, both for those migrating and for those left behind. When men migrate, women have new decision-making responsibilities; this has opened up opportunities for women in countries such as Lesotho, with increased female representation in the workforce (Crush et al, 2010).

Receiving states benefit from the inflow of a young workforce facilitating labor market integration and closing skills gaps in national labor markets. This is also the case for receiving countries within Africa, such as South Africa, which benefit from the inflow of mainly male workers from neighboring Zimbabwe and Mozambique for its mines, as well as all other categories of migrants to its numerous growing industries. In Côte d'Ivoire labor gaps were filled in industry and agriculture (such as the coffee and cocoa industry) by migrants from neighboring countries including Benin, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Togo, which enabled export-led growth.

It is also argued that sending states benefit from counter flows of knowledge (possibly through return) and economic growth. Modeling the consequences of emigration has mainly treated the effects of emigration on aggregate and per capita output on income and welfare of those left behind (Grubel and Scott, 1977). The New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) and the Social Accounting Matric (SAM) were, for example, among the first to attempt to capture the effects of remittances on source regions (Stark and Lucas, 1988; Adelman et al, 1988). Landlocked sending countries have also reaped benefits through reduction of unemployment and poverty as well as through increased human development investment by those left behind, mainly through incoming remittances (World Bank, 2008).

From the perspective of the gains of the sending state, 'migration and development' has been introduced to policy agendas of the international community since 2001. Remittances and the benefits of diaspora have moved to the top of the policy agendas of organizations and

development agencies[26]. The theoretical literature connecting migration to development also tends to focus on this perspective through looking at three main aspects: remittances, diaspora and skilled migration, or the so-called brain drain (Skeldon, 2010). However, it should be duly noted that at the same time controlling migration has been "high politics" in receiving countries for decades (Freeman, 1998; Weil, 1998, Hollifield, 2007).

Hence, there is also reason to be pessimistic: The negative consequences of emigration are usually measured in terms of skills shortages (brain drain) (Mazrui, 2002), and psychosocial effects of persons left behind, while remittances are perceived as reinforcing income inequality in origin countries. This view corresponds well with the views shared by theoretical "structuralist" of social theory, neo-Marxists, and believers in dependency and World Systems Theory (Frank, 1966; 1969; Wallerstein, 1974; 1980). The cumulative causation theory elaborated by Myrdal (1957) for example suggests that migration is depriving poor countries of their scarce resources. Furthemore, there is a differentiation between migrants with the human, social and financial capital needed to benefit from legal international migration and the poorer migrants who lack legal status and often remain marginaziled and easily exploited (Castles, 2012). Data suggests that inequality prevails with regard to the selection of desirable high-skilled migrants as opposed to "undesirable" ones in the global north (Pécoud and de Guchteneire, 2007; 9). While restrictions on mobility for poor Africans have increased, elites and high-skilled Africans are encouraged to leave to join the global north. Skilled migrants with a tertiary education thus have more opportunities for migration, which often leads to so-called brain drain. One in every nine Africans holding a university qualification resides in an OECD country (UNDESA, 2013a). Richer households are also more likely to have a family member who is an international migrant.

Wealthier people, households and societies are therefore generally more mobile than poorer people and societies. People of developed countries migrate more than those that do not have the financial, social, and human capital required to embark on a journey towards improving their life conditions. Emigration rates as a share of population are about 2.1% in low-income countries and 3.6% in high-income countries (Bakewell, 2008a and 2009), and international migrants are twice as likely to come from countries with high living standards as from those

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[26] Such as the European Union (EU), the United Nations as well as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Labor Organization (ILO), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and more recently the African Development Bank (AfDB).

with lower living standards (UNDP, 2009). International migrants do not come from poor, isolated places disconnected from the world, but rather from regions and nation that undergo rapid change as a result of their incorporation into global trade, as well as information and production networks (Massey, 2009). Data shows a large effect of per capita GDP on the capacity to migrate, especially to more distant destinations, which introduces a threshold effect (UNDP, 2009; Shaw, 2007; Shimeles, 2010). An increasing number of people from middle-income countries thus have the resources to migrate to Europe and other OECD countries, whereas only a limited few from low-income countries in Africa have the means to do this.

As mentioned, the concept of a "migration divide" was initially introduced in order to explain the increasing difficulty for the average African to migrate outside the continent (Carling and Åkesson, 2009). Indeed, the large majority of Africans migrate within their sub-region or within the continent (Ratha et al, 2011). In fact, Africans only account for about 10% of the foreign-born in countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), less than any other region in the world (UNDESA, 2013a). Intercontinental migration is thus a resource and a strategy for the wealthiest and most powerful sections of the African population. Intercontinental migration requires more social and economic resources and yields greater increases in income and livelihood security than intra-African migration, and thus tends to exacerbate household inequalities (Wouterse, 2006, de Haas, 2009). Households receiving remittances from outside Africa were already wealthy relative to the general population before their family members migrated (Hampshire, 2002; Black, Natali and Skinner, 2005; Ratha et al, 2011). Shimeles (2010) has stated that migration could increase continental levels of inequality and exacerbate differences in GDP per capita if migration has a net welfare gain to countries of origin. In Africa preferential access to migration is likely to reinforce structural inequalities between rich and poor (De Haas, 2012).

Should we then be optimists or pessimists? The opposition between pessimist and optimistic views of the benefits of migration on development is challenged by three main issues:

First, the heterogeneity of migration impacts (de Haas, 2010a): Research on migration has been criticized for producing a *"tremendous amount of empirical knowledge"* (Bommes and Morowska, 2005; 2) while applying an eclectic approach when it comes to theory (Brettel and Hollifield, 2008). Apart from the large amount of empirical knowledge on migration and the diversity of research methods, research on the impact of migration is also *"complicated by*

technical questions regarding selectivity of migrants and distinguishing cause and effect" (De Haan, 2013; 4). Push/pull theories of migration solely based on individual measures have theorized about benefits of equaling out in the open migration market, however the difficulty is that such a simple analysis overlooks numerous factors that influence migration, such as historical relations, family and community dynamics, policies in place as well as capital and so forth. Hence, while it is important to outline the factors that determine *why* people migrate, it is equally important to determine *who migrates* and *where to*. One also needs to look at the *consequences* of migration and analyze the *conditions* and current constraints as well as benefits for the migrants and the sending and receiving communities.

Secondly, the so-called 'structure-agency impasse': "*If we are to make progress in understanding the relationship between migration and social change, it is essential to find a way round the structure agency impasse that blocks our way*" (Bakewell, 2010: 1705), underlines Oliver Bakewell in his attempt to sum up how structure versus agency has been integrated in theories on migration. This means bringing the state back in and moving beyond the large amount of literature that solely focus on either the drivers of migration or the development benefits from migration. In this contradictory "age of migration" with increasing flows versus rising restrictions to mobility - especially for the poor - understanding migration processes *"involves moving out from the individual to the wider and interconnected sets of circumstances within which an individual agent is located"* (O'Reilly, 2013; 2). Castles argues that: "*It is in any case vital to investigate the human agency of migrants and of sending and receiving communities, and the way this agenda interacts with macro-social organizations and institutions. …. This is crucial to the advancement of migration studies and to its emancipation from the methodological nationalism of the past*" (Castles, 2012; 31). Castles and Miller (2009) also advocate a research agenda where interdisciplinary research examines the role of structures and actions combined with agents and decision-making processes. "*In effect, a danger lies in trying to make the migration tail wag the development dog.*" (Skeldon, 2010; 156). In the following chapter, we will further analyze theoretical and methodological considerations of the current migration divide while attempting to address the structure-agency impasse.

Thirdly, the definition of respectively migration and development: The nexus on migration and development changes depending on how you define respectively 'migration' and 'development', whether it's methodologically individualistic, nationalistic or covers a broader

range of development indicators. Both "migration" and "development" are not straightforward concepts to define. The debate on "migration and development" is now simultaneously a category of social and political *practice* and *analysis* (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000; 4). The concepts have changed during this journey from academia to policy (Van Hear, 2012), as the thinking is translated and modified along the way. The *"buzz"* on migration and development (Brønden, 2012) has led attention away from understanding the complex interactions between social practice and policies. Oliver Bakewell speaks of a "*sedentary bias*" (2008a) that has confined research to the world of "*intentional development*" (Cowen and Shenton, 1995). African migrants are increasingly being regarded as agents of development; however policymakers still seem principally concerned with enabling people to stay at home (Bakewell, 2008a). So while remittances have become "*the new development mantra,*" (Kapur, 2004) there have been few successful attempts to integrate migration concerns into development policy. Many links between migration and development are indeed contradictory, such as the impact of migration on income and inequality and the contribution of remittances and brain drain (Bakewell 2009). The contribution to development has, in this sense, largely been understood as the return of skilled migrants, co-development and remittances sent to origin countries. This has blocked the understanding of migration as a means to accessing opportunities, improving human rights and security, and developing sustainable livelihoods as underlined in the capability approach development by Amartya Sen (UNDP, 2009). Hence, I have carefully evaluated concepts analytically by taking a step back and looking critically at how concepts are used in both contexts of research and policy.

In the following, I will therefore determine the meaning of each concept as analyzed and used in this thesis in more detail. First, migration can involve movement ranging from short-term or circular mobility to permanent settlement (Skeldon, 2010). In this thesis, migration mainly refers to economic migrants from the global south that cross international borders in the search for development gains or to expand their opportunities and capabilities (Sen, 1999a). Secondly, beyond defining what is meant by migration and migration policy, it was also necessary to define the concept of "development", since the narrow understanding of the process of acquiring social mobility to a large extent determines the analysis. In this thesis, we will consider development as inclusive growth.

2.1 Understanding migration flows in Africa

Research on West African migration has tended to focus on specific "crisis migration" issues, such as trafficking[27], international refugee flows[28] or irregular migration to Europe[29]. This reflects rather Eurocentric policy priorities, since these forms of West African migration are actually relatively small in comparison with intra-regional migration. Despite of increasing international migration, there is a 'myth of invasion' (de Haas, 2008a) regarding African migration to Europe. Africans represent only 10% of immigrants to OECD countries, fewer than any other region of the world; and a large majority of these are North Africans (UNDESA, 2013a). Furthermore, the majority of migration to OECD countries is done by students[30] and workers who enter legally (albeit who might overstay their residency rights) (de Haas, 2008a). Indeed, for every 20 migrants who board trains and buses to West African destinations, only one will try to get on a boat to Europe. An estimated 31 million Africans migrate across borders—and at least half migrate within their sub region (Ratha et all, 2011). South-North intercontinental migration is indeed limited to the wealthier countries and people in Africa. In the following we will try to narrow down who migrates, why and where to.

Before diving into the analysis of existing data it should be noted that data collection on migration is a challenge, especially in a south-south context. Official statistics are unreliable or inaccurate, including those from some OECD countries. Since 2000, only 15 African countries have gathered data on migration through national census on immigrants. 24 countries

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[27] Trafficking both to intra-regional and extra-regional destinations is another issue of forced migration that is gaining more policy attention, particularly in EU-Africa cooperation. The plantations of Côte d'Ivoire are destinations for numerous trafficked children from neighboring countries, while women and girls are also being trafficked to European destinations from, amongst others, what has been called the "triangle of shame" on the Niger/Chad/Nigeria border (Robin and Ndiaye, 2010).

[28] Among the main refugee-creating situations have been: The Biafra war in Nigeria 1967-1970, the political isolation of opponents to the Sékou Touré regime in Guinea, the liberation war in Guinea Bissau 1963-1973, border tensions between Mauritania and Senegal in 1989, the Chadian crisis 1982-1990 (note that refugees also arrive from outside the sub-region), the Touareg conflict in Mali and Niger from 1990 till 1997, Mano-river conflicts 1989-2000 (Liberia and Sierra Leone etc.), Côte d'Ivoire from 2002 and, recently, Sudan See an exhaustive listing of conflicts and refugee flows in "Les migrations forcées en Afrique de l'Ouest". (Kotoudi, 2004). Today's refugee-producing crises of West Africa are mainly in Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Togo, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Mauritania and Senegal.

[29] Since 2000, West Africans have become the largest category of irregular boat migrants from Northern Africa (de Haas, 2008a), and these migrants have had much media and political attention.

[30] Student migration is not only directed towards other continents, particularly Europe and the US, but also increasingly within the African continent, to South Africa and Morocco for example. Francophone West Africans such as Ivoirians, Senegalese and Guineans are now among the main West African student migrants moving to the US (Fall, 2007), while Nigeria, Senegal and Ghana remain the main West African sending countries to Europe (de Haas, 2008a).

only have data from the 1990's, while 10 countries have no data (Ratha, 2011). Seasonal and transit migration are often not captured by official statistics. Inadequate data on labor emigration, flows and stocks of refugees; return migrants and consequences of emigration thus hinder the accurate and objective formulation of policies. *"Existing statistics on international labour migration in the sub-region are generally agreed to be scarce, unreliable and subject to problems of comparability and availability.*" (Ba, 2006; 1)

We do know, however, that high demographic growth combined with rising youth unemployment makes migration a key livelihood strategy for many Africans. Demographics and labor market gaps, or youth unemployment, are among the most important factors leading to migration (Hatton and Williamson, 2001; Shimeles, 2010). A rising number of African youth are educated but at the same time unemployed or underemployed; a phenomenon exacerbated by a mismatch between needs of the labor market and skills produced by the education sector. This factor also makes them increasingly mobile. Recent research has assessed the relative weight of different drivers of migration, finding that push-factors (mainly economic) are predominant (King and Skeldon, 2010; Government Office for Science, 2011). Migrants from developing countries are mainly aged 18 to 29, searching for job opportunities (Dodson et al., 2008). A growing number of these migrants are women, who now make up nearly half (45.9%) of African migrant workers (Adepoju, 2006; Ally and MRI, 2006; Klein, 2006; UNDESA, 2013a). In 2010, 15 to 34-year olds accounted for 42.6% of all international migrants in the least developed countries, compared to 29.1% in developed countries (UNDESA, 2011), and Africa generally has the world's lowest median age of migrants (29.9 years) (UNDESA, 2013a).

Figure 1 - Percentage of international migrants by age and development group

*Source***:** UNDESA 2011.

It is important to notice that Africa has experienced average growth of more than 5% over the past decade; however, this is not necessarily enough considering the simultaneous demographic growth. Africa's population is the youngest in the world. 62% of Africans (more than 600 million people) are below the age of 25 and constitute a growth opportunity as they enter their productive years. In 2011, the 10 countries with the youngest populations were all in Africa and by 2040 African countries will have the world's largest workforce surpassing those of China and India. With Africa's current population of 1 billion people, and a projected population of 2.3 billion by 2050, its greatest asset (or potential liability) in the coming decade will be its reservoir of human capital. The *African Economic Outlook* highlights jobless growth as a result of high demographic growth (AfDB, 2012). The *Africa Competitiveness Report* underlines the importance of regional integration in diversifying African economies to absorb the 10 million new entrants to the labor force every year (WEF, 2013).

This situation is particularly dramatic in West Africa. No region in the world has ever experienced demographic growth of the kind that West Africa has, increasing from 40 million inhabitants in 1940 to almost 300 million in 2005 (OECD/SWAC, 2006b). While it is projected that worldwide the proportion of young people under 15 will fall from 28 percent to 20 percent from 2005 till 2050 (OECD/SWAC, 2006b), in West Africa the proportion of young people is on the contrary expected to increase to 29 percent of the population in 2050, or 200 million young people in 2020 (equivalent to the entire West African population in 1990) (OECD/SWAC, 2006b). According to UN projections, Niger will count 50 million inhabitants in 2050 against the 12 million in 2004. The population of both Mali and Burkina Faso will respectively be around 40 million in 2050, against the 13 million in 2004, and Côte d'Ivoire's population will rise from 18 million to 34 million (OECD/SWAC, 2006b). Today, 29 percent of the Sub-Saharan African population lives in West Africa, with only 14 percent of the continents' GNP being produced by ECOWAS countries (IED, 2005). While the population will further increase to an estimated half billion people in 2040 – of whom a large part will be young – nothing indicates that the economy will grow at the same pace[31] (OECD/SWAC, 2006b). Cote d'Ivoire will, for example, in the future not be able to absorb the majority of

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[31] In a country such as Mali, where the population will rise by 40 percent, the Millennium Development Goals will be difficult to achieve. In order to reach the MDGs in 2015, regional growth should be at 7 percent annually, while it currently only amounts to 4 percent. West Africa additionally only accounts for 0.3 percent of the total foreign direct investment (FDI), and accounts for less than 1 percent of the total world trade. Public development aid remains modest in the region, at only 5 percent of regional GNP in 2001. However, the dependency on world markets is very elevated compared to other regions, at 40 percent of regional GNP. (OECD/SWAC 2006b)

Burkinabe migrants, which is the main bilateral migration corridor on the African continent. The West African population will mainly be a non-agricultural population, with up to 60 percent urbanization in 2020/25 and secondary cities will thus become increasingly bigger (OECD/SWAC, 2006b). Subsequently, the mobility patterns of the region have changed and will change radically[32].

Figure 2 - Africa on the demographic upswing

Source: UN, World Population Prospects. The 2008 Revision

Migration is also increasingly a resilience strategy against poverty, food shortage, climate change, natural disasters, and war[33]. By diversifying income, migration can serve as an insurance policy or a risk reduction strategy for the African household (Stark and Taylor, 1991; Taylor, 1999; Bensaad, 2005; Quinn, 2006; Khachani, 2008). Natural resource scarcity, environmental degradation, and climate change are increasingly determining migration flows (Hatton and Williamson, 2001; Stern, 2006). In the preliminary stages of famine, households may relocate some family members or undertake temporary migration to rural areas to enable

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[32] Cotton, coffee and cocoa will plausibly still be among the major agriculture activities. Petroleum exports should, however, increasingly attract migrants to destinations such as Chad, Mauritania, Mali, Niger and (possibly) Burkina Faso. New industries in the sub-region might start attracting skilled labor: Tourism has increased in Gambia and Senegal (OECD/SWAC, 2006b). Another trend is long-distance services, or what one might refer to as cheap outsourced back-office support, with ICT services or "hot lines" already existing in Senegal and Cape Verde (this has been an increasing phenomenon in North Africa for European companies during several years) (OECD/SWAC, 2006b).

[33] Violence of inter-ethnic conflicts, civil wars and humanitarian crises in Africa (in Sudan, Sierra Leone, the Great Lakes regions, Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Sudanese Darfur etc.) are considered as a key "push" factor for migration but to a lesser extent than economic and environmental factors (Naudé, 2010). Over 50% of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) worldwide are in Africa, due to the escalation of civil war and conflicts between 1990 and 2011 Even though South Africa has since 2008 been the recipient of the highest number of asylum applications worldwide, there has been a continuous decline in the number of refugees and asylum seekers in Africa (Ratha and Shaw, 2007). This chapter does not cover refugees, which are governed by different legislation than the ones governing labor migrants.

income diversification. In the Sahel region, environmental drivers of population displacements consist of land degradation, desertification, and drought (Myers, 2002; Grote and Warner 2010). Periods of drought and locust attacks continue to produce migrants from the northern Sahel area, as well as other environmental migrants such as for example fishermen from Cape Verde or Casamance in Senegal (Robin and Ndiaye, 2010). In Niger, for example, two-thirds of the respondents to the study "Voices of the poor" (World Bank, 2000) indicated that, as a way to cope with the lack of food, clothing, or income, they left their homes and looked for livelihoods elsewhere. It should be noted that environmental drivers may be associated more with short-term rather than long-term migration (Henry, Schoumaker and Beauchemin, 2004; Lassailly-Jacob et al., 2006). 80% of the male labor force from landlocked countries located in South Sahara (Chad, Mali, and Niger) migrates seasonally to coastal areas during periods of drought (Grote and Warner, 2010).

Figure 3 - Population mobility strategies associated with food insecurity and famine

Source: Hugo 1991, 133.

Although there is a continuity of established migratory patterns, such as pilgrimage trajectories to the Arabian Peninsula and traditional trans-Saharan mobility, there is an overall increase in distances travelled (Bakewell and de Haas, 2007). Several migration theories (such as theories on new economic labor and transnationalism) have shown that former colonial push-pull models cannot grasp the complexity of the current focus on communities, households, and migrant's agency. The young migrants are more connected to the rest of the world (for example via the ongoing development of mobile phone networks, and its role in migration (Robin and Ndiaye, 2010)), while less in touch with the colonial past and former migration patterns. Trends

are therefore changing in terms of migrants' profiles[34], routes taken[35] and destinations chosen[36].

Many skilled migrants from Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, and Senegal migrated to Côte d'Ivoire over the years. During the 1980's and 1990's, high skilled migration continued to spread within West Africa but also to other African destinations (such as South Africa, Libya, and Zimbabwe) not to mention Western Europe and the USA. Over the last thirty years, West Africa has been the most important source of brain drain from Africa (IOM, 2003). This being said, when revising OECD and World Bank statistics, south-north migration to OECD countries still only represents a small minority of migration patterns. South-south migration slightly exceeds south-north migration, since the migration stock in the global south has increased more rapidly during the last decade.

While the general migration trend is towards regionalization, intra-regional migration has largely been overlooked in migration and development policy research. Migration within sub-Saharan Africa for example represents the world's largest south-south movement of people, since 65% of sub-Saharan Africans stay within the continent (UNDESA, 2013a). Most people move to urban areas in their own country, and in that regard Russell King and Ronald Skeldon (2010) underline the unfortunate development of most current research focusing on international south-north migration while internal migration is, in fact, much more prevalent. Nonetheless, internal versus international migration have a different body of literature, concepts, methods, and policy agendas associated to each separate aspect. However, cross-border movements as well as intra-regional mobility patterns have been largely overseen even though most African migrants move within the continent.

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[34] There are new types of intercontinental migrants emerging, not only increasingly female (e.g. nurses from Ghana) and better-educated (e.g. professors from Nigeria, Senegal and Gambia), but also including a larger number of ethnic groups from various countries going to different destinations (OECD/SWAC, 2006b).

[35] New routes (such as through Turkey) and new destinations (such as Argentina) are also continuously emerging. While Libya has been a traditional labor-receiving country (Haas 2008a), Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania have also transformed into a destination (and not only transit) countries; Labor migration has thus already taken on more complex shapes and patterns, including the Marabous of the Sahelian region moving towards big cities such as Abidjan, Accra, Dakar or Freetown etc. The economic crises of port cities in West Africa have furthermore already extended former migration patterns of, for example, the Wodaabe (from Niger) who earlier migrated to Accra or Abidjan, but today continue to Dakar, passing by Freetown (Boesen, 2005). In spite of Guinea's small population size – with its financial and political problems – it represents the most diversified migratory patterns within ECOWAS, with migrants present in most countries (Robin, 1992). Increasingly, migrants thus travel larger distances within the ECOWAS space, and to new destination cities.

[36] North Africa, Europe, America and, recently, Latin America and the Asian markets (mainly Dubai and China)

Figure 4 - West African intra-regional mobility patterns

Source: Atlas on Regional Integration in West Africa; ECOWAS/SWAC

Africans mainly migrate within their immediate sub-region (Ratha et al., 2011). An estimated 80% of south-south migration takes place between countries that share a common border, compared to 20% for south-north migration (Ratha and Shaw, 2007). Africa's main bilateral corridors are Burkina Faso-Cote d'Ivoire (1.6 million), Zimbabwe-South Africa (1.3 million), and Mozambique-South Africa (1.2 million) (Ratha et al., 2011). Regional hubs such as South Africa, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Gabon, and Libya attract a high number of migrant workers. Increasing border controls and financial crises in Europe and North America have also increased migration to African destinations such as Botswana, Morocco, and Namibia (Crush and McDonald, 2002). In West Africa, around 7.5 million migrants move within the sub-region, accounting for up to 86% of total emigration (Gnisci, 2008). Compared to other African sub-regions, West Africa stands out as the most mobile sub-region of Africa.

Figure 5 - Percentage of African migrants moving within their sub region

Source: Ratha et al, 2011.

North Africa is the outlier region in Africa, since 90% of migrants move to countries beyond the continent. Although long-term youth unemployment in North Africa is a social emergency, cross-country opportunities are not fully exploited. Intraregional mobility is limited, and although data on intraregional migration are scarce, it appears that few North Africans migrate to Sub-Saharan Africa. Within North Africa, Egyptians and Tunisians are the dominant migrant populations. Before 2011, 1 million Egyptians and an estimated 95,000 Tunisian workers were officially resident in Libya, many of them unskilled and employed in the informal sector (IOM and AfDB 2012). Libya has been a magnet for migrants, and as part of its pan-African policies it has looked beyond the region to Sub-Saharan Africa to fill labor gaps.

Sub-Saharan Africans are increasingly migrating to North Africa. An estimated 4.5 million of them were living in irregular situations in North Africa (IOM, 2008). Some migrants use the region as a transit point to Europe; tens of thousands try to cross the Mediterranean each year. Some migrants end up staying in migration hubs along the way. In fact, according to de Haas (2005) trans-Saharan migration has caused trade to flourish and has helped revitalize ancient trans-Saharan caravan trade routes and desert oasis towns in Mali (Gao), Niger (Agadez), Chad (Abéché), Libya (Sebha and Kufra), Algeria (Tamanrasset) and Mauritania (Nouadhibou).

Central Africa is the least integrated region on the continent: its basic infrastructure is minimal and there are overlapping memberships in multiple regional organizations. It also has the lowest human development scores in Sub-Saharan Africa. Peace and security is a deep concern; hotbeds of tension and insecurity—the Central African Republic, Chad, and the Democratic Republic of Congo—stimulate cross-border refugee flows and camps. Gabon has traditionally

been the main destination for migrants. Even though a third of the population lives below the poverty line, the World Bank World Development Indicators estimated that nearly 19% of those resident in Gabon (284,127) in 2010 were migrants attracted by oil production; many of the rest were refugees. But oil production, the backbone of Gabon's economy since it gained independence, is declining. Its GDP per capita is still one of the highest in Africa, but its human development indicators are below average for middle-income countries, and unemployment among young people is 30%, much higher than the national average of 16%.

Migration in East Africa is largely affected by forced displacement in Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. UNHRC Operation statistics from 2018 (http://www.unhcr.org/ke/857-statistics.html) show that over the past decade East Africa, especially the Horn, has been plagued by civil wars, cross-border conflicts, social strife, and arms trafficking. In several fragile states, remittances are estimated to exceed 50% of GDP, but the need to tap the large diaspora for skills is underdeveloped. Among concerns for the region are fragility, insecurity, cross-border conflicts, governance challenges and cross-cutting issues related to gender (such as human trafficking), the environment and climate change. Migration and labor mobility pose health and education challenges for migrants. Kenya is a critical hub for mixed migration in the region, by involuntary migrants, economic migrants, and bona fide refugees, particularly from south-central Somalia (DRC, 2016). Kenya hosts the largest refugee population of Somalis (more than half a million) as well as many Ethiopians (http://www.unhcr.org/ke/figures-at-a-glance). It is also a regional hub for smuggling and obtaining false documentation for visas or new identities. Most of its emigration involves educated Kenyans leaving for educational or business opportunities in the EAC, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, North America, and Europe.

South Africa, a major destination for intra-African migration, is the largest net recipient of low-skilled migrants from the Southern Africa: 67% of migrants in South Africa are from its near neighbors (Department of Home Affairs, 2017). World Bank statistics and country reports show that the region is a diverse mix of middle-income, low-income, landlocked, and small island countries—with some hotbeds of political tension, notably Madagascar and Zimbabwe. In Southern Africa the movement of people across borders has long been linked to work in diamond and gold mines and on commercial farms and plantations in South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. South Africa has been a net recipient of labor migrants not only from the countries bordering it but also from the rest of Africa and abroad. According to the 2011 mid-

census estimates, South Africa received 1.4 million labor migrants in 1996–2011 (Statistics South Africa, 2011). The high immigration rates have led to a more restrictive immigration policy and to xenophobia in South Africa.

West Africa, which is the primary focus of this thesis, is the most mobile sub region of Africa. Most migrants from ECOWAS countries stay within West Africa, partly because ECOWAS allows 90-day visa-free travel and partly for historical and cultural reasons, notably precolonial empires and forced migration during colonization. Coastal urban areas continuously attract labor from landlocked rural areas; Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal have been receiving migrant workers from landlocked Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger (Adepoju 2005). The railways connecting Bamako with Dakar and Niger with Abidjan correspond to today's main migration trajectories. Nigerian industries and Ghanaian and Ivorian gold mines also attract workers, about equally from East and Central Africa. The corridor from Burkina Faso to Côte d'Ivoire has the largest bilateral flows in Africa (1.6 million), even after violent conflict and increased discrimination (Ratha and others 2011). In the following we will closer at Burkina Faso's migration profile.

2.2 Burkina Faso's migration profile

Data on migration is scarce in Burkina Faso, which does not have a Migration profile developed by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) [37]. The last census conducted in Burkina Faso was in 2006[38] by the 'Institute National de la Statistique et de la Démographie' and in 2009 they released an analysis of the Results on the theme of migration (PGPH, 2009). I triangulated and verified this data with international data banks, such as the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division 'Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2013 Revision', and from the World Bank[39] and the OECD data source[40]. The below list presents the main reports/studies and data banks used for developing a migration profile on Burkina Faso[41]:

Table 1 - Statistical reports/studies produced by national entities

- **Institut National de la Statistique et de la Démographie (INSD)** • RGPH in 1975, 1985, 1996 and 2006 • 2009, Analysis of the Results of the 2006 RGPH: Theme 8 - Migration R
- **Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Cooperation (MAECR)** • From July 2005 to January 2007, the project "Mobilisation of the Burkina Faso Diaspora and Identification of Priority Needs in Burkina Faso"

Table 2 - Statistical reports/studies produced by international entities

- **International Labour Organization (ILO)** • 2011, The Age and Sex of Migrants • 2010, Contribution of Labour Migration to Development in North and West Africa • 2006, Statistics on Migrant Workers in West Africa • 2003, Study on Migrant Statistics in Burkina Faso • 2003, Issues and Challenges of West African International Labour Migration • Database: ilo.org/global/statistics-and-databases/lang--fr/index.htm
- **United Nations (UN)** • Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division • 2013, Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2013 Revision (United

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[37] https://www.iom.int/migration-profiles

[38] In 1960-61, a demographic sample survey of Upper Volta; in 1972-73, a population movements survey of the Mossi; 1974-75, national migration survey; 1991, INSD Demographic Survey; 1993, Migration Urbanization Survey in West Africa; 2000, national survey on "migration dynamics, urban integration and environment; and finally, in 2006, a population survey with a special theme on migration developed in 2009

[39] http://data.worldbank.org/

[40] http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MIG

[41] This analysis does not attend to refugees and trafficking: Most refugees flee to neighboring countries (OECD/SWAC, 2006a). Africa holds the largest number of refugees in the world; 2.7 million. With ongoing conflicts in the West African sub-region (or what almost became a regional conflict in the 1990s), it is the second largest region of asylum in Africa (after central Africa) with 725,000 refugees in 2004 (OECD/SWAC, 2006a). The plantations of Côte d'Ivoire are destinations for numerous trafficked children from Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. Women and girls are also being trafficked to European destinations from, amongst others, what has been called the "triangle of shame" on the Niger/Chad/Nigeria border (Robin and Ndiaye, 2010).

Nations database, POP/DB/ MIG/Stock/Rev.2013) • United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2013

- **World Bank** • 31 March 2011, Migration and Remittances Household Surveys in Sub-Saharan Africa: Methodological Aspects and Main Findings• 2011, Remittance Markets in Remittance-Receiving Countries: Burkina Faso • Database: http://data.worldbank.org/
- **United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA)** • 2011, International Migration Report 2009: a Global Assessment FT'
- **United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)** • 2010, Study on Youth, Migration and Employment in Burkina Faso E
- **European Union** • 2007, Country Strategy Document and National Indicative Programme for the 2008-2013 Period • June 2006, EU Strategy for Africa: European Commission Directorate General for Development and Relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific States • 1 September 2005, Migration and Development: R 20
- **Migration Policy Institute**, 2000, Burkina Faso 00
- **Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development - OECD.** • DIOC-E database (data source for Burkina Faso: 2006 census). : http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MIG
- **Interactive Map on Migration (i-Map) - International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD).** • Instrument to support intergovernmental dialogue on migration by facilitating access to and exchange of information through country profiles, visualisation and new updates. www.imap-migration.org

This data collection enabled me to compare migration across regions while the above-mentioned statistics also helped me elaborate Burkina Faso's migration profile. I subsequently combined statistical data with literature review in order to understand the history, changes, and directions of flows across the continent and analyze corresponding policies. I gathered specific background information to conduct a comparative analysis and situate the case of Burkina Faso in a broader West African/African and global context; about trends in migration flows, but more importantly in relation to corresponding policies which is where Burkina Faso stands out.

Burkina Faso is one of the poorest countries in the world, and hence the majority of the Burkinabe do not have sufficient resources to access inter-continental migration. Subsequently, Burkina Faso only has a small diaspora outside Africa. While France is the main destination for the Burkinabe that go beyond the African continent, Burkina Faso is only the 50th placed nationality in immigration terms in France, and around 50% of long duration visas are for students (www.senat.fr). This is quite the opposite for neighboring Mali and Senegal, where the absolute majority of inter-continental migrants go to France. The numbers of the Burkinabe in the world are not that impressive, however most European countries today have a small Burkinabe diaspora (UNDESA, 2013a). Beyond France and Italy, which hold more than 10.000

Burkinabe, the stock of Burkinabe migrants is around 1000 people in the key destinations such as Belgium (870), Germany (1662) and Spain (1184) whereas most other countries only welcome hundreds of Burkinabe migrants in total. Official data from receiving countries show a small and steady increase of the inflow of Burkinabe (including asylum seekers) to Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, the US and Canada (www.oecd.stat) as well as to the Gulf States and other Arab countries (www.data.worldbank.org). However, mobility outside Africa merely represents a small share of the overall migration, which is mainly intra-African. Burkina Faso's migration profile is therefore highly linked with West African sub-regional mobility patterns.

Figure 6 - Inflow of foreign population to OECD by nationality, Burkina Faso

Figure 1 - Inflow of foreign population to OECD by nationality, Burkina Faso

Contry	Burkina Faso														
Variable	Inflows of foreign population by nationality														
Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Australia	1	0	2	2	0	0	0	1	0	1	11	..	2	1	0
Austria	4	5	12	10	16	12	6	13	12	12	21	3	13	18	13
Belgium	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	96	75	123	101	183	164	169
Canada	22	38	36	34	97	91	147	136	139	162	186	144	269	322	339
Chile	..	..	..	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
Czech Republic	..	..	..	4	..	..	5	2	1	4	..	11	1	1	1
Denmark	4	5	4	8	4	2	1	1	1	4	5	2	9	4	1
Finland	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	1	0	2	2	0	3	5
France	188	212	261	289	302	338	392	442	406	427	422	430	446	456	514
Germany	0	0	346	264	241	184	157	169	150	165	191	194	239	348	..
Hungary	..	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
Iceland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	..	..
Italy	438	..	507	1310	1417	856	524	410	1334	1105	1255	913	1015	829	519
Japan	..	..	..	..	..	..	47	66	92	77	170	78	111	131	99
Korea	3	1	1	4	2	0	1	3	1	3	1	1	19	2	3
Luxembourg	0	2	2	4	4	0	2	1	1	8	3	4	4	1	3
Mexico	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	1	0	0	2
Netherlands	20	22	24	30	41	29	20	15	12	24	11	23	11	8	14
Norway	0	0	1	2	2	0	3	1	4	3	2	3	2	3	2
Poland	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	7	8	6	4	1	3
Slovenia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	1	1	1	..	..	..	..
Spain	26	44	37	51	140	148	148	168	178	138	99	107	106	86	86
Sweden	1	1	3	6	8	1	5	6	3	4	8	4	12	9	0
Switzerland	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	44	42	51	30	39
Turkey	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	10	..	..	..	
United States	48	68	64	60	103	128	222	238	238	416	377	433	558	585	583

Data extracted on 04 Oct 2016 00:11 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat

With more than 7.5 million people (3%) circulating, sub-regional migration in West Africa is six times more prolific than intra-European mobility (0.5%) (OECD/SWAC, 2006a). Most migrants from ECOWAS countries stay within West Africa, facilitated by ECOWAS allowing 90-day visa-free travel. Historically, West Africa was a sub-region of free movement, with the French joint administrative unit of Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF) gathering the sub-region from 1895 till 1958. Independence altered the traditionally borderless mobility configurations, with more than 15,000 km of internal borders now separating the 15 ECOWAS countries (OECD/SWAC, 2006b). With borders came indigenization measures restricting the participation of "non-nationals" in economic or political activities. These borders nonetheless

often cross large border-spanning ethnic communities that perceive their movements as being within one socio-cultural space rather than between two nations[42] (Afolayan et al., 2009). Migrants thus sometimes consider the West African sub-region as a single cultural and socio-economic unit within which trade and service are intertwined across countries, and where border crossing is a main part of people's lives and livelihoods.

Migration in West Africa is strongly influenced by poverty due to economic and socio-political crises and continues to be associated with the search for wealth, and thus trade (IED, 2005). While specific commercial migration in the sub-region is female-dominated (such as in the case of the illiterate female traders who dominate the Nigeria-Benin-Togo-Côte d'Ivoire-Dakar-Gambia "informal" trade network) (OECD/SWAC, 2006b), general intra-regional migration remains essentially short-term and male-dominated (OECD/SWAC, 2006b).

Coastal urban areas and forest zones continuously attract labor from landlocked rural areas; Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal have been receiving migrant workers from landlocked Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger from the dry Sahelian hinterland (Adepujo, 2005). West Africa is still largely marked by the main contrast between these two zones and the railways connecting Bamako with Dakar and Niger with Abidjan still correspond to today's main migration trajectories. Three commercial West African sub-spaces exist that are progressively becoming interconnected:
- Centre (poles formed by the economies of Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, stretching until Burkina Faso and the east of Mali). This sub-space is structured around cattle commerce and migration of populations.
- East (with Nigeria as the center, including Benin, Cameroun, Niger, and Chad), mainly connected through traditional cross-border merchant networks led by the Haussa, Ibo and Yoruba ethnic groups.
- West (from Guinea to Mauritania, with Senegal at its epicenter) with Islam as a common cultural base and rice commerce connecting the sub-space, organized by the

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[42] These include the 30 million Haussa (of Niger and Nigeria) and 15 million Mandé (across West Africa), while ethnic groups such as the Soninké (of Mauritania, Mali and Senegal), the Mossi (Burkina Faso) and the Dogons (Mali) have traditionally seen short-term migration as a rite of passage, or as an important part of personal development. Additionally, the *iklans* (or slaves) in the Touareg society also still practice traditional circular migration between the Niger river in the Bankilaré zone and Abidjan (Boyer 2005). Furthermore, Y.F. Yeboah described certain trans-frontier ethnic groups such as the Brong (Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana), the Yoruba (Benin and Nigeria), or the Ewe (Ghana and Togo) as part of groups that consider borders as both "abstract and inefficient" (Yeboah, 1986).

three main networks led by the Dioula, Peulh and Maure (as well as the Wolof). The Atlantic coast countries are the least integrated group of the sub-region, with markets turned mainly towards Europe.

The railway lines connecting, respectively, Bamako-Dakar and Niger-Abidjan today also correspond to the main migration trajectories in West Africa. In this regard, Nelly Robin divided intra-regional migration into a hexagon (with Senegal at the center and including Mauritania, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, and Mali), as well as a polygon that represents the most intense (circular) migration in West Africa (including Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, and Ghana) (Robin, 1992). The latter has remained the most dominant migration pattern, and in spite of small modifications, West Africa is still largely marked by the main contrast between two zones:

1) The coastal area with large port cities, mainly in Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Nigeria, historically constituting the job-creating area (Robin, 1992) and representing around 80 percent of regional GNP, with Nigeria alone accounting for approximately half. This is therefore the heart of the regional economy and the zone of prosperity in West Africa due to its mineral and agricultural resources. The forest zone gathers the main poles of urban growth in the coastal areas (and the immediate hinterland) and has known the largest economic and demographic growth of the sub-region, with historic high numbers of immigrants.

2) The hinterland, corresponding to the traditional labor-exporting area, mainly Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and northern Guinea. Both the Sahelian and Saharan zones of the hinterland have experienced large net emigration rates, mainly due to the severe droughts of the 1970s and 1980s, but present hope for future oil findings and new agro-pastoral systems.

One therefore observes the continued existence of these two West Africas in migration terms, albeit with new destinations emerging.

During the colonial period, major migration to the sparsely populated Côte d'Ivoire boosted cocoa development (Boone 1995; Boone, 1998; RGPH, 2009). Since independence, it is estimated that Cote d'Ivoire was the destination for 90% of Burkinabe migration (UNDESA, 2008). Until the 1990s the vibrant economy of Côte d'Ivoire partly masked the fractious

relations between "pure-blooded" (Mitchell, 2011) ivorians and foreigners, typically of Burkinabe and Malian heritage. The concept of "Ivoirité" (Mitchell 2011) is presented as all the elements (socio-historic, geographic and linguistic) that permit an individual to say that he/she is a citizen of Côte d'Ivoire (Bossard 2003). While Côte d'Ivoire was housing four million "foreigners" of a population of 16 million in 1998, a resurgence of 'Ivoirité' xenophobia and expulsions nonetheless led to a diversification of migratory patterns of the Burkinabe and many others (OECD/SWAC, 2006a). In 2002, deportation and return movement surged due to violent conflict and increased xenophobia against Burkinabe workers in the context of the declining Ivoirian cocoa industry.

Côte d'Ivoire is nonetheless still the main destination for the Burkinabe. Burkina Faso - as mentioned - has the highest bilateral migration flows on the African continent towards neighboring Cote d'Ivoire. In 2013, the Burkinabe migration stock in Cote d'Ivoire was 1.4 million people, which represents almost 90% of all migrants while 94% of its migrants stay with the West African sub-region (UNDESA, 2013c). Other key destinations for the Burkinabe are primarily countries within ECOWAS such as Ghana, Mali and Niger and Ghana (while Gabon is a major African destination outside the ECOWAS region).

For most Burkinabe households, migration is thus a primary strategy and almost 10% of its population lives abroad (UNDESA, 2013a). With a rapidly growing population, and similarly increasing youth unemployment, projections indicate that mobility trends will increase in the future, and still mainly within the West African sub-region (Bloom et al, 2007; UNDESA, 2013a). Migrants thus mainly stay within their sub-regions, as in West Africa where about 7.5 million migrants move within the region, accounting for 71%–86% of total emigration (OECD-SWAC, 2008).

Figure 7 - Main migration destinations within Africa (% of intra-African migration)

Source: Shimeles, 2010.

Burkina Faso is, however, an interesting case since it is both one of the key migrant sending *and* receiving countries in Africa. This is linked to the migration pattern from Burkina Faso to Côte d'Ivoire (and back), hence the migration inflow to Burkina Faso is, to a large extent, due to the high numbers of returning Burkinabe from Côte d'Ivoire. Even though it is the main migrant-sending country in Africa, official remittances to Burkina Faso have declined since 2000. This is a reverse trend compared to most countries in Africa, and remittance fees from Côte d'Ivoire to Burkina Faso are among the world's highest.

Figure 8 - Top 10 sending/receiving African countries (%)

Top 10 Sending Countries in Africa	Top 10 Receiving Countries in Africa (of African migrants)
Cape Verde (>10%)	Côte d'Ivoire (9%)
Equatorial Guinea (>10%)	South Africa (5%)
São Tomé & Principe (>10%)	Nigeria (>2.5%)
Mali (>10%)	Tanzania (>2.5%)
Morocco (>5%)	Sudan (<2.5%)
Burkina Faso (>5%)	**Burkina Faso (<2.5%)**
Benin (>5%)	Uganda (<2.5%)
Tunisia (>5%)	Ethiopia (<2.5%)
Republic of Congo (>5%)	Libya (<2.5%)
Algeria (>5%)	Chad (<2.5%)

Source: World Bank Migration Matrix Data, 2010.

While urban-rural migration is not the center of this thesis, we should not forget that domestic migration represents the largest flows within Africa. Urbanization, or rural-urban migration, has been a key factor in intra-regional West African mobility patterns since decolonization. In 1962, when René Dumont wrote his famous book '*L'Afrique noire est mal partie*', he described the sub-region as a series of isolated "archipelagos" of high economic intensity, and the rest as vast empty spaces that were both unpopulated and uncultivated. In 2001, R. Portier, on the contrary, termed the sub-region a "full space". A large number of today's economic poles were previously empty spaces; such as the groundnut producing zone in Senegal, the "office" in Niger and Mali, the irrigated perimeters in the valley of Senegal, the cotton and cereal producing areas of the Sudanese-Sahelian zone[43], the cocoa- and coffee producing areas of Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, and the two industrial zones in Nigeria and Porto Novo in Cote d'Ivoire (OECD/SWAC, 2006b)

Figure 9 - Expansion of Areas attracting urban markets in West Africa

Figure 6: Expansion of Areas Attracting Urban Markets

Source : WALTPS

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
[43] For example, in the north of the coastal countries and south of the Sahel one finds the Sudanese savannas, where millions of hectares have been made available through programs fighting river blindness (CICRED, 1999). As illustrated on the map, this zone is experiencing a high growth of secondary cities, which might be the beginning of a reversal of the last decade's trend of net emigration. Urban border cities between the Sahelian and coastal countries in fact already existed in 1960, with approximately ten cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants (for example Ibadan and Kano) along the traditional Haussa and Yoruba commerce routes (Fourchard, 2004). Now, an interconnected network of around 50 cities is blooming, with more to come

The capacity in cities to absorb such large influx of population flows is however limited, and a lot remains to be done to ensure services for the rapidly increasing young urban populations. While the total number of West African inhabitants has more than tripled, the urban population has increased by a factor of 10 (OECD/SWAC, 2006a)[44]. More than 80 million West Africans have thus migrated from the countryside to the city during the last 50 years, and urbanization now stands at almost 50 percent[45]. Burkina Faso, in the last national census, had an urban[46] population of almost 3.2 million people, or 22.7% of the total population (RGPH, 2009) which had grown to 5.1 million, or 29%, in 2014 (http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators#selectedDimension_WDI_Ctry). Unfortunately, with this trend of increasing urbanization is accompanied by a trend of increasing slumming. For example, 60% of Ouagadougou's population now lives in slum areas. In Burkina Faso, a "national housing and urban development policy" was adopted in 2007 since social facilities are not sufficient to cover needs for all new urban citizens.

Figure 10 - Population growth in Burkina Faso's main cities

Data extracted on 04 Oct 2016 00:28 UTC (GMT) from
OECD.Stat

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[44] From 88 million to 290 million inhabitants in 45 years (multiplied by 3.3) — and from 13 million in regards to urban population to 128 million (multiplied by 10).
[45] The FAO estimates that the non-agricultural population in West Africa has fallen from 80 percent of the population in 1961 to merely 51 percent in 2001. (OECD/SWAC 2006b)
[46] Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso are the only areas described as 'big cities', while others include Fada N'Gourma.

We can conclude that migrants from poorer regions mainly remain within their own country or at best has access to neighboring countries, with limited opportunities for social mobility. The "poorest of the poor" cannot afford migration because of their limited resources (UNDP, 2009), and per capita GDP has a large effect on the capacity to migrate, especially to more distant destinations, which introduces a threshold effect (UNDP, 2009; Shaw, 2007; De Haas, 2010; Shimeles, 2010). Hence, there is a clear 'migration divide', with limited opportunities for poor people to access developmental benefits of migration.

As part of reexamining the nexus between migration and development, this section has outlined the understanding of migration with analysis of flows and trends, while the following will look closer at the understanding of the development part. With non-inclusive growth leading to rising inequality, one might question whether this leads to differentiated access to migration and whether migration, in return, rather facilitates the accumulation of subtypes of capital by resourceful segments of society. Societies differ in the extent to which social mobility is possible (OECD, 2018). Inclusive growth in Africa would demand a broader distribution of wealth and opportunities throughout society, a process of social mobility of the poor towards becoming middle-class through the acquisition of either financial, human, or social capital. Poverty is thus a strong deterrent of mobility – both geographic and social.

2.3 Development as inclusive growth

Development has been defined in many ways over the years by the international community: From structural adjustment in the 1970s dominated by "growth-first" ideas and neo-liberal policies. In the 1990s, however, inequality returned to the agenda (Kanbur and Lustig, 1999); the link between growth and inequality was a central theme in classic development literature (e.g. Adelman and Morris, 1973; Ahluwalia, 1974, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2002). Inequality was introduced into Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, under concepts such as "pro-poor growth" and "good governance" - led by Douglas North (1990) and Mustaq Khan (2009), amongst others, underlining the inter-relationship between governance and growth - as well as the notion of "social development" - developed by Coleman (1988), Putnam et al. (1993) and Narayan and Pritchett (1997) etc., outlining the importance of social capital for human capital development and poverty reduction.

The development part of the "migration and development nexus" has largely been determined as human development, mainly based on the notion of development as defined by Amartya Sen (Sen, 1992) which is widely integrated in both research and in the world of practice and is applied in the Human Development Reports. The essential change presented by Sen was to focus on poverty reduction before growth. There are two distinctive periods in the work of Sen. The first period, from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s, Sen dedicated to the theory of social choice and issues related to inequality. One of the first papers describing the so-called "capability approach" is called "Equality of what?" (Sen, 1980), and was an elaboration of the "basic needs approach", led by John Hicks, amongst others (Reader, 2006). In a second period, from the mid-1980s to the present day, Sen developed an analysis of these issues in conjunction with political and moral philosophy that take into account actual situations of inequality, particularly those in developing countries. Economic growth should not only focus on income but on the ultimate aims of developing human life. The approach as suggested by Sen is based on the conviction that 'economics is a moral science' (Sen, 1999b). In that regard, he quotes John Hicks: "*The liberal, or non-interference, principles of the classical economists ... were not, in the first place, economic principles; they were an application of economics of principles that were thought to apply to a much wider field. The contention that economic freedom made for economic efficiency was no more than a secondary support*" (Sen, 1993; 28). His recent work led him to propose an evaluation in which individual well-being is no longer measured by utility but "capability", or by the freedom of an individual to choose the type of life he or

she wishes to pursue. The capability approach thereby offers an alternative to the utility-based perspective (welfarism) as a basis for evaluating individual well-being.

The secondary literature on Sen has grown both in applied research but also in philosophy. Basically, the Human Development Reports (HDR) that have been produced since 1990 by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have been based on the same conceptual framework. The initial reports expanded Sen's approach, and later reports have even revised the definition of human development as being a process of enlarging people's choices. For example, in the 2010 HDR, it is stated that "*human development is the expansion of people's freedom to live long, healthy and creative lives*". In both 1991 and 2010, it is mentioned that "*people are both the beneficiaries and the drivers of human development, as individuals and in groups*". Since 2009, the focus on development has been predominant following the comprehension presented in the Human Development Report on *'Overcoming barriers: Human Mobility and development'* (UNDP, 2009) as well as the accompanying background papers and secondary literature. The most common understanding of the migration and development nexus is that migration leads to development ranging from individual human development through improvements in health and education at household level, as well as advancement on the labor market combined with wealth accumulation – this also leads to macroeconomic development through remittances sent back to the communities in countries of origin. In that regard, the Human Development Report from 2009 outlined evidence about the positive impacts of migration on human development, such as increased household incomes via remittances, diaspora initiatives and improved access to education and health services (UNDP, 2009).

It is important to note that Sen's contribution has furthermore been to combine the formulation of capability as two parts: freedom and valuable beings and doings (functionings). Sen wishes to formulate and evaluate the various characteristics of an individual space (what it does or what it is), called "functionings" and freedom by a person to choose one of these functions and lead a particular type of life (his entire capability). For example, on paper I might have the freedom to migrate, while in reality I might not be able to do so – or not to the destinations that I aspire to reach. Sen stresses that the vector of functioning is what people can really achieve. The combinations of functionings (or beings and doings) that a person can achieve *"… is, thus, a set of vectors of functionings, reflecting the person's freedom to lead one type of life or another… to choose from possible livings"* (Sen, 1992; 40). *"The focus here is on the freedom*

that a person actually has to do this or be that – things that he or she may value doing or being" (Sen, 2009; 232). Freedom is *"the real opportunity that we have to accomplish what we value,"* (Sen, 1992; 31) hence not a freedom on paper but in reality. *"The 'good life' is partly a life of genuine choice, and not one in which the person is forced into a particular life – however rich it might be in other respects"* (Sen, 1985, 69-70).

Freedom therefore has two parts, the opportunity/capability aspect – the set of vectors - as well as the process aspects – ability to act on behalf of what matters (agency). Sen's approach is essentially "people-centered" with human agency at the center. One must however distinguish between capabilities themselves, which exist at the individual level, and the causal conditions for capabilities, which may well be structural. In the latter, I will expand on how my research combines the people-centered perspective as outlined in the capability approach by Sen (1999) with a focus on the role of states in facilitating access to opportunities, knowledge, services, and more secure livelihoods. Sen's normative description of wellbeing and capabilities is a crucial part of understanding what freedoms people have, which goes well beyond human development. This basically means looking at social change theoretically. Some argue that the approach is left deliberately incomplete for researchers of other fields to further this approach.

When trying to move beyond the "structure-agency impasse" in migration research, it is important to also focus on the conditions under which people can expand their life choices by migration, especially considering the growing global inequality and limited access for the poorest. This has led me to instead consider development as an understand of inclusive growth, which encompasses reducing inequalities and improving well-being, social cohesion, growth, and development (Commission on Growth and Development, 2008; World Bank, 2009). This perspective allows us to encompass would-be migrants in the analysis as well as poor African migrants with limited access to opportunities linked to migration as a consequence of the high constraints associated with intra-regional migration.

The inclusive growth agenda is a further attempt in policy circles to look beyond the traditional economic models, which have not distributed benefits equitably (World Bank, 2005b; Commission on Growth and Development, 2009). The argument that poverty and inequality are multi-dimensional has become generally accepted through the Human Development Reports built on Amartya Sen's notion of capabilities, and reinforced by, for example, the Sarkozy Commission (Club de Madrid, 2011). In 2001, Atkinson noted that *"the welfare basis*

of policy evaluation is a topic which should receive greater priority" (Atkinson, 2001; 203). In *'Economic Growth in the 1990s; Learning from a Decade of Reform'* (World Bank, 2005a), it was broadly established that the necessary fundamentals for growth (such as a stable macro-economic environment, enforcement of property rights, openness to trade and effective government) are not necessarily enough to lead to sustainable development. While growth is the main driver for poverty reduction, it alone is not sufficient. Consequently, since the late 2000s there has been a global trend toward policies of "inclusive growth", further to reports underlining how extreme poverty is decreasing but national inequality is rising, and that growth has been jobless and has mainly benefited the elites (OECD, 2011; AfDB, 2012; Oxfam, 2014). Inclusive growth is both an outcome (Ali and Son, 2007; Rauiyar and Kanbur, 2010) and a process (Ali and Zhuang, 2007; Klasen, 2010). *"On the one hand, it ensures that everyone can participate in the growth process, both in terms of decision-making for organizing the growth progression as well as in participating in the growth itself. On the other hand, it makes sure that everyone shares equitably the benefits of growth. Inclusive growth implies **participation** and **benefit sharing**. Participation without benefit sharing will make growth unjust and sharing benefits without participation will make it a welfare outcome"* (.http://www.ipc-undp.org/pages/newsite/menu/inclusive/whatisinclusivegrowth.jsp?active=1). Inclusive growth is a development concept and approach now widely accepted and used in policy circles (de Haan and Thorat, 2013).

Indeed, development has not been inclusive and only segments of society (mainly the elites) actually benefit from development (AfDB, 2012; Oxfam, 2014). The World Bank has described this decade with the concept of "Africanization of poverty" (www.worldbank.org/poverty), with rising inequalities between countries. *"Economic inequality is rapidly increasing in the majority of countries. The wealth of the world is divided in two: almost half going to the richest one percent; the other half to the remaining 99 percent. The World Economic Forum has identified this as a major risk to human progress. Extreme economic inequality and political capture are too often interdependent. Left unchecked, political institutions become undermined and governments overwhelmingly serve the interests of economic elites to the detriment of ordinary people"* (Oxfam, 2014; 1). When analyzing the *'cascading privilege: Making the gaps between the haves and have-nots permanent'*, Oxfam (2014) notes that social mobility is not high in a society with high inequality. In those cases, life opportunities are mainly based on the income of one's parents. The report '*Divided we stand; why inequality keeps rising'*

(OECD, 2011) underlines that extreme poverty is decreasing, but inequality is rising, and that growth has mainly benefited the elites.

Deepening inequalities, globalization and wage differentials compared with conditions in the major destination countries therefore make migration a key strategy for income diversification in a country such as Burkina Faso, which is one of the least-developed and poorest countries on earth. Furthermore, both globally and in Africa, in-country inequalities have been increasing during the last two decades. In Africa, as in Burkina Faso, in-country inequalities have also been rising during the last two decades (IFAD, 2011), and almost half of all Africans still live on less than $1.25 a day (www.worldbank.org/poverty). In 2010, six of the 10 most unequal countries worldwide were in sub-Saharan Africa (AfDB, 2012). Youth unemployment, rural poverty, poor governance, and inequality with regards to access to education and health – and migration – have increased in Africa compared to other regions.

The clearest examples of non-inclusive growth are countries with high GDP growth due to extractive industries together with poor populations, causing high inequality between the few that benefit economically and those that do not, as measured by the Gini coefficient. GDP in oil-rich countries like Equatorial Guinea and Angola have grown at average annual rates of more than 10 percent since 2000. Exports of oil, natural gas, metals, and minerals foster high growth in Tanzania, Zambia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, and Namibia. However, though several African countries are among the faster growing economies in the world, inequality remains widespread, hindering the rate of poverty reduction (World Bank, 2013).

The inclusive growth agenda is built on the recognition that economic growth and financial capital is not sufficient to understand development, and thus goes beyond the traditional divide between poverty and growth analyses, which have generally been undertaken separately (World Bank, 2009). Inclusiveness refers both to the pace and pattern of growth and encompasses equity, equality of opportunities and protection in market and employment transitions (Commission on Growth and Development, 2008). The idea of equality of opportunities is especially emphasized, with access to markets and an unbiased regulatory environment. Inclusive growth implies structural transformation for people to be able to contribute to and profit from economic growth. The inclusive growth approach is different from the analysis of pro-poor growth, which only focuses on one group – the poor. When applying the inclusive growth model, one instead needs to look at constraints to growth and social

mobility in a broader and more general analysis. There is an emphasis on the opportunities of individuals to make use of resources available and on strengthening their capacities and opportunities.

The inclusive growth approach is now being integrated in national Poverty Reduction Strategies[47] across Africa, while migration is similarly being incorporated. However, the link between the two is understudied (one main study: Keller and Scheja, 2011) and they are not being joined as concepts associated with one another but, rather, treated as distinct. Migration is thus not being addressed as a factor in inclusive growth. Furthermore, in the world of practice, human development is usually associated with education, health, and social protection – while those working on governance mainly deal with policy. This thesis will instead look at the broader framework that would allow migrants to achieve social mobility, access education abroad and gain human capital. This allows me to combine structure and agency, and to introduce an overlooked analysis on migration policies from sending states and their effect on development. The thesis will therefore adopt the concept of inclusive growth as a governance framework under which people could improve their capabilities through migration (Sen, 1999a).

In conclusion, when analyzing the 'nexus' between migration and development scholars have mainly looked at how people - based on their own agency - migrate and subsequently sustain links with origin countries that can have positive benefits for development. These social practices have been supported by policies in order to enhance their effects, mainly when it comes to remittances, skilled migration (or return) and diasporas (or co-development). However, literature on migration and development has not yet sufficiently attended to the role of overall structures and migration management in establishing or enhancing a possible link between migration and development. I have instead examined the migration divide that springs as a consequence of limited and preferential access (North, 2007) to migration from sending countries. I argue that this divide is to a large extent determined by initiatives from within the

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[47] After 2002, after criticism of a lack of ownership from developing countries, African countries were requested to elaborate Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) in order to outline strategic direction for development initiatives in order to access funding from Bretton Woods institutions. PRSPs describe a country's macroeconomic, structural and social policies and programs to promote growth and reduce poverty, as well as associated external financing needs. PRSPs were prepared by governments through a participatory process that involves civil society and development partners, including the Bretton Woods institutions.
After 2014, again after criticism of lack of ownership from developing countries, they now develop their own national plans, however mainly with support from the development partners.

sending states. Reduced opportunities to exercise agency have negative impacts on migrant well-being as well as on the poverty- and inequality-reducing potential of intra-regional migration. While scholars have underlined the need to include domestic migration in the discussion of migration and development, most theoretical work has neglected intra-regional flows. Through analyzing structural barriers to African intra-regional migration, I address to what extent migration – in particular intra-regional – is embedded into the political and development agenda in (West) Africa. Through analyzing capabilities versus aspirations of sending states, I narrow down whether migration policymaking of the West African states interacts with development processes. While "*reducing north-south inequality is the real key to effective migration management*" (Castles, 2004), this thesis will focus on leveraging migration for development in an intra-regional context, where "*creating a borderless West Africa*" (Adepujo, 2005a) is on the actual political agenda.

3. Theoretical and methodological considerations of the migration divide

The revision of the nexus between migration and development above led to three main conclusions that helped shape the theoretical and methodological approach to researching the migration divide: First, the nexus between migration and development is immensely complex and whether there are positive or negative benefits depends largely on the perspective applied ranging from the individual agency level, to households and politics of sending state policies to receiving state policies. Second, when applying a perspective of migration benefiting inclusive growth, it is important to understand the national context and the structural constraints under which individuals try to migrate. The achievement of inclusive growth depends, to a large extent, on the capability of the most disadvantaged social groups to participate actively in the formation of wealth and receive, in return, a rewarding proportion of growth that can spur social mobility (Commission on growth and Development, 2008; World Bank, 2009). In that regard, sending country initiatives for equal access to migration have been largely overlooked. Finally, simply looking at data or documents/policies is not sufficient in order to understand the context of policy-making, especially in African countries with limited access orders and off-stage policymaking. The understanding concept of the migration divide is therefore nuanced by looking at the root causes through introducing a sending state perspective and looking at initiatives related to access to emigration.

Migration research was, for a long time, studied through empiricist-positivist approaches and their associated quantitative survey methods. Today, more qualitative research methods have emerged due to the growing interest in the complex factors of the migration phenomenon. Most of the aspects studied, nonetheless, have kept the migrant's perspective - or employed so-called methodologic individualism - such as analyzing the process of migration decision making, identity formation and change through the migratory experiences, the role of social capital and social networks, ethnic discrimination, or racism. This research will present an innovative approach to mixed qualitative research focusing mainly on sending state policy makers and policy making. Furthermore, the thesis is the first to analyze African policy implementation.

Qualitative research can result in valuable insights into multiple and intersecting causal factors contribute to society reality. Nonetheless, in many cases the epistemological and methodological framework within which qualitative research is applied to migration research is based on the adoption of a relativist stance and fails to account for the complex nature of

relations between structure, culture, and agency. The connection between structure and agency remains one of the most persistent problems of social science (Archer, 1995). Critical realism allows for the interplay between structure and agency over time, rather than the reduction of one to the other (Iosifides, 2011). In this research, we will attempt – through a critical realist meta-theoretical framework – to link structure, culture, and agency, producing social—scientific explanations for the nexus between migration and development with a perspective from the sending states. Through a mixed qualitative approach, the thesis attempts to cover the process through which the current situation of the migration divide has emerged and its links with other aspects of the migratory policy field in sending countries. This would subsequently imply that qualitative methods are not confined only to the micro-level (Tacq, 2010). Within the logic of social constructivism, interacting social agents create (or construct) what is taken to be 'social' reality via interchanging meanings through language. Hence, Burr states that "*Our way of understanding the world do not come from objective reality but from other people, both past and present*" (Bur, 2003;7).

When applying a qualitative analysis of migration policy making, I had to invest time in understanding the historical, economic, demographic, social and political context, to better analyze policymaking and the role of states in migration management. At the beginning of this research in 2009, only one West African country – Cape Verde – had a migration policy. The methodological question then arose regarding how to study a policy that does not (yet) exist? Subsequently, nine countries in the sub-region - Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria - started drafting policies on this matter, while sources informed me at the time that Senegal would also be looking to develop a migration policy. Benin, Cape Verde, Mali, Nigeria, and Senegal even created ministries for nationals abroad (Agunias, 2009; Ratha et al, 2011) while Burkina Faso created a High Council for Burkinabe Abroad. My main approach was to examine the extent to which the phenomenon of migration was integrated in the political and development agenda of West African states, or to investigate the possible gaps between intent/policy discourse, (draft) policies and their intended versus actual implementation.

To conduct my research, it was necessary to adopt a methodological approach adapted to analyzing how the migration policy field is linked to social change. Understanding policy changes and the complex issues that surround them in regard to migration requires a combination of qualitative methods suited to understanding diverse behaviors, systems, or

cultures. Hence, I chose a mixture of four qualitative methods to go into depth with the multi-layered phenomenon of migration and development accounting for the interpretive understanding of the social world along with specific structural and cultural contexts:

1) First, while considering the complex relations of structure, culture, and agency I chose to do qualitative interviewing with policy makers in Africa.

2) Second, in consideration of the social-constructivist emphasis on the historical and cultural specificity of social understanding, I undertook biographic research of policy makers from Burkina Faso.

3) Third, with social constructivism considering language pivotal for any social process, I did discourse analysis on migration policy from the sending country perspective.

4) Finally, I put emphasis on all of the above through a case study on Burkina Faso, and comparative case examples from neighboring Mali and Senegal.

This chapter therefore underlines both the theoretical and methodological foundations of the research. The theoretical framework to a certain extent defines the qualitative research and hence "*There should be congruence between the object of the study, the assumptions about society and the conceptions of how knowledge is possible, and one's choice of design and method*" (Danermark et al, 2002; 150). Methods were thus chosen in consideration of the meta-theoretical principles to ensure alignment with ontological assumptions and hence the usefulness of research findings. In the following, we will first explore the theoretical framework and subsequently underline the qualitative methods used.

3.1 Moving beyond the structure-agency impasse

Research on migration and development has broadly debated the agency of people versus the role of states (Haq, 1995; Sen, 1999a: Zolberg, 1999). As noted above, the opposition between pessimist and optimistic views of the benefits of migration on development is challenged by the heterogeneity of migration impacts on the one hand (as elaborated above), differences between neoclassical and developmentalist views on the developmental effects of migration, on the other hand, particularly relate to the role they attribute to the state. Migration as self-help development "from below" is partly driven by neoliberal ideologies that shift the attention away from structural development constraints and, hence, the responsibility of migrant sending states to pursue political and economic reform (de Haas, 2012). In fact, migration has increasingly been seen as something beyond the control of states (Massey et al, 1998; Sassen, 1996).

My research thus combines the people-centered perspective as outlined in the capability approach by Sen (1999) with a focus on the role of states in facilitating access to opportunities, knowledge, services, and more secure livelihoods. Sen's approach is essentially "people-centered" with human agency at the center. One must however distinguish between capabilities themselves, which exist at the individual level, and the causal conditions for capabilities, which may well be structural. This has been discussed by numerous scholars (including Amartya Sen himself) such as Frances Stewart (2013), who insists that social institutions (including norms) affect individual capabilities and functionings and influence people's relative power, their market conditions and their access to politically granted benefits. Bourdieu's work on "habitus"[48] or forms of domination and "capital" supplements my theoretical approach, since his theories of the social field have proven to be an important and influential concept for understanding the relation between structure and agent in the context of practice. Pierre Bourdieu (1984; 1991) was interested in the ways in which societal structures are perpetuated, and how the dominant classes retain their position. Bourdieu sees power as culturally and symbolically created, and constantly re-legitimized through an interplay of agency and structure. Bourdieu, on the other hand, has been criticized for downplaying the complexities

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[48] He defines 'habitus' as: *"a system of durable transposable dispositions, structured structures, predisposed to function as structuring structured structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them"* (Bourdieu, 1990; 53).

comprising individual decision-making and the role of the agent[49] (Archer, 2000; Mutch, 2004).

By integrating the capability approach, on the one hand – which is people-centered and ethically individualistic but not methodologically individualistic – it offers a possibility to analyze the distinction between resources and functioning, thus a discussion of what development and possibilities people have on paper versus what the reality presents. In an African context, this distinction is very important, and is at the heart of my research. On the other hand, by simultaneously integrating Pierre Bourdieu's notions of habitus and symbolic violence, we can draw out a critical perspective of social relations and domination in West Africa, and Burkina Faso more specifically. The notion of habitus is simultaneously a micro- as well as macro-interpretation of how individuals form, and are formed, by their social milieus. Being structural without being overly deterministic, habitus incorporates the structured reality that one is born into which in turn structures perception.

Sen defines agency as "*what a person is free to do and achieve in pursuit of whatever goals or values he or she regards as important*" (Sen, 1985; 203). This is distinctive, since it contains an emphasis on value; the person's ability to act on what they value and have reason to value. *"Someone who acts and brings about change, and whose achievements can be judged in terms of her own values and objectives, whether or not we asses them in terms of some external criteria as well"*. (Sen, 1999a; 19). Even though political debates have become more pronounced in Sen's more recent writings, where freedom is defined as both personal, systemic, and political, and a process freedom is often a collective response, the approach is essentially "people-centered" with human agency at the center rather than organizations, governments, or public policy. Sen (1999a) also put forward an agency-oriented approach to migration, while many theories of migration rest on the assumption that migrants have a level of choice (agency) over their decisions to move (Bakewell, 2010).

The question remains how this plays out if you chose to cross a border and migrate as a means to acquiring social mobility. When conducting a Bordieuan analysis, to what extent are people in this globalized world still determined by "habitus" in the country in which they are born? If

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[49] He sees the individuality of practices as the result of peculiar historical make-up of the socially given disposition of the habitus, which some have analyzed as being overly simplified (Chandler, 2013).

migrating is dependent on "capital" in any of its forms – does that mean that the social elevator via migration is out of order? From a Bordieuan perspective (Bourdieu, 1984; 1991), one might underline that international academic migration has introduced an additional elite selection criterion that has impeded inclusive growth and equal opportunities. In the case of Burkina Faso, for example, this happens through the restriction of access to the resource of legal migration to the global north.

I have thus deemed it important to go beyond the people-centered approach to also focus on an institutional understanding of the conditions under which people can expand their life choices by migration. Pierre Bourdieu studied the perpetuation of status quo through the reproduction of forms of domination by state institutions and their actors, or "social fields". In a series of works dedicated to class, culture, and structures of domination, he shows how institutions – including educational institutions – can help preserve existing hierarchies and social orders (Bourdieu, 1984 and 1991). According to Bourdieu, the reproduction of structures of domination in society precisely depends on the imposition of cultural values which are represented as universal but which are in fact politically and historically determined. The main way this happens is through what he calls "habitus" or socialized norms or tendencies that guide behavior and thinking. In other words, habitus is *the way society becomes deposited in persons in the form of lasting dispositions, or trained capacities and structured propensities to think, feel and act in determinant ways, which then guide them"* (Wacquant, 2005: 316). Bourdieu (1984) includes cultural capital (e.g. competencies, skills, qualifications) as a source of symbolic violence. This includes western education (Bassey, 1999; Giroux, 1983; Freire, 1970). "Symbolic violence" functions by the conversion of economic capital into cultural, social, and symbolic capital – in this case, for example, academic migration as a criterion for access to political posts.

In attempting to move beyond the *"structure agency impasse that blocks our way"* (Bakewell, 2010: 1705), many scholars have used Giddens' (1984) theory of structuration, which proposes a compromise since structure is here regarded as dual in nature, as *"both the medium and the outcome of the social practices they recursively organize"* (Giddens, 1984: 25). I have also chosen a dual theoretical approach in an attempt to encompass both micro- and macro-level

factors that impact on migration processes [50] . More recently, O'Reilly refers to the "structuration theory of practice", which helps understand *"the production and reproduction of structures through actions and practices, in communities and networks"* (O'Reilly, 2013; 1). *"The structuration theory of practice thus enables us to understand the practice of daily life as the outcome of the constant interaction of structure and agency, where structures are both external to and internalized, enacted and performed by agents"* (O'Reilly, 2013; 1).

The work of Amartya Sen (1999) and Mahbub ul Haq (1995) amongst other highlights the agency of people rather than states in accessing opportunities, knowledge, services, and more secure livelihoods. Neoliberal and developmentalist ideologies of the migration and development nexus shift the attention away from structural development constraints and, hence, the responsibility of migrant sending states to pursue political and economic reform (de Haas, 2012). Indeed, migration is increasingly seen as something beyond the control of states (Massey et al, 1998; Sassen 1996).

The state was brought into the field of study of the politics of international migration when the agenda of migration moved from 'low politics' to 'high politics' in the US (Skocpol, 1985; Freeman, 1998; Weil, 1998, Hollifield, 2007). Aristide Zolberg was among the first to try to insert political variables into the equation of migration research, concluding that the state matters and has the capacity to regulate migration flows and stocks (Zolberg, 1999). Modern states thus monopolize the mobility of 'means of movement', amongst other by the introduction of passports (Torpey, 1998).

Aristide Zolberg (1999) reinserted political variables into the equation of international migration, concluding that the state does matter and has the capacity to regulate migration flows and stocks. Indeed, only with the advent of the nation-state in sixteenth and seventeenth-century Europe did the notion of legally tying populations to territorial units and to specific forms of government become commonplace, creating barriers to the mobility of citizens (Moch, 1992). Almost every dimension of human existence – social-psychological, demographic, economic and political – was reshaped to conform to the dictates of the nation-

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[50] Bakewell (2010) provides a criticism of the structuration approach, even though he has used it himself in articles from 2000 and 2008, and instead suggests that critical realism offers a more sophisticated analysis. However, this has not yet been reflected in migration and development policy research and I would agree with Castles (2007) who warns of the dangers of engaging in overly abstract theoretical debates which are only of interest to other academics.

state (Hobsbawn, 1992). State building entailed consolidating territory, centralizing authority, controlling the nobility, imposing taxes and waging warfare (Tilly, 1975, Sassen, 2006; Castles, 2009). The institutions of nationality and citizenship, which would become the hallmark of the modern nation-state, did not develop fully until the nineteenths and twentieth century (Koslowski, 1999).

Beforehand, migration theory generally tended to be dominated by economic and sociological explanations. Only since the 1980s and 1990s has the field of study of the politics of international migration emerged, and theorists have underlined how we can "bring the state back in" (Skocpol, 1985) to social scientific analyses of migration (Rueschemeyer and Evans, 1985; Freeman, 1998; Weil, 1998; Zolberg, 1999; Brettel and Hollifield, 2008). This coincided with the agenda of migration moving from "low politics" to "high politics" in the United States. Almost all literature on the politics of control is focused on the receiving countries (except Sadiq, 2005) under the three major themes of control, security, and incorporation (Dowty, 1987; Fitzgerald, 1996; Massey et al, 1998; Zolberg, 1999; Meyers, 2000; Cornelius et al, 2004).

Scholars working on migration have been criticized for assuming that the natural level of analysis is the nation-state (Wimmer and Schiller, 2002, Bauböck, 2003): "*Mainstream scholars of international relations continue to place the state, as a unitary and rational actor, at the center of their analysis of any type of transnational phenomenon, whether it is trade, foreign direct investment, or international migration*" (Hollifield, 1998). Nonetheless, this critic was mainly addressed to scholars working outside the African context, notably receiving countries that can be described as open access orders (North et al, 2007) of developed democracies that indeed include the participation of multiple actors and stakeholders in policy- and decision-making. In contrast, most sub-Saharan African sending states – such as Burkina Faso - can be described as a Limited Access Order where the only durable organization is the state itself (North et al, 2007). Additionally, the nation-state remains the driver for policies on cross-border movements, citizenship, social security, health services and education, and the elaboration of migration policies is monopolized by centralized governments (Fitzgerald, 2006). In the specific Sub-Saharan African context –with a large concentration of power in the presidency - the sending state perspective will be the central point of analysis in this article. "*To use a familiar Weberian metaphor, the speeding train of international migration is fueled*

by economic and sociological forces, but it is the state that acts as a switching mechanism, which can change the course of the train or derail it altogether." (Hollifield, 2007).

Nina Glick Schiller's criticism of the "methodological nationalism" (Wimmer and Schiller, 2002) in most migration research points to the fact that scholars often adopt the perspective of their respective nation-states instead of situating the context in a global power perspective. This has, in many cases, been interpreted as an argument regarding the declining significance of the nation-state (Bommes, 2005, Waldinger and Fitzgerald, 2005). However, this is a misunderstanding. Glick Schiller, along with a long line of scholars, sees nation-states, their legal systems, migration policies and institutional structures as significant in the establishment and persistence of transnational social fields (Basch et al. 1994; Glick Schiller and Fouron, 1999; Faist, 2000; Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004a; Levitt, 2001, Smith and Guarnizo, 1998).

I have chosen to focus on the (sending) state, for three main reasons:

1) The above critique of assuming that the natural level of analysis is the state was mainly addressed to scholars working outside the African context, notably in 'open access orders' (North et al, 2007) of developed democracies that include the participation of multiple actors and stakeholders. In the specific sub-Saharan African context - with a large concentration of power in the presidency due to a lack of a strong civil society - the sending state perspective will be the central point of analysis. Hence, one of the key questions related to bringing in the sending state, is which type of state system are we dealing with? This would demand looking inside Burkina Faso; more specifically at existing societal structures and how the population can access the resource of migration. Burkina Faso can in that regard be described as a basic Limited Access Order where the only durable organization is the state itself (North et al., 2007).

2) Secondly, the nation-state remains the driver for policies on cross-border movements, citizenship, social security, health services and education. "*To use a familiar Weberian metaphor, the speeding train of international migration is fueled by economic and sociological forces, but it is the state that acts as a switching mechanism, which can change the course of the train or derail it altogether.*" (Hollifield, 2007: 196). The development of migration policies is also monopolized by centralized governments (Fitzgerald, 2006).

3) Furthermore, even though research is still debating the effectiveness of policies and the role of macro-level structures versus agency-models in facilitating the "nexus" between

migration and development, this discussion is not reflected in the world of practice. In fact, all international migration and development resolutions and declarations – amongst other from the UN and EU - are based on the firm link between state intervention and facilitation, and highly recommend migration policies as the solution to ensuring development benefits of migration.

3.2 Elites and policymaking in Africa

When analyzing policymaking, we would also have to look at policy makers in the sending states. The work of Bourdieu allows an analysis of how people become vested in particular roles that emerge out of specific sets of social relations, and which in turn shape, constitute, and form the basis of individual identities. Bourdieu's work implicitly retains the spirit of Marx's materialist analysis by continuing to regard the capitalist market as the underlying force of social relations. However, the analysis moves beyond economic analysis in a broader understanding of class struggle and cultural domination. Sociologist Loic Wacquant developed Bourdieu's work with the articulation of symbolic violence. For Bourdieu, the power of the past constitutes the essential element of habitus (Chandler, 2013), and as early as 1976, Christian Potholm noted that in Africa; *"there have been many shortcomings in newly independent states, leading to the stifling of electoral competition and the entrenchment of ruling elites"* (Potholm, 1976).

In an article from 1922 entitled *Black skyes arriving over West Africa'*[51], Maurice Delafosse, a colonial humanist, rightly predicts the following about West African migrants: *"Un grand nombre d'entre eux essaieront de rester en France, attirés par le faux espoir de pouvoir continuer à mener une vie facile, dénuée de soucis matériels, vie à laquelle leur séjour dans les baraquements de l'armée les aura habitués. Ils mèneront une vie misérable...Quant aux meilleurs, ceux qui choisiront de retourner à leur terre natale, on peut craindre qu'ils ne veuillent vivre comme des « famas » [« rois bamabara », ou « homme d'influence »], comme on dit au Soudan, c'est-à-dire comme ceux qui, parce qu'ils sont infatués de leur personne et méprisant des autres et du travail, ne constituent qu'un poids pour la majorité [des Africans] qu'ils devraient au contraire aider »* (Delafosse, 1922 ; 246).

When conducting a historical analysis of class and elite formation in West Africa, it is noteworthy how migration plays a key role. Some have contended that Africa is a classless society, due to the lack of widespread industrialization and capitalist penetration. However, that one cannot find a classic divide between a proletariat and a bourgeoisie does not mean that class and class conflict are absent in Africa. Higley and Gunther state that: *"elites are the principle decision makers in the latest or most resource-rich political, governmental, economic, military, professional, communications and cultural organizations and*

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[51] « Des nuages noirs plantent sur l'Afrique de l'Ouest »

movements in society" (Higley and Gunther, 1992; 8). Assuming then that elites are those persons who "*hold authoritative positions in powerful public and private organizations and influential movements and who therefore are able to affect strategic decisions regularly*" (Higley and Gunther, 1992; 8). David Easton (1990) also asserts that all decision-making regarding the allocation of scarce resources is made by the elite. While Harold Lasswell (2011) states that decision makers are those people who determine who gets what, when (and) how. Marger goes a step further in the analysis and notes that: "*Elites are those who occupy the society's top positions of power and wealth. They are the people who exercise authority, influence, and control of resources within the society's important organizations. They formulate policies, guide the activities, and decide the significant issues of government, the corporation, education, and other major societal institutions. And, perhaps most importantly, they are able to impose on society as a whole their explanation and justification for the dominant political and economic systems.*" (Marger, 1981; 21).

The ruling class found in Africa, Alex Thomson (2000) argues, is a political bureaucratic bourgeoisie (also termed a state, organizational or managerial bourgeoisie), not an economic, commercial, or industrial bourgeoisie. While the international bourgeoisie, in Marxist terms, might own the means of production, Stanislaw Ossowski (1979) considered not only the means of production as a defining feature of class, but also the means of consumption and the means of compulsion. Richard Sklar (1979) built on Ossowski's work, applying it directly to African states. The ruling class in the continent, Sklar argues, is more usefully identified in relation to the political realm rather than the economic. Nicos Poulantzas (1969) moreover argues that classical Marxist analysis suffers from "economism". Poulantzas went on to argue that these political factors could produce periods in history when the dominant economic class actually fails to control the state. The owners of the means of production are, therefore, not necessarily the ruling class. Instead, a political elite may be dominant. Since Africanists have to approach the concept of class with flexibility, one might apply the theories of Max Weber (1948). He stated that economically conditioned power is not synonymous with "power" as such. On the contrary, the emergence of economic power may be the consequence of power existing in other terms. Indeed, as early as 1962, Dumont was talking of a bourgeoisie of a new type that Karl Marx could hardly have foreseen: a bourgeoisie of the public service. For Bourdieu, class domination could similarly not be explained by economics alone, and he is especially known for his discussion of "capital" – the ways in which people would use social networks or cultural

knowledge to undergird their place in the hierarchy. Migration is amongst other a key element distinguishing the elite from the rest.

When analyzing policy-making, it is important to understand the social-economic and political context in developing countries such as Burkina Faso. Mushtaq Khan (2006) sheds light on the structural factors at work behind corruption in developing countries. In the first place, the economic and political elites base their domination over the rest of society precisely on the fact that they are the only ones to enjoy durably protected rights and privileged access to a certain number of resources, such as international migration. Political power could therefore be described as highly personalized, originating through the informal sector, and resting on well-established norms of reciprocity. African problems can therefore not exclusively be perceived as the victim of globalization, "*but also stem from the large-scale neo-patrimonial policies introduced by African governments in an attempt to gain constituent support*" (Chabal, 1992; 5). This reiterates Claude Kabemba's (2002) words that "*Africa's bad shape is the result of misguided leadership, systematic corruption, economic mismanagement, senseless civil wars, political tyranny, flagrant violation of human rights, military vandalism and bad policies*". Such conditions would undoubtedly warrant the high importance placed on issues of corruption, political instability, and lack of accountable governments.

African states have been characterized as "neo-patrimonial" because they combine the formal architecture of a modern bureaucratic state and informal and clientelist relations (Médard, 1991). The neo-patrimonial political system is based on vertical links of patronage between a political elite and their client constituencies. Political accountability was therefore rooted in the extent to which patrons were able to meet the expectations and needs of their clients. Patron-client relations stretch all the way through the hierarchy, from the president to his subordinates and further down to the general population. The purpose of neopatrimonial governance was mainly to ensure personal means for the rulers. Until the 1990s, such rulers remained in power for decades (Huntington, 1991). This was still the case in Burkina Faso until late 2014, where Blaise Compaore had been in power since 1987. Until recently, it was also the case in Angola, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Kenya, Libya, RDC, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

A fundamental cause of resistance to change in developing countries is linked to the predominance of specific interest groups acting across the social, economic, and political spheres and at all levels of governance (from local to international). The exposure of the

African continent to the forces of globalization has resulted in a transnational elite "*comprising of transnational executives and their affiliates, globalizing state bureaucrats, capitalist-inspired politicians and professionals and consumer elites*" (Taylor and Nel, 2002; 177). It would seem that any transformation of the social order that might call into question their privileged access to economic and political resources generates strong resistance on their part. They notably resist the introduction of impersonal institutions that would guarantee, in the economic, social, and political fields, open access for all and regulated competition. In this way, the trend towards the formalization of rules is the object of fierce resistance by elites (the insiders). It is also the object of fierce resistance by society because, by threatening the distribution of rents on which the equilibrium of the system is based.

Neo-patrimonial states, or social alliances among elites, are not necessarily based on class solidarity, but on a willingness to cooperate with strategic allies to receive more of the spoils associated with the state. Jean-François Bayart (1993), in this respect, talks of the "assimilation of elites", forming an uneasy ruling coalition, or a hegemonic bloc. Throughout the literature, narrow interest groups within such a bourgeoisie have been described as "distributional coalitions" or "predatory cartels" (Olson, 1982), "patrimonial and neo-patrimonial State" (Bayart, 1993), "embedded autonomy" (Evans, 1995), "crony capitalism" (Haber, 2002), "patron-client relations", "insider systems" (Meisel, 2004, Meisel and Ould-Audia, 2007), "hand-in-hand arrangements" (Moore and Schmitz, 2007), and now, "limited access social order" (North et al, 2007). In the following section, I will expand on the latter in the specific context of Burkina Faso.

The Burkina Faso of today can be described as a society with a basic limited access order (North et al, 2007). Douglass North, John Wallis, Steven Webb, and Barry Weingast (2007) theorize about high-income advanced industrial countries as open access orders, and middle- and low-income developing countries as limited access orders. North et al distinguish three broad types of LAOs along a spectrum - fragile, basic, and mature limited access orders. In the *basic* LAO, such as Burkina Faso, the state is well established and, in contrast to a *fragile* LAO (such as Somalia or Haiti), generally able to reduce outbreaks of violence. Basic LAOs, which include many Arab countries and most Sub-Saharan African countries, create and sustain a stable organizational structure for the state. An individual or group who wishes to pursue a complicated activity requiring a more sophisticated organizational structure must use the state itself as the vehicle for organization. As a limited access order, even in the *mature* LAO (such

as most Latin American countries, India, and South Africa) it is required that each organization be sanctioned by the state.

They argue that all countries before 1800 were limited access orders, with limited access of the general population to opportunities, positions and income, rent-creation, and the selective suppression of competition. The great civilizations of the past were all successful limited access orders (LAO). Open access orders, on the other hand, are characterized by open competitions, multi-party democratic political systems and a secure government monopoly over violence. The open access order relies on competition, open access to organizations, and the rule of law to hold the society together. An important difference between the two social orders of open and limited access is the level of personification and personal relationships regarding all sorts of exchanges, ranging from economic to political. While open access orders have the ability to create and sustain impersonal exchange, in a basic LAOs the only durable organization is the state itself, and elite rights and privileges are closely identified with it. This allows the state to limit competition and create rents to maintain the dominant coalition. The limited access order creates limits on access to valuable political and economic functions as a way to generate rents. Rents are created both by limits on access to resources and functions – like trade, education and migration – and by limiting access to forms of social organization that the larger society will support. *"A common feature of limited access orders is that political elites divide up control of the economy, each getting some share of the rents...Adequate stability of the rents and thus of the social order requires limiting access and competition—hence a social order with a fundamentally different logic than the open access order"* (North et al., 2007).

This analysis will add to the understanding of limited access order, since in a society with basic limited access order such as Burkina Faso, *"Many elites in LAOs [Limited Access Orders] have been educated in the OAOs [Open Access Orders] of Europe and North America".* Migration is today a strategy and a resource for improving one's life conditions. In this thesis, I take a closer look at migration as agency, or as a means to address (or escape) inequality and structural constraints.Bourdieu notes that in the fields of social action, agents employ *"strategies through which members of a group seek to distinguish themselves from the group immediately below… and to identify themselves from the group immediately above… which they recognize as the possessor of the legitimate life-style"* (Bourdieu, 1984; 246). (North et al, 2007; 30). A comparative study of elites in seven African countries (South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria, Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe), undertaken by the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, indeed showed

that migration is a common characteristic of elite distinction in Africa (Kotzé et al, 2003). However, there is no further elaboration of the correlation between migration and access to opportunities.

I will therefore examine the factor of migration as an element to institutionalizing open access and obtaining social mobility. If most Africanists have seen migration as being a consequence of poverty, instead of being linked to profit, it also means that the factor of elite migration as a resource in political strategy has been largely overseen. To address this matter, I had to take a closer look at the elite structure of the Burkinabe society and applied methodological tools to policy-makers themselves.

To understand policy making in Africa we would thus need to look closer at the policy makers as well as at the relationship between institutions and development in Africa, or at the development on paper versus informal processes that govern. The problems in Africa have been attributed to both poor economic policies and political governance on the part of African regimes on the one hand, and on an unfair international system on the other. But according to Mills and Oppenheimer: "*The African challenge is a complex one, rooted in history and defined by ill-formed (sometimes dysfunctional) geographic and state units. It has domestic, regional and international dimensions, relating both to its colonial history and to the nature of the continent's transition to independence. Along with the growth of corruption, nepotism, populist redistribution and patronage politics, Africa's economic decline reflects both political and institutional failure" (Mills and Oppenheimer, 2002; 92).* A simple answer to the question on the relevance of studying elites, points to the fact that an understanding of the attitudes of the elite may provide us with an indication of their judgments regarding policy issues or governance. When comparing converging to diverging countries, the elements that stand out are thus mainly: The elites priority for development and their ability to bring out common interests (Meisel and Aoudia, 2008). The capacity of the state for co-ordination and a joint strategic vision between ministries and public authorities therefore emerges as a major element in the economic takeoff (Rostow, 1960).

3.3 Introducing qualitative methods for researching policy making

Doing solid research on African migration management poses numerous methodological challenges, and particularly requests a range of mixed methods to address this complex socio-political phenomenon. Through a mixed and combined approach of qualitative methods in alignment with the theoretical considerations above, I was able to answer the research questions: i) *How is migration – in particular intra-regional –embedded into societal and development trends in (West) Africa?* ii) *To what extent is migration a vector of inclusive growth in Burkina Faso?* And iii) *Does migration policymaking of the West African states interact with development processes?* I used four main qualitative research methods: 1) Qualitative interviewing, which also supported the process of 2) biographic research. 3) I also conducted discourse analysis and framed the above-mentioned methods within 4) a case-study[52].

Qualitative methods inspired by critical realism do not confine themselves to 'understanding' social phenomena but also attempt to assess their relevance (Iosifides, 2011). This method is hence useful for *"Understanding the meaning, for participants in the study, of the event, situations, and actions they are involved with and of the accounts that they give of their lived experience"* (Maxwell 1996; 17). Realist approaches take into account the social agent's interpretations, meanings, and discourses into explanatory schemes because they acknowledge that they are integral parts of social reality (Maxwell, 1996). Understandings and beliefs of social agents are hence real in the sense that they play a role in the social causal order since they may influence others (Fleetwood, 2005; 200). This is particularly important when evaluating policy makers.

The interpretations of social agents can be understood by *"the embeddedness of all human action within a wider range of social processes"* (Pawson and Tilley, 1997; 64). In depth interviewing, can therefore tell us something about social reality. Wengraf (2001; 6-15) noted *"to go in depth is to get a sense of how the apparently straightforward is actually more complicated, or how the 'surface appearances' may be quite misleading about 'depth realities'.* Qualitative research is essentially about detection. Finding associations in attitudes, behaviors or motivations has been important to understanding policymaking, and there is a certain

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[52] I would like to extend my gratitude to all the government officials and policy makers that made this work possible by agreeing to interviews and also to sharing documentation.

categorization involved, which in my case involved "looking behind the façade" and bringing policymaking center stage (North, 2007).

My case is the nation-state of Burkina Faso. While numerous definitions of case study research exist: Blatter (2008:68) defines case study as a 'research approach in which one or a few instances of a phenomenon are studies in depth'. The seems to be an overall agreement that case studies allow for a multi-aspect and holistic investigation of a certain phenomenon or process. Furthermore, case-studies often imply qualitative mixed methods (Ragin, 2000). The goal is mainly to generalize theories. *"In migration studies, the employment of qualitative case study research assuming realist principles can shed light on the complexities and multidimensionality of instances of various migration-related phenomena, can contribute to explanatory endeavours and have wider implications for the depth understanding of the operation of certain causal mechanisms beyond the case or the cases under study".*(Iosifides, 2011).

In migration research, qualitative interviewing is common, especially migrants' stories (for example Lawson, 2000). I was nonetheless determined to introduce new data on policy makers. I conducted interviews with policymakers by judgment sampling, which is a common nonprobability method. I first verified whether a specific Ministry had been created for citizens abroad or African integration – which was the case in countries such as Benin, Cape Verde, Mali, Nigeria, and Senegal. In 2009, Agunias had established a partial list that I used as starting point, and it was further completed by Ratha et al in 2011 (see below). While Burkina Faso does not have a ministry for citizens abroad, the country had instead created High Council for Burkinabe Abroad.

Figure 11 - African Government Institutions dealing with diaspora communities

ANNEX 4A   EXAMPLES OF AFRICAN GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS DEALING WITH DIASPORA COMMUNITIES ABROAD

Table 4A.1   African Government Institutions Dealing with Diaspora Communities Abroad

Country	Diaspora institutions	Activities
Algeria	• Ministry of National Solidarity, Family and the National Community Abroad	
Benin	• Ministry for Foreign Affairs, African Integration, the Francophone Community • Beninese Abroad Subagency (Directorate for Relations with Beninese Abroad)	• Contributes to periodic census of Beninese abroad, in coordination with other agencies.
Burkina Faso	• High Council of Expatriate Burkinabé • Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Cooperation	
Cape Verde	• Ministry of Emigrant Communities • Focal Points for Migration, established in each of Cape Verde's 22 municipalities	
Ethiopia	• Ethiopian Investment Agency • Ethiopian Expatriate Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs • Diaspora Coordinating Office, Ministry of Capacity Building, in each of Ethiopia's nine regional states and in three administrative cities • Embassies abroad	• Ensures the well-being, safety, security, rights, and privileges of Ethiopians abroad. • Disseminates information to the Ethiopian community abroad through media outlets. • Conducts research to identify problems faced by the diaspora in order to improve legislation for its increased participation. • Keeps diaspora informed of relevant issues. • Support events involving the diaspora. High Commission in London organizes annual events. Ghanaian Embassy in Rome works with Council of Ghana Nationals Associations in Italy.

Source: Ratha et al, 2011 page 177

However, I generally noted that these Ministries neither had the political mandate nor the budget or data available to feed into the research as such. There was a need to do further qualitative research and "look behind the façade" (North, 2007) to determine power relations and centers of actual decision-making.

From 2009 until 2014, from Burkina Faso and across Africa to Paris and Copenhagen, I progressively gained access to policymakers and institutions that helped shape the research. This was a long-term endeavor, and a list of people that constantly changed. Migration is an interdisciplinary topic and is at the same time a regional or international matter while being very specific for each country involved. Multiple players and ministries are therefore involved in migration decision-making in African countries, and one cannot necessarily pinpoint a related ministry for all countries. Therefore, I had to do a mapping for each country-specific context to analyze who would be relevant to interview. For example, the migration and development portfolio were moved between three ministries in France during this research, first attached to the Ministry of Foreign affairs, subsequently to the Ministry of Immigration and finally a part of it in the Ministry of the Interior. Furthermore, public players such as OFII (office Francais de Immigration et integration) as well as the Agence Francaise de Developpement should also be included in the stocktaking. After having interviewed key people in charge of the Migration portfolio in the above organization in France, I found out that a person in the Ministry of Finance was also attached to the dossier.

Each country presented a particular institutional setting. Therefore, while the mapping by Aguinas (2009) is useful to determine a trend on migration policies in Africa, it is not in itself useful as methodological approach towards planning interviews with key policymakers. In Burkina Faso, the portfolio was shared between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, in Mali it was amongst other the creation and funding by the EU of the 'Centre d'Information et de Gestion des Migrations' that led to the creation of a ministry for Malians abroad. However, funding quickly dried out for the Ministry itself. In Senegal, one might underline that the portfolio is located at the cabinet of the president, thus surpassing singular ministerial priorities and certain budget restrictions. Beyond the involvement of Ministry of Senegalese Abroad in the portfolio, one should also include the Ministry of Women Entrepreneurship that has been conducting specific interventions on the topic.

Furthermore, policies are also determined – on the one hand - by regional organizations such as ECOWAS, while on the other hand by border agencies and other executing units that are in charge it the actual implementation of the policy. I met with more or less all key stakeholders in West Africa, such as the ECOWAS secretariat, the Ghanaian border agency, Malian customs officers and so forth. Hence, the methodological approach itself of narrowing down the Ministry(ies) in charge of migration policy could be replicated, but it is not sure that the same

people or ministry will be in charge. To obtain draft or even confidential material, one must be able to establish trust with the counterparts and not limit the field of inquiry to predetermined questions (Minichiello et al., 1990; Punch, 1998). These interviews were therefore open-ended (even if preceded by detailed research and preparation (Patton, 2002)). I quickly gave up guiding the interview by a list of questions, also called an *aide memoire* or agenda (Minichiello et al., 1990; Briggs, 2000) but I systematically kept in mind the study's purpose and the general scope of the issues that I wanted to discuss in the interview (Fife, 2005).

As indicated, I progressed by using snowball sampling, which is a non-probability sampling technique that works like chain referral. More specifically, I progressed by exponential non-discriminative snowball sampling, and asked for assistance from the subject being interviewed to help identify people with a similar trait of interest. I would then observe the nominated subjects and continue in the same way until obtaining sufficient information. Beyond conducting interviews with sending and receiving country officials in Africa, I also met with international organizations, experts on migration policy, and migrants. I was in close contact with migration experts across the continent from the main organizations working on labor mobility issues in Africa. This includes organizations such as the African Development Bank, the World Bank, the International Organization for Migration, the International Labor Organization, the European Union, the ACP Secretariat, UNESCO, UNICEF as well as the World Economic Forum's Global Agenda Council on Migration, which also includes private sector actors. I furthermore interviewed officials from other countries around the world, such as Haiti and Trinidad and Tobago, to get access to relevant documentation.

To understand the policymaking process in Burkina Faso, I notably met with both Burkinabe prime ministers in office between 2009 and 2014, Tertius Zongo and Luc Tiao. I also had working sessions with the team in charge of developing Burkina Faso's migration policy, led by Adeline Viviane Zoure, Director of the promotion of regional integration at the Burkinabe Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I additionally met with civil society actors such as King Thiombiano of Fada N'Gourma who is also Member of Parliament, and Moustapha Thiombiano who is head of the Journalist Association. In Burkina Faso, I also met with former Ministers and Ambassadors in order to verify historical aspects, such as Serge Theophile Balima, former Minister of Information under the rule of Thomas Sankara and the first Burkinabe Ambassador to France during the Presidency of Blaise Compaore. I equally had working sessions with policy makers from across Africa and in particular West Africa. I

amongst had other had working sessions with representatives from the governments of Cote, d'Ívoire, Mali and Senegal as well as with the ECOWAS commissariat.

The list below (Annex) provides an overview of the main 50 interviews, and most importantly the data/documents provided by these counterparts. While the chain referral process allows the researcher to reach populations that are difficult to sample when using other sampling methods, a disadvantage of this method is that the researcher has little control over the sampling method. The subjects rely mainly on the previous subjects that were observed. Representativeness of the sample is therefore not guaranteed, and a sample bias was a concern for me during this process. This was especially the case in Burkina Faso - with strong power concentrated in the presidency, a lacking political opposition and a weak civil society - where the main party in power is both the driving force between policies but also the obstacle in actually implementing them. A risk of the snowball sample is hence to see only a group of likeminded people involved in policy making in one single country.

To mitigate this risk, I applied two separate methods: First; I meet with civil society such as the President of the Journalist Association, members of Parliament and the local king of Fada N'Gourma. I also discussed with parents and migrants during field trips. Second: I participated in seminars (See Annex) that worked as focus groups used for generating information on collective views, and the meanings that lie behind those views. It also added cross-border discussions and perspective. Such seminars allowed open discussions on the implementation of policies from high-level policymakers, as well as academics, on the topic of migrations, ranging from remittances to visas to labor mobility and regional integration. It was an opportunity to meet policy makers from different countries along with practitioners and academics to clarify, extend, qualify, or challenge data and information collected through the other methods.

With large gaps in statistics as well as inconsistencies across migration data I had to be creative in my methodological approach towards original data collection. At the same time, I had to address the evident link between policy decisions and those who exercise authority, influence, and control of resource in a society (the people I were mainly interviewing). Elite theory argues that "*public policy is not determined by the demands and actions of masses, but by the ruling elite whose preferences are carried into effect by public officials and agencies*" (Anderson, 1994). In my case, it therefore became important to look at elites migrating to Europe even

though the focus of my thesis is on leveraging intra-regional migration for development through policy making. The relationship between elites and development is crucial due to their predominant role in policymaking.

Paradoxically, the same people that became an elite through access to migration - amongst other – are now in charge of elaborating migration policies that should generate open access for all citizens. I therefore undertook biographic research with the aim of reconstructing social processes of the life-course of social agents in charge of policy making in Burkina Faso. I derived the data from a series of research strategies ranging from the in-depth interviews, literature research, formal and personal archival research. This biographic research can be used as data to link structure and agency regarding migration and its related policies and development potential. "*Biographical methods may lead to detailed and comprehensive reconstructions of linking chains between events, meanings/interpretations, actions and practices*" (Losifides and Sporton, 2009: 104). "*life story and biographical research should be carried out not just to document how people's lives evolve in the subjective sense, but rather that biographical interviews should be used in order to explain life trajectories as they take place in modern societies accounting for underlying social structures and present day societal restructuring and change*". (Iosifides, 2011; 193, quoting Steensen [date unknown]: 11)

In migration research, biographic analysis has the potential to explain patterns of social mobility (Archer, 2007). While the departure of one person seems to be the consequence of an individual decision, biographical research can show correlations to broader trends and structurally conditioned 'collective trajectories' (Apitzsch and Siouti, 2007; 13), not to mention policy trends and political situations. Biographic research can provide depth to the understanding of social reality through analysis of complex multi-level, multidimensional interplay of real causal powers of social agents, structure and culture (Iosifides, 2011).

I therefore undertook a large data collection and analysis of migration patterns of the Burkina Faso governing elite. The sectors from which African elites are mainly drawn included; the private sector, NGO's, CBO's, civic organizations, professional, academic or analyst, the trade union sector, the media and church sector and naturally the public sector and politics (Kotze et al, 2003). The latter two represent what Vilfredo Pareto (1977) describes as governing elites, and is the focus of the analysis. I used sources ranging from historical research to surveys, to newspaper articles and old journals and especially through review of CV's. I first conducted a

thorough historical literature review on the role of migration for elite formation. I went through journals read by the elite at the time and sorted through data and surveys from pre-and post-colonial areas. I subsequently started gathering information about the migration patterns of the Burkinabe governing elite and policy makers through review of CV's of former ministers and Ambassadors etc. I acquired the CV's mainly through trusted sources, data collection or interviews, and it was quite a long data collection process. It showed that with a minority of the population having access to intercontinental success migration, an absolute majority of the Ministers are have attended western foreign schooling. Migration is therefore a criterion of elite distinction.

With a general emigration rate of 9,8%, and 94% of migrants from Burkina Faso going to other African destinations (http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_BFA.html), I began to wonder whether there was a correlation between access to migration and political power when 99,4% of the Burkinabe ministers are return migrations from Europe and North America. This led me to conduct a methodological combined approach of looking partly at elites and at the same time looking at the migration pattern of elites. This allowed me to distinguish three groups of new elites in Burkina Faso since independence and since the decline of the traditional elite: The first group are African-educated civil servants, the second and third groups - respectively military and academic elites - intertwine in regard to migratory trajectories, both having France as transit points for political posts. The latter groups - and especially the academic group - have since independence represented the governing elite.

Table 3 - African versus internationally educated elites

'Company boys' – African-educated (pre-colonial elite)	New elites – return migrants (France) (post-colonial elite)
Maurice Yameogo (b. 1921), *first President of Upper Volta (1960-1966),*	**Major General Aboubakar Sangoulé Lamizana (b. 1916),** *President (1966-1980)*
Ouezzine Coulibaly (b. 1909), *first Vice-President of the Territorial Assembly (1957-1958),*	**Colonel Saye Zerbo (b. 1932),** P*resident (1980-1982)*
Joseph Conombo (b. 1917), *first Vice-President of the National Assembly of Upper Volta (1961)*	**Thomas Sankara (b. 1949),** *President (1983-1987)*
Daogo Mathias Sorgho (b. 1920), *first Minister of Education and Ambassador to Paris (1963-1966)*	**Fidèle Toé (b. 1944),** *Minister of the Conseil National de la Republique (1984-1987)*
Gérard Kango Ouedraogo (b. 1925) *first Prime Minister (1971-1974)*	**Blaise Compaore (b. 1951),** *President (1987-2014)*

It should in that regard be noted that my research ended before the fall of Burkina Faso's long sitting President Blaise Compaore (1987-2014)[53]. A popular uprising forced Blaise Compaore from office in October 2014. It should be underlined that current President Roch March Christian Kabore was already before the election on my list of policy makers in Burkina Faso that share the main characteristics of the Burkinabe elite; being a return academic migrant from an OECD country. President Kabore obtained his master's degree at the University of Dijon in France. The migration divide should thus differentiate various categories of migrants (high-skilled versus low-skilled, and intercontinental versus intra-African, the elite versus masses), and include the large contrast between those for whom migration represents a livelihood - or even survival – strategy, compared to those where it is an opportunity, an investment, or an insurance function for income diversification.

Policies cannot simply be downloaded from a website, and I thus encountered methodological obstacles as to how to obtain such policies. Therefore, a combined methodological approach was necessary; firstly, to establish contact and build trust with West African and African policy makers; secondly to acquire and analyze African (draft) migration policies and protocols, and subsequently measure their actual implementation. Secondly, it was difficult to assess the

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[53] While my research took place from December 2009 to June 2014, data collection was mainly carried out from 2009 to 2013.

actual implementation of policies both due to lack of data and statistics and since this therefore requires detailed qualitative fieldwork (Cf. Brachet, 2005; Infantino, 2010). Thirdly, in order to go further in the analysis as to explaining the factors determining why they are not implemented demands thorough analysis of financial and human resources, competing policy priorities and the investment by civil servants (Boswell, 2007; Czaika and de Haas, 2011). The disparate methods adopted reinforced one another (Silverman, 2000; Legan, 2003). Evidence from desk work informed the content of questions raised during interviews, while evidence gathered in the interviews corroborates the findings of the first part. This combination of qualitative methods allowed for a broader understanding of the subject.

Beyond international resolutions and agreements (such as those set forth by the United Nations, the European Union, and the African Union), the various policy discourses and policies on migration are my main source of information to examine how labor mobility is reflected on the political agenda in West Africa.

I used discourse analysis to further understand the implementation of policies or relating discourse to non-discursive realities. Since I was not as such researching migration flows, but rather the management of migration I had to obtain and evaluate obtain migration policies in an African context that functions largely without data, statistics and is to a large extent offline. "*Through discourse analysis, the aim is to investigate "the subtle ways in which unusual power relations are maintained and reproduced through language use"* (Weininger, 2008; 145). Norman Faircloud underlines that *"The objective of discourse analysis, on this view, is not simply analysis of discourse per se, but analysis of the relations between discourse and non-discoursal elements of the social, in order to reach a better understanding of these complex relations (including how changes in discourse can cause changes in other elements)"*. (Fairclough 2005: 924). Discourse analysis is also particularly well suited as a qualitative method of studying migration, seeing the recent surge of discourses regarding migration as 'immigration problem' or 'threat'.

I also built my thesis around information drawn from original and undisclosed (often confidential) - acquired by sources through numerous interviews and field visits - information from draft national migration policies across Africa such as; The draft migration policy for ECOWAS (currently confidential draft version); draft migration policies for Mali, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia and Nigeria; draft revision of the ECOWAS 1979 Protocol on Free Movement; draft national Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (with integration of migration); draft regional Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers; draft COMESA negotiation paper; mapping of migration

portfolios in national governments; ongoing cross-border or regional negotiations; mandate of ECOWAS Executive Secretariat; official progress of Policies in Regional Economic Communities stated in public documentation.

The frameworks of neighboring countries guided the work of this thesis by outlining the international factors that might influence national policymaking in Burkina Faso. Unfortunately, the migration policy under elaboration in 2014 was not validated in time and hence forgotten amongst other political priorities – this was also the case for the Migration Policy developed for neighboring Mali in the year prior to the uprising in 2013. This does not mean that migration is not a priority issue for development in landlocked poor Burkina Faso (and neighboring Mali). However, it remains to be determined whether migration will become "high politics" under a new era of Burkinabe politics in the government following Blaise Compaore. Qualitative historical and discourse analysis proved to be an important tool to understand social mobility and change over time, and through numerous interviews with policy-makers I was able to build a case-study on Burkina Faso as presented in the following chapters.

4. Historical perspectives on the migration divide in Burkina Faso

Access to migration is a privilege that is unevenly distributed among human beings from developed versus developing countries, as underlined in the scenario of "Migration Without Borders" (Pécoud & de Guchteneire, 2007). People from developing countries depend on visas and residence permits to a larger extent than citizens of the developed world. There is thus an asymmetry between the right to *emigration* - as underlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) – which is not complemented by an internationally recognized right to *immigration* (Walzer, 1983, Pécoud & de Guchteneire, 2007, Zolberg, 2012). Both the theory of involuntary immobility (Carling, 2002) and the scenario of Migration Without Borders (Pécoud & de Guchteneire, 2007) define migration and mobility as a strategic resource and underline the contradictory reality of enormous flows versus increasing restrictions to mobility. The concept of the migration divide was developed to describe the increasing difficulty or "involuntary immobility" of Africans accessing the resource of migration to improve life conditions in the global north, and it mainly alludes to a difference between those who *can* and *cannot* migrate to OECD countries (Carling, 2002; Carling and Åkesson, 2009).

The moral responsibility of the migration divide is largely placed on the receiving and developed countries and the inequality of mobility has mainly been determined as a consequence of restrictive immigration policies. Against the background of tightened immigration control in the global north and the "securitization" of migration, the debate about "open borders"[54] has spread in recent years. One of the moral arguments for open borders is the issue of inequalities (Carens, 1987; 2011). While citizens from developed countries may travel and settle down almost anywhere in the world, their counterparts from less-developed countries are usually restricted in their movement. *"Citizenship in Western liberal democracies is the modern feudal privilege – an inherited status that greatly enhances one's life chances"* (Carens, 1987). Inequality also prevails with regard to the selection of desirable migrants as opposed to 'undesirable' ones (Pécoud & de Guchteneire, 2007; 9).

Empirically, this chapter shows the historical emergence of a *migration divide* between intercontinental and intra-African migrants. Through a historical analysis, the paper underlines how academic migration to France became a means to social mobility in Burkina Faso after

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[54]   A comprehensive collection of arguments for and against open borders can be found at http://openborders.info/

independence, while today there is a breakdown of the social elevator via migration since preferential access to migration is likely to enhance the divide between rich and poor.

The achievement of inclusive growth depends, to a large extent, on the capability of the most disadvantaged social groups to participate actively in the formation of wealth and receive, in return, a rewarding proportion of growth that can spur social mobility (Commission on growth and Development, 2008; World Bank, 2009). For migrants this would mainly be achieved through an income increase and the concomitant increase in remittances. The concept of the migration divide, as defined in this paper, therefore combines the theories involuntary immobility and migration without border in order to nuance the understanding of the migration divide while introducing a sending state perspective and looking at initiatives related to access to emigration. This dissertation suggests that the migration divide should differentiate various categories of migrants (high-skilled versus low-skilled, and intercontinental versus intra-African, the elite versus masses), and include the large contrast between those for whom migration represents a livelihood - or even survival – strategy, compared to those where it is an opportunity, an investment or an insurance function for income diversification.

In order to conduct this analysis, it was important to look at migration patterns of the governing elite in Burkina Faso over time. This chapter presents a historical analysis of the migration divide in Burkina Faso through primary sources (surveys and journals as well as review of CV's) looking at: First, the history of when intercontinental migration became a means to social mobility after independence, and, secondly, the consequent breakdown of the social elevator. It is crucial to look at historical factors since, according to Bourdieu (1991), the reproduction of structures of domination in society precisely depends on the imposition of cultural values which are represented as universal but which are in fact politically and historically determined. The understanding of social mobility as presented in this thesis is built on the capabilities approach as developed by Amartya Sen (1999), which necessitates a combination of opportunity/capability (vectors) and process (ability/agency). Furthermore, social mobility implies equity and equality of opportunities, thus inclusive growth – which is both an outcome and a process (Ali and Son, 2007; Rauiyar and Kanbur, 2010; Ali and Zhuang, 2007; Klasen, 2010). This thesis introduces the argument that there is limited and preferential access to migration – thus a migration divide – that is to a large extent determined by initiatives from within the sending states. Therefore, beyond looking at the role of restrictive immigration

policies in shaping a migration divide, one should include domestic factors that limit access to the resource of migration.

Through alternative methodological approaches, the following shows that since only a privileged few have access to intercontinental migration for academic or wealth accumulation; migration has become a key criterion of elite distinction in Africa. Burkina Faso has always been a country of high emigration, mainly providing cheap labor to neighboring Côte d'Ivoire. The large majority of Burkinabe migrants stay within Africa for income diversification or even survival. After reviewing the CV's of ministers in the governments under Burkinabe President Blaise Compaore (in office 1987-2014), it is striking to see that with only 6% of all migrants going outside the African continent the absolute majority of ministers have undertaken academic migration to OECD countries, for example 99,6% of the ministers in the 2002-2007 government. Comparative studies of elites in African countries have indeed showed that migration is a common characteristic of elite distinction in Africa (Kotzé and Steyn, 2003). In a society with a basic limited access order - built on interpersonal relations - such as Burkina Faso, many elites have been educated in the Open Access Orders of Europe and North America (North et al, 2007; 30). However, the theory of Limited Access Order does not further elaborate on the correlation between migration and enhancing one's capabilities (Sen, 1999) in order to access opportunities for elite formation. With academic migration as a main entry point to access this limited social order, this thesis will therefore question the factor of migration as an element to institutionalizing open access and the link between migration and social mobility. In doing so, theories addressing forms of domination and the role of structures become important (Bourdieu, 1991).

4.1 History of migration as a means to social mobility

Already in the commercially based society of 19th century West Africa, migration was key to elite status (Manchuelle, 1997). In this competitive hierarchic society, where influence was measured in riches, migration was a resource and a strategy for the elite in order to either stay in power or gain power. From the 19th century on, Soninke migration represented a power strategy[55]. In the same sense, during the 20th century, the majority of Krou chiefs in Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia had migrated as sailors aboard European ships, and accumulated riches during their long periods overseas (Manchuelle, 2004). Over time the most prosperous migration patterns have been practiced by the elites; from navigation to railroad construction, and from diamond trading to today's Western academic migration (Dia, 2010; Gaibazzi, 2012).

Historians such as Manchuelle (2004) and Gaibazzi (2012) have underlined the lack of correlation between poverty and migration among the pioneer migrants. If many scholars have seen migration as being a consequence of poverty, instead of being linked to profit, it also means that the factor of elite migration as a resource in political strategy has been largely overlooked. The general perception of the causes of migration during colonization has mainly been that they lay in the instauration of colonial taxes and the pressures exercised by the colonial powers, as well as the impoverishment of the rural regions during colonization. However, the pioneers of West African intercontinental migration were the Soninke, and mainly the upper social classes. Clientelism has yet to occupy a main place in migration studies, but alliances among certain aristocratic families and clans contributed to the further development and monopolizing of migration. In societies with weak, decentralized and non-existent states - or in limited access orders - clientelism has often been one of the essential elements of power enforcing the goal of establishing a clientele (Manchuelle, 2004).

Until the 1960's, the Soninke represented most Sub-Saharan migration towards France. Historically, the main basin of emigration towards France was thus around the Senegal River, the border area linking Senegal (regions of Bakel and Matam), Mauritania (Hodh Baydân and Gidimaka) and Mali (Kayes region), inhabited by the Soninke. Their migration towards France inscribes itself within a tradition of mobility that has its roots long before the massive black

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[55] While migration for the Soninke represented a road to power, migration for the Foutanke (the neighbors of the Soninke) was not a strategy practiced by the chief families. The elected nature of the Foutanke government obliged the candidates to renounce migration and stay close to the political arena. Simultaneously, the maraboutic Foutanke had very early on played a political role (from the 18th century), and did thus not have to focus all energy on commerce in order to acquire influence solely through riches.

labor recruitments in the French colonial maritime traffic and before the enrollment of African soldiers, the "tiralleur senegalais" during the First World War (Bredeloup, 1994; Michel, 2003; Gubert, 2008). The Soninke became specialized as maritime navigators in the 20th century, which induced the first arrival of Soninke in France, followed by many to come. manpower enlisted by French companies. In 1956, there were officially 15.000 Sub-Saharan African immigrants in France, mainly of Soninke descent. In 1968, 85% of African immigrants in France originated from the small region linking Senegal, Mauritania and Mali, 85% of them were Soninke. In the early 1970s the number of sub-Saharan African work migrants had increased to 65.000, where of 64% were of Soninke descent (Manchuelle, 2004).

The Soninke also had a precursor role in shaping intercontinental migration pattern, for example for the Burkinabe. The following section shows that it was only after the Second World War that intercontinental migration for profit was introduced in the societal order in Burkina Faso. The Soninke influenced the movement of other ethnic groups - such as the Houssa and the Mossi of Upper Volta - who started arriving in Dakar and other African cities after the Second World War and subsequently in France largely due to the ties developed with the Soninke during work migrations (Manchuelle, 2004). This migration was neither generated by colonization nor by poverty but rather by pull factors such as profit and politics.

During colonization, the French indirect rule had permitted traditional leaders to retain traditional authority and status if they cooperated with the colonial administration (Gervais, 1996). The French had created territorial units in West Africa as well as a federal administrative entity; Afrique Occidentale Francaise (AOF). AOF was composed throughout most of its history of eight territorial units: Dahomey – now Niger, French Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, French Soudan -now Mali, and Upper Volta – now Burkina Faso. The colony of Upper Volta was created in 1919 after the conquest of the territory around the River Niger. Upper Volta was, however, broken up and merged with the neighboring territories (French Soudan, Dahomey and Ivory Coast) from I932 to 1947 in order to create a reservoir of manpower (Fall, 1993). These migration patterns of providing manpower from the Burkinabe hinterland to the more prosperous coastal country of Côte d'Ivoire has since then represented the majority of all emigration, while it still represents the largest bilateral flows in Africa even today.

The AOF simultaneously established modern educational systems and productive enterprises linked to the world market; such as cotton production in Upper Volta (Wallerstein, 1965). The

territorial structures with their administrative centers, schools, and the new economic activities combined to produce a new migratory movement to the towns and the emergence of non-traditional elites centered in the urban areas. This group has been referred to as the administrative elite or "company boys" (Le Vine, 1968; 372), which existed parallel to the traditional elite, respectively laying claim to prestige and position in the urban, territorial social structure versus the rural traditional one.

When looking at the history of education and its role in the emergence of a new elite in Upper Volta, it is important to underline that children of the educated formed the larger part of those who went to school in the period I930-45 (Wallerstein, 1965). The AOF teaching report of the year 1905-1906 very well underlines the objectives of the french colonial schools: "*Réunir à l'école les enfants des grandes familles qui ont gouverné autrefois ce pays, les amener à comprendre la fermeté bienveillante de notre domination, à apprécier la grandeur de nos idées et de nos institutions et leur donner en meme temps une solide instruction de manière à ce qu'ils puissent devenir de précieux agents pour le maintien de notre action politique parmi les populations indigènes* » (Massa and Georges, 1995 ; 363). Upper Volta had generally been marginalized within the Sudanese and Ivorian school systems, and at the reconstitution of the colony in it had the lowest percentage of school enrolment (2,3%) of the AOF. The schools mainly recruited sons of village chiefs, of notables, of religious chiefs and of former soldiers.

Physical mobility – domestic and internation migration in pursuit of education – played a key role in social mobility and particularly in the deline of the trafitional rulers. The French indirect rule permitted traditional leaders to retain traditional authority and status if they cooperated with the colonial administration (Le Vine, 1968). The delegates of the French African Conference in Brazzaville in 1944 laid the ground for the governmental structures under the French Union but failed to define the role of the chiefs. At the 1945 post-war elections of municipal officers, none of the African chiefs thus had a role besides from their unofficial influence. Nonetheless, various traditional leaders, such as the Mossi chief called Mogho Naba, still represented important areas of real power and electoral strength since the level of political participation as well as political party activity was low throughout the territories of French West Africa before the Second World War (Skinner, 1964). The Mossi count approximately half of the Upper Volta population, with four kingdoms: Ouagadougou, Yatenga, Tendokogo and Fada N'Gourma.

Picture 1 - The chiefs of Burkina Faso

(Mogho Naba Kougri – center- and, from the left, the Kambo Naba, the Gounga Naba, the Ouidi Naba, the Larhalle Naba, the Baloum Naba, and the Nembo Naba.) (Skinner, 164; 178)

From Brazzaville in 1949 to Dakar in 1956 - during a Congress of chiefs with the Union of syndicates of traditional chiefs - the influence of the chiefs declined drastically. Chiefs thus only continued to be represented in the territories where they were most powerful, such as Upper Volta as well as Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Cameroon and Chad (Le Vine, 1968). It should however be noted that the Mogho Naba retained less power and autonomy within the new African states than for example the Lamibé in Cameroon, or the marabouts of the Mouridiya "confréries" in Senegal that held a political leverage with the modern government of President Leopold Senghor (Hailey, 1957).

In the decade before independence, political oppositions to chiefs (such as the Movement democratique Voltaic led by Gerard Ouedraogo) had started to form out of the fact that chiefs were operating in one power structure and the politicians in another (Le Vine, 1968). Afrique Nouvelle, which was read by the West African elite, wrote in 1957 "*let us democratize the chieftainship*" (Skinner, 1964; 192). The 1945 election in the Ivory Coast/Upper Volta[56] of the second-college deputy (until I946 Africans were legally divided into 'subjects' and 'citizens') to the First National Constituent Assembly under the 4th Republic in France opposed the old, new and traditional elite (Wallerstein, 1965).

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[56] Upper Volta was integrated in Ivory Coast at the time

Prior to World War One, only a small number of Africans were educated in metropolitan French schools. In 1946, there were less than fifty students from francophone Africa in metropolitan France, and these were mainly Senegalese Soninke (Le Vine, 1967). The introduction of a modern education system introduced significant political consequences. Education played a key role in the decline of the traditional elite, with the introduction of an alternative means of social mobility beyond the traditional structure in society. The following sections will show how *"The prestige of the chiefs fell sharply and passed on to the white man's scribblers"* (Ayandele, 1967), first through education acquired within Africa then by academic migration to the global north.

Victor Le Vine, in his book 'Political Elite Recruitment and Political Structure in French-Speaking Africa', describes the French-speaking African elite from 1945-1960 as "company boys" (Le Vine, 1968; 372). This group existed parallel to the traditional elite, respectively laying claim to prestige and positions in the urban, territorial social structure as opposed to the rural traditional one that was on the decline. *"Those recruited were middle-level civil servants, professionals, quasi-professionals, trained before the war, and in Africa, plus chiefs and notables, most of them appointed or legitimized before the war"* (Le Vine, 1968; 377).

The electoral law of the territories of October 1946 did not specifically discriminate against the chiefs, but it was heavily weighted in favor of the educated and urban elite. The electorate was confined to civil servants, soldiers and veterans, chiefs and permanent employees. Candidates notably had to have good knowledge of French. Over 50% of those recruited to the 1946-1952 Assemblies were products of the colonial system. It was the expertise and political skill acquired within the system that appears to have been the main criteria of eligibility for recruitment to the legislatures. Many chiefs were thus eligible but because their fathers had opposed them being educated at mission-sponsored schools, few were qualified to run for office. The candidates included a few educated members of the chiefly families that had been given to the Europeans to be educated – not being in the main line of descent or being otherwise ineligible for office in the traditional system. In Upper Volta, the choice of African civil servants was that they were among the only persons with the training and education required for candidacy.

Picture 2 - The new urban elite in Burkina Faso

(Left: Mogho Naba Kougri and Ouezzin Coulibaly. Center: Maurice Yaméogo. Right: Mogho Naba Kougri (1957) on his ceremonial horse at his installation) (Skinner, 1964; 77).

Thus came into existence a very small urban elite, where membership was obtained through education (acquired in Africa at that time). In Upper Volta, civil servants - such as Blaise Benon, Francois Bouda, Zinda Kaboré, Christophe Kalenzaga, Tindougou Ouedraogo, Zabango Pohi and Maurice Yaméogo - were among the only persons with the training and education required for candidacy (Skinner, 1964).

In AOF, a little more than half (52%) of the first Ministers were career civil servants (Massa and Georges, 1995). In Upper Volta, nonetheless, only 17% were civil servants, while they had the absolute largest majority of teachers (58%) in the AOF. Simultaneously, Upper Volta had some of West Africa's lowest levels of representatives of the liberal professions (17%) and industrials/plant owners (8%). This group of African educated, civil servants trained under the French administration was called the administrative elite. Among the civil servants were previously mentioned Maurice Yameogo who became Upper Volta's first president. The group also includes Ouezzine Coulibaly and Joseph Conombe. Both started their careers at the notorious Colonial school William Ponty in Dakar and became respectively the 1st vice-president of the territorial assembly from 1957-1958 and the 1st Vice-president of the National assembly of Haute Volta in 1961. This group of people born from 1907-1925 also includes the

first prime minister, Gerard Kango Ouedraogo, and the 1st Minister of Education and Ambassador to Paris, Daogo Mathias Sorgho.

Before international academic migration was introduced as a means to social mobility, the schools in Africa were among the few institutions that could allocate and regulate privileges, mainly built on Western liberal traditions and Christian values (Watson and Ozanne, 2012). The majority of the first group of African educated civil servants had attended the Pabré Seminary in Burkina Faso (Jezequel, 2005) or the William Ponty School in Dakar before joining the ranks of the administration. This group included, amongst others, the first President of Upper Volta and the first Prime Minister. In the following, we will see that the introduction of academic international migration led to social mobility for the new post-independence elite.

4.2 Return migrants; the new elite

While the cocoa boom of the 1960s was inducing high levels of emigration from Upper Volta to Ivory Coast in particular (but also initially Ghana and Nigeria), school enrolment in Upper Volta had only risen to 6% in 1960 (Massa and Georges, 1995), which is where membership to the elite was from now on obtained. Education was translated into occupations, particularly administrative positions, which in turn were the most stable and one of the most lucrative sources of income. With time, it became a relatively open elite, in that access to education became available to lower-caste persons in the traditional systems, albeit not in absolute proportion to their numbers. For the new African states, education was equally seen as a rapid mechanism for the creation of national loyalty. Its expansion was a way of rectifying the regional imbalances and increasing the size and the number of economic institutions. Secondary and higher educational institutions were opened in French Africa, notably the universities in Dakar and Abidjan. The elite distinction now became foreign higher education, and the main route to political destinations was through Paris/France.

One can therefore distinguish three groups of new elites in Burkina Faso since independence and since the decline of the traditional elite: The first group are African-educated civil servants, the second and third groups - respectively military and academic elites - intertwine in regard to migratory trajectories, both having France as transit points for political posts.

Table 4 - Group 1: African-educated elites

- **1st president 60-66:** Maurice Yameogo (1921) – African educated, civil servant under French administration
- **1st vice-president of territorial assembly 57-58**: Ouezzine Coulibaly (1909): Colonial school William ponty in Dakar
- **1st Vice president of National assembly of Haute Volta 1961/3rd prime minister 1978-80**: Joseph Conombe (1917). Colonial school William ponty in Dakar l'école Africaine de Médecine Jules Carde à Dakar and also a tirailleur sénégalais
- **1st prime minister (71-74):** OUEDRAOGO Gérard Kango (1925), primary school Terrasson de Fougeres in Bamako, colonial administration at the governors palace in Bamako, civil servant under French administration
- **1st Minister of Education, Ambassador to Paris (63-66):** SORGHO Daogo Mathias (1920) African educated, civil servant under French administration

Table 5 - Group 2: Military elites

- **Director for Haute-Volta school of administration, Minister of foreign affairs (1967):** ZOROME Malick (1935), ENA, Paris

- **2nd president 66-80/2nd prime minister 74-78**: Major General Aboubakar Sangoulé Lamizana (1916) french colonial army, as tiralleur sénégalais. Wars of Indochina and Algeria
- **3rd president 80-82**: Colonel Saye Zerbo. 1932 french colonial army, as tiralleur sénégalais. Wars of Indochina and Algeria
- **5th president 83-87**: Thomas Sanakara (1949). Military academy Madagscar and France
- **6th president 87-now:** Blaise Compaore (1951). Military academy in Cameroun and France

Table 6 - Group 3: Internationally educated elites

- **4th president 82-83**: Major Dr. Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo (1942) medical doctor (France)
- **Minister of foreign affairs (82-82):** KAFANDO Michel (1942) Master Bordeaux, Paris, Geneve.
- **Judge, Ambassador to US (73-74):** YAGUIBOU Amadou Télesphore. Dakar, Paris
- **Minister of commerce (74-78):** ZOMA Emmanuel (1934), Sciences Polituques Paris

The latter groups and especially the academic group - with around 99% of the ministers being return migrants - have since independence represented the governing elite.

After 1946, opportunities for technical and higher education in France were extended to thousands of French-speaking Africans. University students in Paris have continuously since 1945 represented the radical leaven in French-speaking West Africa. By 1957, expanded educational opportunities (in France but also in Africa) plus the activities of political parties and modern organizations, such as unions, began to produce a new and younger generation of recruitable leaders. At the eve of independence in 1959, the number of "boursiers" in France from French West Africa and Madagascar had rapidly increased to 3000 from 471 in 1953 (Le Vine, 1967). It quickly rose to 5000 in 1961 for French Africa and Madagascar.

"As new generations of persons return from abroad with more varied educational experiences, and with degrees from a variety of foreign educational systems ... those derived from the colonial period (were) increasingly challenged" (Coleman, 1965; 45). Consequently, in the first years of independence, a large distrust towards the other generation developed. *"The national leaders, using the state machinery and the national party structures, are in a sense constantly struggling on both fronts, and have thus far managed to remain in power in all the states of French-speaking West Africa."* (Wallerstein, 1965; 32).

This was coupled with a progressive change of tactics by the French administration under the leadership of the then Minister for Overseas Territories, Francois Mitterrand, from systematic opposition to the 'new' modern elite - the emergent enlarged administrative bourgeois class - to cooperation with it. The victory of the modern elite was secured in July 1957 by the mass parties with the establishment of territorial governments under the loi-cadre (Wallerstein, 1965). The law gave them the essential legal and political tools with which to consolidate their power against traditional elites, the 'old' urban elite, and the colonial administration, and even more so after independence in 1960.

Among the respondents to Victor Le Vine's 1966 survey of the West African elites, it was the case that most of the first-generation elite tended to feel that some form of activism was the prime characteristic of the elite, while most of those in the second generation stressed the possession of formal education as the main feature. *"Education now confers a privilege previously unknown,"* said a respondent to the survey (Le Vine, 1967; 15). Magnus Bassay explains that, without exception, all initial leaders of the trade unions and youth movements in Africa were also individuals educated in the West: *'Western education was not only the prime mover of political socialization in Africa but also its "Open, Sesame"'* (Bassay, 1999; 107). Formal education was linked directly to employment prospects and education became key to elite formation in post-independence Upper Volta. Academic migration thus enforced the divide between the haves and have-nots due to the uneven acquisition of education between ethnic groups and regions. *"In Africa, education is not only a means of social, political and economic reward, but also a powder keg or megaton bomb",* (Bassey, 1999; 107).

Sources from the 1960's underlined the following characteristics of the political culture of the new elite: 1) common French educational experience, 2) shared political values, 3) common political education, 4) contact with or participation in French political parties and/or trade unions, or their African affiliates, 5) participation in African political parties, movements or associations (Le Vine, 1967; 5-7). In Peter C. Lloyd's introductory chapter to 'The New Elites of Tropical Africa' from 1966, he defined the new elites as *"those persons who were Western-educated and wealthy to a high degree relative to the mass of the population"* (Lloyd, 1966; 4). Or as Victor Le Vine put it: *"The definition of a political elite in French-speaking Africa, moreover, is clouded by the fact that membership of the 'elite' is claimed by most people who have acquired modern secondary and higher education"* (Le Vine, 1968; 375).

The drive towards centralization meant that after independence politics became primary not only in an ideological sense but also in the sense of being the main vehicle of personal wellbeing and social mobility for the elite.

While from 1947 to 1960, political life in Upper Volta was characterized by a multiparty system (Massa and Georges, 1995), the Upper Volta of the early 1960's can generally be described by primacy of the party (over the administration, and over interest groups) and the structure of the party as a mass party (Wallerstein, 1965). Aristide Zolberg (1966) has characterized this as the 'party-state'. By July 1962, all French-speaking West and Equatorial African States, except Gabon, had become (formally or de facto) single-party states. In six states, a "parti unique" had been installed before independence[57]. In Upper Volta, the UDV was the de facto single-party[58]. "*Les ambitions et les querelles de personnes marquent fortement la vie politique; de même, l'influence de Houphouët-Boigny et de la Côte-d'Ivoire sur celle-ci est manifeste... A la veille de la proclamation de l'indépendance, le multipartisme s'était progressivement transformé en monopartisme de l'UDV-RDA. L'opposition parlementaire crédible a été liquidée*" (Massa and Georges, 1995; 447).

Picture 3 - Burkina Faso & Cote d'Ivoire Presidents Blaise Compaore and Felix Houphouet

(Massa and Georges, 1995)

In a classic analysis of the ruling class, John Plamenatz (1965) underline four minority categories that occupy the central political stage in a democracy: a) The head of organizations that struggle to be in power (parties), b) civil servants, c) the head of organizations that rival to influence those in power, and d) those who independently shape public opinion such as

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[57] Senegal, Mali, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Central African Republic and Niger
[58] Burkina Faso is still a de-facto single-party state, without a powerful opposition and with every Prime Minister under President Blaise Compaore – in power since 1987 - having been from the ruling party.

journalists. The main thing they have in common is preserving the system that keeps them in power. When there is supremacy of one party, such as is the case in Burkina Faso, one can talk about the leading elite instead of a ruling class (Plamenatz, 1965). Only a limited number of people can get access to the positions of central decisions making, which is generally achieved through the support and acceptance of the politicians already in place.

Among the migrating governing elite were the military. The Mogho Naba Soughri II was allegedly elected amongst other because he had been an officer in the French colonial army in Cote d'Ivoire, while his younger brother had stayed in Burkina Faso (Massa and Georges, 1995). One might include Mogho Naba in the category of rulers of French military educated Burkinabe such as the second and third presidents of Upper Volta: Major General Aboubakar Sangoulé Lamizana and Colonel Saye Zerbo. Both integrated the French colonial army as "tirralleurs sénégalais" and participated in the wars of Indochina and Algeria. Also the last two presidents, Thomas Sankara and Blaise Compaore[59], born in 1949 and 1951, joined military academies in France and Africa.

Similarly, their trajectories seem to initially be African destinations, such as Madagascar, Cameroun or Morocco, and then France. During Thomas Sankara's further military education in Morocco he meets Blaise Compaore (Massa and Georges, 1995). Their common stay in Morocco consolidates the future group of revolutionary military of Thomas Sankara, Blaise Compaore and Jean-Baptiste Lingani and Henri Zongo. In Bordeaux he joined Fidèle Toé who reached out to Burkinabe students, and in Paris he met Valère Some who frequented the anti-imperialist circles with among other Soumane Touré. He went to high school in Bobo-Dioulasso with both the latter.

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[59] On the 15th of October 1987 Thomas Sankara was assassinated, and Blaise Compaore was subsequently in power from 1987 until 2014. Sankara is thought to have himself declared that *« Si un coup d'état a lieu contre moi, cela ne peut venir que de Blaise Compaore. Il connait toutes mes habitudes»* (Jaffré, 1997; 194).

Picture 4 - Thomas Sankara

(Massa and Georges, 1995)

"One might add that migration not only played a key role in accessing power, but also in constituting political alliances" (Interview 9) explained Serge Theophile Balima during an Interview conducted in September 2010 in Ouagadougou. When Sankara entered the government of Colonel Saye Zerbo as Minister of Information, he chose Fidèle Toé as cabinet chief and included Serge Theophile Balima in their team. Serge Theophile Balima later became Minister of information in the Sankara government and Ambassador to France. Today, Serge Theophile Balime is a Professor at the University of Ouagadougou and also assists International Organisations in Burkina Faso.

The interview with Serge Theophile Balima was important in the sense that it gave insights into key historical events that shaped policy and politics in Burkina Faso. The extraordinary experience of Mr Balima, and the very pedagogical way he explains it, helped understand the complex relationships in a limited access order such as Burkina Faso. The interview both confirmed what the academic literature underline but also gave nuance to the importance of migration in accessing power, through access to privileged education abroad but also networks and alliances across the elite.

Shortly before the 1982 coup d'état which brought Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo into power, when the director of the Voltaic press agency was questioned by the police, Sankara resigned from his minister post and from the CMRPN "« *je me démarque de cette action politique. Et c'est parce que la forme de pouvoir pour conduire le 'redressement national' ne pouvait servir que les intérêts d'une minorité. ... le CMRPN ne saurait ignorer que tout le pouvoir à*

nécessairement un contenu de classe » (Jaffré, 1997; 126). While Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo at the "carrefour africain" meeting with Thomas Sankara on January 3rd in 1983 stated that the politicians in power since the 1960's were « *loups déguisés en agneaux* » (Jaffre, 1997; 142). John Plamenatz explains that : « *Sous tous les climats, la majorité des hommes sont formées de moutons, si bien que les lions et les renards se placent spontanément à leur tête. ... Si l'on entend juger la portée du contrôle exercé par certains hommes sur d'autres, il faut procéder à l'étude concrète d'un système de relations gouvernées par des règles.* » (Plamenatz, 1965 ; 28). Thus, only a limited number of people can get access to the positions of central decisions making, which is generally achieved through the support and acceptance of the politicians already in place. In 1966, Afrique Nouvelle wrote that: *"Nobody is hiding, and especially the youth, that a dictatorship of a little clan has imposed itself on Upper Volta[60]"* (Afrique Nouvelle, 1966, Nr 962; 16). In fact, the Yamoeogo government was described as a *"Clan who had against it the youth, unions and traditional leaders"[61]* (Afrique Nouvelle, 1966, Nr 965; 16).

The conversion from multi-party to a single-party system represented a fundamental change in the elite recruitment system: apart from the official theory of rapid Africanisation, none of the West African governments were willing to employ all the "intellectuals" available[62]. One reason was economic, since the French government paid the salaries of its civil servants who were seconded to work with African governments[63], thus providing an important subsidy to African budgets that would be lost by Africanisation. But the main reason was political, with fear of being overthrown by the younger returning academic migrants: "*We send them abroad so that they can learn to help us. They return believing us all wrong in everything we do, and burning to replace us.*" (Le Vine, 1967; 52). Since the "democratization" of the chieftaincy - which had meant increasing the role of rural "non-traditional" or "modern" elements in the choice of local authorities – the government had begun to hire nationalists as civil servants and keep an eye on the technicians. This was especially true for the new ones recently returned

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[60] *"Personne ne cache ici, et surtout par les jeunes, qu'une dictature d'un petit clan s'est abatue sur la Haute-Volta*

[61] *Clan qui avait contre lui les jeunes, les syndicats et les chefs traditionels ».*

[62] Additionally, unlike Senegal, Upper Volta did not have an intellectual surplus. Rather, there was a lack of trained personnel, especially trained technicians, engineers and doctors. Official manpower-need projections for the period 1961-1965 listed 542 positions in government. In March 1965 only 124 Upper Voltans of the more than 350 abroad in secondary and higher education institutions in France and Africa were said to be trained in those positions.

[63] Over 450 French personnel worked in Upper Volta during the presidency of Yameogo, including those providing technical assistance in the governmental machinery, but also 56 French teachers fulfilling their national service obligations by teaching at the Lycée Oezzin Coulibaly in Ouagadougou and other schools.

from universities in France, while it also applied to the older technicians who were suspect of collaborationist ideas. They instead created party structures, composed of men who were less educated than the technicians but more committed to the new governmental structures, to keep watch over the administrators. Under the slogan of "*pas d'africanisation au rabais*" (Wallerstein, 1965; 21) the students contested the non-employment of many intellectuals. Therefore, some returning elites preferred to withdraw from active participation in the dominant party to await a hypothetical "changing of the guard".

When reading Afrique Nouvelle from the months around the 1966 elections, a generational clash indeed seemed to be approaching. *"One could easily imagine a real quarrel between ancients and moderns in Upper Volta[64] »* (Afrique Nouvelle, 1966, nr 966; 16). The coup that in neighboring Dahomey in October 1963 forced President Hubert Maga out of office and placed Colonel Christophe Soglo at the head of Dahomey's government was almost certainly engineered by a group of young second-generation elites in the government, the trade unions and education (Le Vine, 1967). Likewise for the bloodless coup in Upper Volta in January 1966, the trade unions were said to have played a key role in organizing the general strike of January 3rd 1966. Afrique Nouvelle wrote: *"If the old regime were to regain power.. Upper Volta would lose its elite.. the students would refuse to return[65]"* (Afrique Nouvelle, 1966, nr 964; 16). In what is described as an *"Immense crowd, popular relief.. The unions and the young people, peaceful but determined have decided to call for Lieutenant Colonel Sangoulé Lamizana"* (Afrique Nouvelle, 1966, nr 962; 1), with banners saying "power to the army" (Afrique Nouvelle, 1966, nr 962; 16). The coup brought a significant number of the second-generation elite – return migrants - to power.

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[64] *On pourrait facilement imaginer une véritable queelle des anciens et des modernes en Haute-Volta ».*
[65] *Si l'ancien regime revenait au pouvoir.. Haute-Volta perdrait toute son élite : syndicale, administrative.. Les étudiants refuseraient de rentrer"*

4.3 Breakdown of the social elevator

The previous sections have shown that around the time of independence education became a means to social mobility, first through secondary education in Africa. Later on, the main route to political destinations and elite status would be through academic migration for higher education, mainly to France. While we have learned that after independence, all initial leader were educated in the West (Bassey, 1999), academic migration to the global north has remained a key characteristic of elites in Burkina Faso. Foreign education has since generally imposed itself as the common heritage of the elite political culture of limited access order in French speaking West and Equatorial Africa. As academic migration became a key element to social mobility and elite distinction in post-independence Burkina Faso: "*In Africa at the present, the elite is characterized by the number of its members who have come from humble homes..*" one should note that "*. The well-educated and wealthy elite is tending to become a predominantly hereditary group*". (Lloyd, 1966)

This preferential access to migration has led to underrepresentation of certain groups in state bureaucracies, and consequently to uneven distribution of national resources in favor of those who have academic qualification from the global north. For example, while the Fulani population in the Sahel region of northern Burkina Faso supplies a large proportion of the country's emigrants, and the Bissa have to a large extent monopolized the migration towards first Gabon and then Italy, some subgroups have never practiced migration, and this is again represented in the elite structure among ethnic groups in Burkina Faso (Hampshire and Randall, 1999).

"*After independence, studying in France was perceived as the quickest route to social mobility and became key to access elite status for those who decided to return to Africa*" (Interview 9) explained Serge Theophile Balima, former Minister of Information under the Presidency of Thomas Sankara and Ambassador to France. Membership in the new elite thus appeared to be represented by the historical sample of francophone African students in France surveyed by Jean-Pierre N'Diaye in 1961. In 1965, James Coleman underlined that; "*The relationship between formal education and the formation of the new political elite in African countries is so clear-cut... Indeed, because formal education has come to be viewed as presumptively determinative of political elite status, students now in school are uncritically regarded as preordained members of the second or third-generation successor elites*" (Coleman, 1965; 4).

Even today, Burkina Faso is a country with very low school enrolment and literacy rates, and only 29% urbanization – and consequently a limited number of students have access to the best schools teaching French and English at satisfactory levels. However, after independence secondary school education became a mechanism for sorting and selecting young Africans for upward mobility. Secondary education nonetheless remained - as during the colonial regimes - limited to intermediate and top-level African officials (Uchendu, 1979). "*Secondary education, which will train the cadres of the country, and particularly higher education, is reserved for bourgeois and petit-bourgeois children, the middle-classes*" (Moumouni, 1968; 146). Thomas Sankara was for example a son of a gendarme, one of the few African functionaries employed by the colonial state. Magnus Bassey argues how educated elites in Africa have "*made opportunities available to its members to the exclusion of the poor through selective ordering, legitimization of certain language forms in school, legitimizing of certain thinking types and legitimizing of elite codes*" (Bassey, 1999; 3). The nature of the education system in Africa, together with the great disparity in home conditions and especially the restricted access to academic migration or schooling *".. gives the elite parent a very good chance of ensuring that his children will enjoy the same status as himself*" (Bassey, 1999; 57). The educated elites are thus able to use their power to obtain the best education abroad for their children at the secondary and university level. Life chances of an individual in Africa for achieving political elite status are enormously enhanced if they already belong to, or can through academic migration, access the exclusive elite in the limited access order (North et al, 2007). In fact, the social elevator seems to be broken with inter-generational poverty being a condition for the large majority (OECD, 2018).

"*For those children who are not born into the elite, their main chance for social mobility is education. For the lucky few who have access to primary education and then also finish secondary education, in order to further succeed and find important jobs they would need to study – and they would preferably need to study abroad*"[66], (Interview 7) said Mr. Thiombiano, Member of Parliament and King of Fada N'Gourma. We were sitting in his court during the interview, which was basically a courtyard outside his hut, on plastic chairs (most of them with holes in them). I was both honored and humbled to be able to meet with such an important personality from Burkina Faso. The Chief provided key guidance to my work through three main subjects: 1) conditions in rural Burkina Faso and the role of migration; 2) histories about

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[66] Translated from french

how migration has altered the chiefdomshifs in the West African region; and 3) the limited importance of migration in parliamentary hearings.

The interview with Chief Thiombiano was important to really understand the overarching presence of migration for citizens in Burkina Faso, as compared to the limited policy attention. When discussing the quantity of migration, the Chief underlined that in Fada N'Gourma:*"All families have sons or daughters that have left, mainly to Ouagadougou but some are in neighboring countries, mainly Ivory Coast, Ghana and Mali, whereas only a few have relatives in France"* (Interview 7). Across Africa, most of the successors of the traditional leaders are now abroad. Chief Thiombino noted that "*my children are working in France*, *they do not see any future here*" (Interview 7).

People use migration as a livelihood strategy in the lack of other policies such as access to social, educational and health services, employment strategies and other developmental policies that should protect people from poverty. Chief Thiombiano explained *"In parliament I am not working to address migration, since this is only a way for people to adress poverty – and this is the root problem to solve"* (Interview 7). His priority was to help citizens access clean drinking water, build a new school and make sure they could replace the teachers, address agricultural issues and other topics that touch the people that stay. When driving out from Fada N'Gourma towards Ouagadougou, I could not help but think about all the Burkinabe that have passed the the large elefants that mark the edge of the city to never return back again. I met the Chief again in his office in Parliament one year later, where he again confirmed that a migration policy was not a priority.

The absolute majority of Burkinabe migrants are unskilled and are in neighboring countries, mainly Ivory Coast. Migration to the global north requires more social and economic resources, and migrants to Europe or North America thus tend to be wealthier and more educated than migrants to other African countries. Studies and surveys have also confirmed this over time: A study of the Fulani found that seasonal labor participation increased with higher household wealth (Hampshire and Randall, 1999). A survey of rural households in four villages in Burkina Faso furthermore showed that intercontinental migrants tended to come from the highest-income groups (Black et al, 2005). Those receiving remittances from outside Africa are thus in the top consumption quintiles and were already wealthy to a degree relative to the general population before migrating (Hampshire Randall, 2002; Black et al, 2005; Ratha et al, 2011). Wouterse and van den Berg (2004) also found that the more people in a Burkinabe household

with secondary education, the greater probability that someone from the household would migrate. The majority of highly qualified people emigrate, both during and after their education, with 74% of those educated at college level having left the country (Shaw, 2007).

Today, in Francophone West Africa the absolute majority of Ministers have attended schools in the global north. In Burkina Faso, all prime ministers in office during the presidency of Blaise Compaore have studied in France (mainly Dijon, Lyon, Nantes and Paris), obtaining either a masters or a PhD. While this information only applies to ministers, one should note that the top administration (such as ambassadors and chiefs of cabinet) of the rather politicized state machinery have generally followed the same trajectories in their route to political positions.

In Burkina Faso's 2002 government, most minister had studied in france – with a few exceptions in other European countries (Germany, Netherlands) and one person in the US. In the 2010 Government, out of 36 ministers, as well as the Prime Minister and President, only three – whereof two are women – have not undertaken intercontinental migration during their education (one has however attended further training in Europe during her career). The intercontinental destinations were mainly France (Paris, Bordeaux, Lyon, Montpellier, Toulouse and Nancy) or francophone Canada (Montreal, Laval, and Sherbrook). One has been to the Netherlands and two in Germany (Saarbrucken).

Table 7 - Migration patterns of the initial Governments under Blaise Compaore

- **Minister of Information (87), Ambassador to France (90):** BALIMA Serge Théophile (1949), phD Strassbourg, Bordeaux
- **Secretary general to Ministry of Education (1987-92),** Ambassador to Central Africa: MILLOGO Youssoufou (1950). Master US
- **Minister of foreign relations (89-91):** VOKOUMA Prosper (1955), Ouagadougou and Paris
- **4th Prime minister 92-94**: OUEDRAOGO Youssouf (1952), DEA and PhD in France (Dijon)
- **5th Prime Minister 94-95**: KABORE Roch Marc Christian (1957) DESS in France (Dijon)
- **Minister of Foreign Affairs (94-**99): Ouedraogo Ablassé (1953), PhD Nice, France. UNDP, WTO, AFD
- **6th Prime Minister 96-00 (from 01 Ambassador to EU/Bruxelles):** OUEDRAOGO Kadré Desiré (1953). Preparatory in Lyon, HEC and Sorbonne in Paris.
- **7th Prime Minister 00-07**: YONLI Paramanga Ernest (1956). DESS, PhD from Paris France/Netherlands and African universities.
- 8th **Prime Minister 07-12**: Tertius Zongo (1957). Master, Dakar and Nantes, France.

- **Minister of terrotial administration (02), Ambassador to Germany (88-91)**: FABRE Moumouni. Master from Germany (Saarbrucken)
- **Minister of post (02-07):** THIOMBIANO Tièba Justin, Toulouse, Antananarivo, Paris
- **Minister of environment (04-07):** SEDOGO Gouinde Laurent, netherlands
- **Minister of higher education (00-07):** SAWADOGO Laya (1947) Netherlands
- **Minister of public function:** SAWADOGO Lassané (19 Enam and Perpignan
- **Minister of communication (02-07):** OUEDRAOGO Mahamoudou (1956), Dakar, France
- **Delegate Minister for territorial administration (06-07)**: OUATTARA Soungalo (1956) ENAM, Bordeaux, Paris
- **Minister for social action (02-07)**: LAMIZANA/TRAORE Mariam (1951), Paris
- **Minister of Information (04-07):** KAHOUN Gnanata Joseph, Dakar, Laval (Canada)
- **Minister for human rights**: ILBOUDO Monique (1959), Paris
- **Minister for Promotion of women:** GUIGMA/DIASSO Mariam Marie Gisèle (1954), Abidjan, Germany
- **Minister for relations with parliament (02-**07), FOFANA Adama (1948) Toulouse
- **Minister for territorial administration (02-06):** FABRE Moumouni (1953) Abidjan, germany (Saarbrucken)
- **Minister of state, agriculture (02-**07) DIALLO Salif (1957) Dakar
- **Member of government(02-07):** CONGO-KABORE née OUEDRAOGO Adèle (1952) paris
- **Minister of finance and budget (07**) COMPAORE Jean-Baptiste Marie Pascal (1954) Lome, Dakar
- **Minister of animal resources (00-05)** BONOU Dofinwiya Alphonse (1954), paris
- **Minister of education (05-07**) BONKOUNGOU née BALIMA Marie Odile (1991) ENAM
- **Minister of Information, Ambassador to Austria (03)**: DAMIBA Noellie Marie Béatrice. Master France Strassbourg
- **Minister of justice (-07):** BADINI Boureima (1956) Paris

Table 8 - Migration patterns of the 2010 Government under Blaise Compaore

- **Ministre de l'administration territoriale et de la décentralisation** ; SAWADOGO Clement (1960) Ouagadougou ENAM, civil servant from 1985.

- **Ministre de la Promotion de la Femme :** Céline Yoda (1958) Dakar.

- **Ministre de l'enseignement de base et de l'Alphabétisation :** Bonkoungou (née Balima) Marie-Odile (1961) ENAM, (cadre de carriere à partir de 03) stage ENA Paris, ENAM Québec

- **Ambassadeur de France :** Beyon Luc Adolphe TIAO (1954) master Dakar, Université de Montréal, paris

- **Ministre délégué de l'administration territoriale et de la décentralisation** Abdoulaye COMBARI (1953) PhD Nany, Montpellier

- **Ministre de l'Agriculture, de l'Hydraulique et des Ressources Halieutiques** ; Laurent Gouindé SEDOGO (1956) PhD Marocco, Netherlands

- **Ministre délégué chargé de l'Agriculture**, Abdoulaye COMBARI PhD (1953) Niamey, Nancy

- **Ministre de l'économie et des finances**; Lucien Marie Noël BEMBAMBA (1957) Master Lome, Dakar (entered government 1993, before BCEAO)

- **Ministre de justice** (07-)Zakalia KOTE (1958). Master Paris

- **Ministre de défense** (04-), Yéro Boly (1954) ENA, Paris, Bordeaux

- **Ministre de la sante;** Seydou BOUDA (1958) Master Lome, Montpellier

- **Minister of communication,** Filippe Sawadogo (1954) Master Paris Bordeaux

- **Ministre des Enseignements Secondaire, supérieur et de la Recherche scientifique**, PARÉ Joseph (1957) PhD Paris, Université de Montréal

- **Ministre de l'Environnement et du Cadre de Vie ;** Salifou SAWADOGO (1963) DESS Canada

- **Ministre délégué de l'Environnement et du Cadre de Vie** Zomomenibé, Maxime SOMÉ (1959) PhD Toulouse

- **Ministre de la fonction publique et de la réforme de l'Etat ;** OUATTARA Soungalo (1956) master bordeaux, Paris

- **Ministre du Travail et de la Sécurité sociale :** BOUGOUMA Jérôme (1963) PhD Montpellier

- **Ministère de l'Action Sociale et de la Solidarité Nationale** TAMINI Boutoubakuo Pascaline(1952) Dakar, Paris

- *Ministre des Ressources Animales* ; Sekou Ba (1955) Master Montpellier, Paris

- **Ministère de la promotion des droits humains** ; SAWADOGO née TAPSOBA Salamata(1958) master, judge Paris

- **Ministre des Postes et des Technologies de l'Information et de la Communication** *;* Noël KABORE(1949) Sheerbroke, Canada

- **Ministre des sports et loisirs** Mori Aldiouma Jean-Pierre PALM (1953) Military academy Morocco and France (from 1987 Ministère de défense)

- **Ministre des affaires étrangères** YODA Alain Bedouma (1953) Master Cameroun, Clermont-Ferrand

- *Ministre des transports ;* Ouedraogo Gilbert Noel , avocat, DEA Lyon

- **Ministre des relations avec le parlement** ; Tibo dite Cécile BELOUM née OUEDRAOGO (1950) Lomé, Laval (Quebec)

- **Ministre du Commerce et de la Promotion de l'Entreprise et de l'artisanat** *Leonce Kone (1948) master Aix-en provence, paris*

- **Ministre des mines** Abdoulkader Cisse (1955) Master Kiev/Ukraine, Toulouse

- **Ministre jeunesse et emploi** Koutaba Justin (1958) PhD Strassbourg

- **SG du gouvernement et conseil des ministre**s BARRY Yacouba (1959) Bamako, Montpellier

With a population of 17 million in Burkina Faso and scarce resources, where about 90% of the population is engaged in subsistence agriculture (http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/bfa_aag.pdf) , the elite is small. Studies on elites suggest that in large societies such as the United States there are probably between 5,000 and 10,000 people comprising the national elite. In middle range societies, such as Germany and Australia, this group may vary between 500 and 1,000 (Kotzé, 2003). Burkina Faso additionally has a poverty rate of 43 percent (http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/BURKINAF ASOEXTN/0,,menuPK:343886~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:343876,00.html), and a ranking as 185th out of 188 countries in the 2016 UNDP Human Development Index.

One might therefore cautiously estimate a group of a few hundred people representing the elite. It is noteworthy that the demographic trend of the African elite is mainly returning academic migrants from the global north. A survey of African elites shows gender disparities, with more than 75% of the sample being male representatives (Kotzé, 2003). Their average age is somewhat similar to that of ministers in developed countries (generally between 43-53 years old), which however stands in stark contrast to the average age of adult men in African countries. In fact, life expectancy at birth is 53 in Burkina Faso, and 52 throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. The African elites included in this survey additionally show high levels of education. Almost half of the ministers in Burkina Faso hold a PhD (mainly from European and North American universities) – which is above the education level of ministers in developed countries and, naturally, massively above the level of the total population which has a literacy rate of just 21.8%, as well as an average duration of education of only five years. While the difference between the general population and the governing elite is imposing in West Africa, one does not necessarily expect the elite to possess the same basic demographic characteristics, and this law of increasing disproportion seems to apply to nearly all political systems. Putnam notes that *"the disproportionate advantage of male educated, high status recruits increases as we move up the political stratification system"* (Putnam, 1976).

At the same time, it is worrisome that the profile of Burkinabe labor migrants to Côte d'Ivoire has not changed drastically since independence. Demographic surveys show that the average international Burkinabe migrant is – and has been since the beginning of the 19th century - a non-skilled worker providing labor for commercial agriculture in neighboring countries, mainly in the plantations in Côte d'Ivoire (Shaw, 2007, RGPH, 2009). Migration from Burkina

Faso to other African countries is undertaken by comparatively poor households in response to lack of work and insufficient income (Wouterse and van den Berg, 2004). International migration is largely carried out by young men looking for opportunities to study or work in Cote d'Ivoire (RGPH, 2009). While women have increasingly joined the stream of South-South migrants, international emigrants are still mainly poorly educated young men (ages 15-29) (mainly Mossi) from rural areas that migrate to rural areas in Côte d'Ivoire for low skilled labor (RGPH, 2009). Some stay on for generations, while rural migrants to Côte d'Ivoire often migrate on a temporary basis (circular migration) in order to diversify income and increase resilience (CONAPO, 2006). A large portion of this migration is thus short-termed (approximately 2 years) and circular, while recent socioeconomic factors have also led to elevated numbers of returns (Beauchemin et al, 2005; Zoukaleini, 2005). Historical trends show that people plan to leave for the long term, however the flows have become increasingly circular (or short term) due to the returns provoked by the Ivorian crisis as well as evictions from Libya, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon, amongst others.

It should be noted that while this cross-border migration has led to improved human development effects through acquisition of skills and sending remittances to those left behind, it has not necessarily led to social mobility for the large numbers of low skilled workers. The first generation of return migrants has very low levels of education, especially the women. 80.9% of these returnees have attended no education at all. Moreover, the vast majority has some education only attended primary or middle school. For the second generation of Burkinabe returning from Ivory Coast, there is a slight improvement, with respectively 44.4% of men and 18.7% of women educated. This migration is hower not development-generating, but rather a response to push-factors such as poverty and becomes a *"consolidation or survival strategy"* (Broekhuis, 2007), also known as *"eat away"* migration (Wouterse, 2008).

Luc Tiao, former Ambassador to Paris and subsequently Prime Minister in the last Compaore Government until 2014, noted during an interview in March 2010, where he greeted me in his office in the Embassy of Burkina Faso in Paris: *"Poverty – extreme poverty - is the main reason why our citizens move to Cote d'Ivoire; however this has not led to prosperity. Our young and hopeful people are obliged to work away from their homes, not on computers and not across*

the world, but mainly in the fields next door with old tools repeating the jobs of their parents.[67]" (Interview 3)

During the interview with Ambassador Tiao, and in the follow-up with his staff, it was surprising to discover the limited role played by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassy in Paris in particular, in migration management. Indeed, even though the majority of intercontinental migrants are in Europe, there was not a general perception of responsibility towards improving posibilities to migrate nor conditions of migrants or opportunities stemming from mobility. While the discourse showed concern with migration not leading to development and inclusive growth in its current form, the Embassy was not able to send me any data or estimations of the number of migrants, neither confirm that any activities or support were being executed as part of a diaspora-outreach, not any attempt to engage with the French authorities on the subject. In general, I did not sense an actual empowerment of the Ministry or the Embassy in changing the situation of the majority of their migrants through improved policy development and implementation.

Migration from Burkina Faso to other African countries is undertaken by comparatively poor households in response to lack of work and insufficient income (Wouterse and van den Berg, 2004). While intra-regional migration has led to improved human development effects through acquisition of skills and sending remittances to those left behind, it has not necessarily led to social mobility for the large number of low-skilled Burkinabe workers. Migrants to Europe or North America, on the other hand, tend to be wealthier and more educated than migrants to other African countries. Intercontinental migration - which requires more social and economic resources - also yields greater increases in income and livelihood security than intra-African migration and thus tends to exacerbate household inequalities (Wouterse, 2008; De Haas, 2009). *"While better-off people, for example the sons of landowners, move for more rewarding opportunities, at the bottom of the income hierarchy the benefits from migration are likely to be lowest"* (De Haan, 2013; 22).

Furthermore, building on the theory of cumulative causation, it is noteworthy that the pioneers arrived in France to relatively positive economic and political contexts, facilitating the success of their migration (Myrdal, 1957; Massey, 1990a). After independence in 1960 academic migration to France became a means to social mobility in Burkina Faso. 79% of the one million

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[67] Translated from french

foreign workers that arrived in France between 1955-1965 were regularized in 1965: "*The pioneers of international migration and their successors from the years that coincided with the big droughts drew many benefits from migration*[68]*»* (Dia, 2010; 312). Serge Theophile, who is currently a professor at the University of Ouagadougou notes that *"In spite of the continuous development of the University of Ouagadougou migration to Europe continues to represent a prerequisite for elite status"* (Interview 9). It should be noted that the University of Ouagadougou was funded in 1974, the same year as we saw restricted access to inter-continental migration due to increasingly closed European borders.

Presumably, the relative closing of the European borders has fostered the divide between elite migration to the global north versus low-skilled migration to neighboring countries, allowing those with dual citizenship or funds for visas to further profit from their early arrivals. The arrivals of Africans (mainly from rural areas) in the early 1970's marked the beginning of worsening economic situations in both entry and departure countries. Radical changes and politics of limited immigration were instituted in Europe from 1974 (Manchuelle, 2004). It has therefore become increasingly difficult to migrate to the global north as well as to acquire social mobility from such migration. Pierre Bourdieu has studied such perpetuation of status quo through the reproduction of forms of domination by state institutions and their actors.

In a classic Bourdieuan (1984) perspective one might underline that academic migration has introduced an additional elite selection criteria that has helped maintain the dominance of the few with the required education and means to migrate: From during colonial times, development unions, families, clans and communities contributed money to send their sons abroad to receive education in order to subsequently integrate the state system. It is noteworthy that almost all the early political leaders from independence in Africa had benefited from such arrangements. Serge Theophile explained that it's general knowledge in Burkina Faso that *"Reverend Thévenoud, who managed the Pabre Seminary, made sure to acquire finances to send his students to France to attend medical studies"* (Interview 9). At the same time, Hamidou Dia (2010) has shown that government scholarships in Senegal today are largely influenced by interpersonal relations among the elite. Academic migration had thus become a key element of elite distinction, and in the case of Burkina Faso it has become increasingly difficult to access the resource of migration, especially intercontinental, as well as to acquire

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[68] « *Les pionniers de la migration internationale et leurs successeurs des années ayant coïncidé avec les grandes sécheresses ont tiré beaucoup de bénéfices de la migration* »

social mobility from migration. Since the large majority does not have the financial, social or human capital (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) to migrate to the global north, there is a migration divide between the masses and the elite. Bourdieu shows how institutions – including educational institutions – can help preserve existing hierarchies and social orders (Bourdieu, 1984). This functions with the conversion of economic capital into cultural, social and symbolic capital – in this case academic migration as a criterion for access to political posts, or the reproduction of structures of domination in society which are politically and historically determined (Bourdieu, 1991).

In conclusion, migration constitutes less a vector of social mobility, since preferential access to migration is instead likely to enhance the divide between rich and poor in Burkina Faso. Migration instead reinforces inequality where international migration is limited to the wealthy elites (de Haas, 2012). The more restricted the access is of the poor to social security, public services and markets in national contexts, the more difficult the access of the poor is to non-exploitive forms of (labor) migration. If the poor are able to gather capital to migrate, they often work in the most exploitive jobs (De Haan, 2013), while many elites have had access to migrate to Open Access Orders to be educated and has constituted a strategy and resource for improving one's life conditions. Migration has not been an element to institutionalizing open access and obtaining social mobility. Currently, in Burkina Faso, preferential access to migration is therefore likely to reinforce structural inequalities between rich and poor. "*In these situations, migration might even function to reinforce pre-existing inequalities by mainly serving the material interests of the already well-off and by maintaining the (often authoritarian) political status quo.*" (de Haas, 2012:14). Historical analysis shows that while intercontinental migration spurred social mobility and changed the societal elite structure after independence, there is today a *"breakdown of the social elevator partly linked to the hardening of conditions of entry and stay in western countries and the worsening of material living existence in departure countries"* [69] (Dia, 2010: 240).

Intercontinental migration is therefore a resource and a strategy for the wealthiest and most powerful sections of the West African population. Migration requires resources, and while the poorest often cannot migrate, the majority of migrants go to neighboring countries for low-skilled professions. This thesis has introduced the concept of the *migration divide* between the

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[69] « *panne de l'ascenceur social a partie liée avec le durcissement des conditions d'entrée et de séjour dans les pays occidentaux et l'aggravation des conditions d'exisistence matérielles dans les pays de départ* »

few with access to intercontinental migration versus those that migrate within Africa, since there are broad differences in access to social mobility related to the two migration patterns.

Today, we live in a contradictory age of migration, where rising numbers of migrants cross borders every day, combined with increasing restrictions to migration (especially for poor and low-skilled migrants). While alliances among certain aristocratic families and clans in the 19th century contributed to the further development and monopolizing of migration (Manchuelle, 2004), one might draw parallels to the current 21st century situation of highly politicized state machineries in West Africa, where foreign diplomas represent a comparable asset to ensure and maintain elite distinction. In Burkina Faso's small traditional and largely hierarchical society with a limited access order built on interpersonal relations and informal processes, the current situation has maintained the established elite as the few with access to academic migration. Academic migration has helped reproduce the structures of dominations by imposing cultural values that are historically determined (Bourdieu, 1984; 1991). *"The ability to control and manipulate others also derives from the privileged access to and control of valued resources such as education, personal wealth, housing, food, health care and weapons of war",* wrote Seth Kreiberg in 1992. Today*, 'intercontinental migration'* should be added to the list as a key element for elite distinction.

5. Apprehending the 'failure' of emigration policies

In order to understand migration policy-making in Africa, and the success or failure of migration policies, we would need to also understand the general context of policy-making in an Africa where states have generally been failing to conduct inclusive policy-making and provide basic services to their populations.

It is quite a paradox that theories describe the inequality of migration as a consequence of restrictive immigration policies in receiving countries (Carling and Åkesson, 2009; Pécoud and Guchteneire, 2007) while at the same time underlining a so-called "efficacy gap" of policies aimed at restricting migration (de Haas and Vezzoli, 2011). For example, both theories of 'involuntary immobility' as well as 'migration without borders' define migration and mobility as a strategic resource and underline the contradictory reality of enormous flows versus increasing restrictions to mobility. When reiterating Van Hear's (2004) demand for the analysis of policies and migration regimes, it should be noted that most scholars have not studied the consequences of migration regimes from the global south. Scholars such as Skeldon, de Haan and Kothari advocated an approach wherein policymakers facilitate the types of movement that are most likely to lead to an alleviation of poverty while protecting migrants from abuse and exploitation. When measuring the positive versus the negative views on whether migration leads to development, de Haas (2012) calls for policies that enable this process, through legal frameworks and enhanced services and rights.

With an increasing amount of literature pointing to 'policy failures', this chapter will build on that research while introduce a focus on the role of sending states in facilitating development from migration. In the following, we will attempt to bring policy-making center stage and shed new light on the role of emigration policies. Since 2000 there has been a resurge of optimism regarding the benefits of migration on development, this has particularly been expressed at the international arena through policy discourse. Discourse analysis will allow us to add new information to the academic debate on the discourse gaps (between the discourse and the actual policy) from a sending country perspective and provide new evidence on Africa's implementation gap (between stated objectives and actual implementation).

The objective of the thesis is neither to paint a static pessimist or optimist picture of the link between migration and development, but instead to examine the way discourse shapes

structures and policies shape migration (Philips, 2011), which has been largely overlooked. In my opinion, before asking how effective policies could be or assuming that if policies where implemented this would lead to development, one would need to ask why current policies are not implemented. It would be important to determine if preferential access to migration - due to the lack of implementation of policies - is a reflection of a broader societal context of limited access order in middle-and low-income developing countries (North et al., 2007). This demands a broader theoretical discussion on the capabilities, aspirations and the role of structures/policies in improving the lives of (would-be) migrants, as presented below.

The original intention with devising emigration policies, nonetheless, was to support out-migration of certain sections of society, such as political opponents or the poor. This was for example the aim with the 'Poor Law Amendment Act' introduced by the Whig government in England in 1834 (Constantine, 1990). Taking the case of Italy, a similar emigration-encouraging policy was devised during what Cometti (1958) described as the 'golden period' of Italian emigration legislation. Here, the management of emigration was mainly introduced with the purpose to count emigrants, not to control them (Douki, 2007). During the Cold War and in authoritarian countries with concerns over dissidents[70], on the other hand, emigration policies were devised to control migration. Zolberg (2007) has emphasized the historical shifts in emigration policies, from encouraging emigration to prohibiting migration to 'laissez faire'. Through this research we reveal that there is today a trend towards a general change in migration discourse from sending countries across the world in moving towards the elaboration of migration policies that aim to facilitating the link between migration and development.

This thesis asserts that "filling the sending-country gap" in migration policy should go beyond the role of policies in shaping (or reducing) migration. It therefore contributes to ongoing research of the interplay between receiving and sending states and the 'failure' of their respective policies. In this 'age of migration', it is striking how little we know about how policies can best be used by sending states as a tool for poverty alleviation, human capital development and labor market integration – even in the face of restrictive immigration policies

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[70] In authoritarian states a 'success criterion' of an emigration strategy would be to restrict emigration. Only in these cases can one consider a distinction between the *effectiveness* of policies - meaning the implementation of stated goals – and the "effect" of such policies on controlling the size, direction and nature of migration streams (de Haas, 2011). This so-called "efficacy gap" (de Haas and Vezzoli, 2012) will not be further analyzed, I would argue that this efficacy gap is not relevant in the context of measuring emigration policies that do not attempt to control migration flows but rather to promote their impact on development.

on the other side of the border. Hence, analysis of emigration policies should reflect the broader development goals of emigration policies, taking into consideration the *capabilities* of sending states in the face of restrictive immigration policies on the other side of the border. One should also consider the *aspirations* of sending states in assuring development benefits from migration.

Paradoxically, in an African context this has not led to a research trend towards 'bringing the sending state back in' (Skocpol, 1985) in an attempt to analyze the implementation of emigration policies and their effect on development. Migration policy research is biased towards receiving countries, where scholars have contested the effectiveness of immigration policies. Furthermore, even emigration policies are generally evaluated against the interests of receiving states, which is mainly the ability to control migration. While research is still evaluating the effectiveness of policies and the role of macro-level structures versus agency-models in facilitating the "nexus" between migration and development, this debate is not reflected in international resolutions which prone policies as key to ensuring development benefits from migration. Few studies have thus examined Burkina Faso's emigration policies, even though it is among the main sending countries in Africa and the bilateral migration flows to neighboring Côte d'Ivoire are the largest on the continent.

This thesis introduces a case study on Burkina Faso, which is a mainly south-south sending country and one of the main emigrant-sending countries in Africa. Burkina Faso is furthermore one of the poorest countries in the world and was also one of the first African countries to attempt to leverage migration for development by the introduction of policies following independence in 1960. This thesis will therefore explore the *capabilities* and *aspirations* of the Burkinabe state throughout time. With a case study on Burkina Faso, policymaking is brought center stage in order to explore whether the current elaboration of an emigration policy signifies a change towards migration becoming – once again – "high" politics in Burkina Faso. The chapter thereby brings the sending state "back in" (Skocpol, 1985; Hollifield, 2007) by going into depth regarding the development of a migration policy in Burkina Faso.

When analyzing policy making, one should broadly distinguish between policy discourse and policy, or between discourse gaps - between stated goals and actual policy document - and implementation gaps - the *effectiveness* of policies, or the gap between what is stated in the policy and what is achieved. Scholars have widely criticized migration and development

'policy'[71], but during my literature review I noted a discrepancy as to whether scholars were talking about policy or policy discourses. There seems to be a conceptual confusion between 1) policy discourses, 2) policies on paper, 3) policy implementation and 4) policy impact. *"Although policies on paper and implemented policies seem to be the correct yardstick to factually assess policy effectiveness, in practice, the (generally more pronounced) discourses or stated policies are often used as an implicit benchmark in the migration policy literature to assess policy effectiveness"* (de Haas and Czaika, 2013; 41). One would hence need to distinguish between policy gaps in regards to respectively, 1) discourse gaps; and 2) implementation and 3) efficacy gaps - the effect of such policies on intended results. The former and latter gaps are the topics most attended to by migration and development policy researchers, especially looking at EU policy gaps when it comes to migration control.

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[71] The dictionary defines policy as *"1) the basic principles by which a government is guided. 2) The declared objectives that a government or party seeks to achieve and preserve in the interest of a national community (http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/policy.html)"*

Figure 12 - Policy gaps

Source: de Haas and Vezzoli, 2011

Instead of studying the discourse gap from the perspective of European states, this thesis intends to inform the scholarly debate by providing new information on policy discourse from the perspective of the sending state, both looking at a broader African context and more particularly at Burkina Faso. Moving from policy discourse to policy elaboration is a first step towards formalizing rights and procedures in order to manage migration for the benefit of the broad population. My research shows that this is not yet the case in most countries. Is there a discourse gap from sending countries, and why would that be considering that they should have the 'aspirations' of reaping the developmental benefits from migration?

This thesis also presents a first ever analysis of the implementation gap of policies in Africa. As to the effectiveness of policies in a society based on Limited Access Order of interpersonal

rules and rent seeking, presumably sending state policies would in themselves constitute elements of development. For those countries that do have policies on paper, the implementation of the migration policy remains subject to the social practice and norms. Often, the same political capital put into developing a policy is not used to actually implement it.

Once the migration policies across Africa are being implemented, scholars should start empirically evaluating the effectiveness of such policies in achieving what is stated as to the nexus of migration and development. Evaluations would need to have a broader range than controlling migration flows, and conceptually and theoretically include aspects of development which would be part of emigration policies education, health and social protection and other broader development issues[72].

When examining the "failure" of migration policies, it should be noted that managing migration has become a key policy agenda for countries around the world, in the aim of respectively filling labor shortages in receiving countries and improving life conditions for people in sending countries. However, there is a contention between the objectives of immigration and emigration policies. Immigration policies generally aim to control movement according to categories of migrants needed on the national labor markets, which has led to increasing restrictions for low-skilled workers through efforts such as an externalization of border management. The objectives of sending country policies conversably generally aim to find solutions for unemployment and poverty alleviation for their populations abroad, and in other instances to attrackt high skilled workers back home. For the government of the Philippines, for example, emigration is a national development strategy (Asis, 2008), and there has been a proactive negotiation with receiving countries through labor export schemes and bilateral agreements.

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[72] When analyzing the intended versus actual implementation of policies, de Haas (2011) adds a distinction between the *effectiveness* of policies - meaning the implementation of stated goals – and the *effect* of such policies on controlling the size, direction and nature of migration streams, which is the political goal. In my opinion, there is no reason why the study of *emigration* policies should be limited to their capacity to control migration, when history shows that this has not been the main objective of such policies – except for during the Cold War and in authoritarian countries with concerns over dissidents – and especially in the light of the fact that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts the right to freedom of movement. This so-called "efficacy gap" (de Haas and Vezzoli, 2011) (except in authoritarian states which fulfill the 'success criterion' of restricting emigration) will not be further analyzed in this thesis, since I would argue that this does not apply to policies that have stated goals other than controlling migration.

Nonetheless, for most African sending countries it has been difficult to institute policies to ensure development benefits of all their citizens abroad. There is an intricate relationship between immigration and emigration policies, which are affected by foreign policy considerations and bilateral relations with conflicts often translating into inter-state problems. Immigration policies, nonetheless, are less affected by emigration policies than the other way around. Sending countries are thus in asymmetric relationships with the often more powerful and wealthier host states. Sending states are therefore largely at the mercy of receiving countries with reduced "capabilities" to manage migration, and a heavy reliance on labor export can generate dependency patterns (de Haas and Vezzoli, 2011). *"..both migration and development policies are embedded in imbalanced power relations and north-south divide"* (Geiger and Pecoud, 2013;1). When analyzing the macro-level, Stephen Castles underlines that the reason '*Why migration policies fail'* (Castles, 2004) in the global north is mainly attributed to the north-south divide and factors within political systems. Hein de Haas further insists that '*Why 'development instead of migration policies' are bound to fail'* (de Haas, 2006a) is due to the fact that demand for both skilled and unskilled migration is likely to persist in the EU and the US.

History shows that when receiving countries experience a reduced demand for workers, they have not been shy to halt recruitment programs or break agreements (OECD, 1974; OECD, 1976). In periods of rapid growth, African governments have welcomed labor migrants, but sometimes expelled them *en masse* during economic crises, of which there were 23 instances between 1958 and 1996 (Bredeloup, 1995). Migration streams between Tunisia and Libya have for example had three periods of open access and eight of expulsion between 1969 and 2013.

Literature regarding sending states rarely focus on the nature and implementation of emigration policies. Research has rather measured the externalization of European borders (e.g. in North Africa) and the failure to export European immigration control (Paoletti, 2010; Betts and Milner, 2006; Boswell, 2003). "*Some problematics still remain unexplored, and gaps in the research include topics such as emigration policies (rules of exit), the "diplomacy of migration" led by emigration countries.."* (De Wenden, 2008*)*. On the global spectrum, some of these politics can nevertheless be described as politics of *attention* (historically the case of Russia and Italy) or of *influence* towards a continually stronger Diaspora for domestic political and economic reasons (China and India). Some countries use the Diaspora as an advocacy group for *power struggles* (Mexico and its electorate in the US, to some extent Algeria). The

West African countries with a large concentration of diaspora in France (such as Senegal and Mali), in most cases seem to use it as *a diplomacy of influence*, with emphasis on the demographic and mainly economic aspects through remittances and investments. This chapter will further explore the relationship between emigration and immigration policies, and how sending states can best use policies as a tool for poverty alleviation, human capital development and labor market integration – even in the face of restrictive immigration policies on the other side of the border.

The "failure" of migration policies has mainly been analyzed in a context of *receiving* states attempting to affect the level of immigration through restrictive policy measures and increasing border control (Castles and Miller, 2009; Massey et al, 1998). While some scholars argue that immigration policies have been effective in controlling migration flows (Brochmann and Hammer, 1999; Collyer, 2006; Striwerda, 1999), most underline counter-productive effects such as discouraging return (Castles, 2004b; de Haas, 2007; Grütters, 2003). The deficiency of restrictive immigration policies to control flows has been measured through spatial, categorical, inter-temporal and reverse substitution effects of flows. Basically, instead of reducing migration, de Haas (2011) argues that migrants instead change destination, channels or limit returns.

We also see these counter-productive effects clearly within West Africa: In the 1950s and 1960s the cocoa boom led to high levels of immigration to Ghana, mainly originating from Togo, Burkina Faso (Haute Volta at the time) and Nigeria, but also Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, Mali, Senegal and Liberia. From the 1960s, regulations were tightened massively, and from 1969 it is estimated that up to a million migrants left Ghana (Bredeloup, 1995). Immigration policies introduced in Ghana in the 1960s led to people passing the porous borders without papers, and others changing destinations and migrating towards Nigeria during the petrol boom. Nigeria began its petrol boom reinforced by the second petrol crisis in 1979, which led to heavy immigration. In 1983, 2.5 million West Africans were registered in Nigeria (OECD/SWAC, 2006a). Nigeria subsequently attempted to reduce immigration and conducted expulsions due to the economic crises in the early 1980s. In 1983, Nigeria expulsed a million undocumented workers, and subsequently another 700,000 in 1985 (Afolayan 1988). Among them were many Ghanaians (approximately two million Ghanaians left for Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire between 1974-1975 and in 1981), but also migrants from Togo, Benin, Cameroun and Burkina Faso (Tabatabai, 1988). This redirected one part of the migration flow towards cocoa plantations in

Côte d'Ivoire. In 1983, Côte d'Ivoire – in what was then called the Ivorian miracle – had become the main receiving country of the sub-region. Traditional Burkina Faso-Côte d'Ivoire migration increased from the mid-1970s to the 1990s; in 1975, 74 percent of Burkinabe migrants went to Côte d'Ivoire, while 12 percent went to Ghana. In 1985, this amount had risen to 83.9 percent and 2.2 percent, respectively (Robin 1992). Cote d'Ivoire undertook expulsions in the 1990s in an attempt to reduce immigration.

Another cause attributed to the "failure" of both immigration and emigration policies, is the fact that migration is driven by micro-, meso – and macro-contextual factors that go beyond policies of individual states. Migration is increasingly seen as something beyond the control of states (Massey et al 1998, Sassen, 1996). At the meso-level, determinants such as networks of individuals and transnational communities and migration systems also tend to shape migration, while other actors include multinational companies (de Haas, 2010b; Fawcett, 1989; Kritz et al, 1992; Mabogunjo, 1970; Massey et al, 1998). Theorists of neo-liberal globalization often argue that contemporary economic and political relationships imply shifts away from hierarchical power structures towards network patterns. This would place the power not with the centralized government but with transnational functional cooperation. Cross-border factors are also resulting in growing regional integration through bodies such as the EU and ECOWAS. What Hollifield (1992) called the "liberal paradox" describes the relations between states and markets. Sometimes the state is brought back in, while sometimes there is a gap between migration policies and flows.

There has been increasing recognition of the importance of sending state initiatives in order to ensure the link between migration and development, through developing ties with the diaspora, improving the costs and usages of remittances, extending political and economic rights and exercising pressure in the destination countries (Levitt and de la Dehesa, 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004; Délano, 2009). "*What these elements have in common - along with processes of co-development - is that they were mainly initiated by migrant agency and have subsequently been supported by structures in order to maximize their effect on development*", (Interview 14) explains Jacques Ould-Audia of the French Ministry of Finance, who led research efforts on good governance and institutional development in developing countries as well as on diaspora initiaves for Maghreb countries in collaboration with Nicolas Meisel from the Agence Francaise de Developpement. A growing number of research has been conducted on sending country governments efforts to strengthen ties with

the diaspora (Itzigsohn, 2000; Morawska, 2001; Guarnizo et al, 2003; Smith, 2003a, 2003b; Gamlen, 2006; Agunias, 2009). It is however noteworthy that the role of the sending state has mainly been studied in cases of refugees and high skilled migration (Zolberg et al, 1989; Iredale, 2000; Lowell and Findlay, 2001; Mcdonald and Crush, 2002). Today, we see a trend towards development of migration policies in sending countries that are meant to emcompass a holistic approach on migration and its link with development. "*Developing countries are increasingly linking migration issues with developmental issues and trying to mend the two ends. A clear example is when it comes to matching jobs across borders for unemployed nationals to find opportunities abroad.*" (Interview 40) Said Michael Newson from the International Organization of Migration in North Africa in 2012.

From the sending state perspective, it is highly relevant to study policy discourse and policy gaps on migration and development for three main reasons: First, since 2003 a large quantity of policy discourse has been developed and expressed regarding the importance of migration in spurring development. Secondly, this policy discourse point to the necessity of policies in order to assert the link between migration and development, inspite of research not having established a clear correlation between the two. Finally, despite of the optimistic policy discourse there are very few countries that have actually implemented policies directed at establishing the link between migration and development. In order to analyze this contradictory situation, this chapter will provide an overview of the policy discourse and implementation gaps in the field of migration and development.

5.1 Discourse analysis; from international optimism to African realism

Discourse analysis has been widely used by migration scholars to establish the 'discourse gap' between the policy language and the policy itself from the North-South normative perspective. While the discourse gap in the EU has been attended to, this thesis will look at the unexplored African case of sending country policy intent. This thesis more particurly uses discourse analysis to analyze what is driving the elaboration of migration policies in Africa, what their actual goals are and what political capital politicans are willing to spend in implementing them[73].

While European discourses underline that migration and development must be based on the understanding of encouraging the human development of migrants[74], there are parallel agendas of northern countries for facilitating the reduction and return of low-skilled migration while attracking high-skilled migrants[75] (Black and others 2006; Hujo and Piper 2007; Ratha and Shaw 2007; Bakewell 2008). In opposition to initiatives towards temporary and circular migration schemes (supported by efforts such as 'Africa-recruit') comes politics to attract high skilled human capital through 'selective immigration'[76]. From a North-South perspective, scholars have become increasingly critical towards the gap between policy discourse and public policy. When going through public policy on migration and development, Vammen and Brønden (2012) also underline that the association of migration and development initiatives in the global north with controls on visas and policies of return migration seem likely to undermine, if not reverse, the benefits for migration. *"A natural gap develops between policy and politics when the two largest demanders of brains - the EU countries and the international*

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[73] For example, the European Union has previously concluded Mobility Partnerships with respectively Cape Verde in Africa, numerous East European countries along with North African countries with the aim of facilitating mobility and including the states adjacent to the EU in governing migration. However, there is a lack of research into the sending state perspective in regards to their 'capabilities' and 'aspirations' looking at issues such as why countries such as Senegal did not enter into the suggested Mobility Partnerships with the EU and what would have been the possible value added.

[74] The EU has proclaimed that it *"will take a lead in placing migration and development issues on the agenda of the international community*." Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council (14/15 December 2006)

[75] In the EU development aid there has since 2005 been a strong trend towards: Circular migration, brain gain and mainstreaming migration into development policies.

[76] A West African example is the creation of the EU-funded 'Centre d'Information et de Gestion des Migrations' in Mali and Cape Verde. The center exclusively targets high skilled candidates and is not associated to any European politics for multiple entry visas, which could have motivated candidates to return to Mali for a short period without fearing not being able to re-enter the EU. The Center neither has the mandate of ensuring the governance of European codes of conduct for recruitment in specific sectors. Brain drain therefore generally seems to have been downsized to the neutral project level, ensuring political attention but escaping large policy implications.

institutions - are the ones also implementing the policies against brain drain" (Interview 32) explains Inye Briggs, Nigerian Civil Servant seconded to the African Development Bank as Trade and Regional Integration Office. One should therefore not lose the global perspective of the international competition for talent: while the European Union is a stated partner in brain gain schemes for West Africa, the European countries are themselves developing policies for the retention or return of their highly skilled nationals, and most notably for attracting third country nationals. Hence, not surprisingly, there is a gap between the integration of migration into development projects of the European Union, and the introduction of development into European politics of migration[77]. This demands a closer look at the relationship between stated policy objectives versus actual practice at numerous levels – also looking beyond the discrepancies of EU policies.

The discourse gap from a North-South perspective is not surprising, considering that numerous factors influence policy making: First, migration policies are influenced by a range of actors such as businesses, trade unions and civil society. Second, national and international constraints of either political, legal and economic characters limit policy options. Thirdly, discourse is of a general nature whereas migration policy is often directed to specific categories and groups of migrants (De Haas, 2011).

In the following, we will analyze whether or not there is a discourse gap from a sending country perspective. My research shows that there is a long way from the UN Secretary General's statement at the 2010 Global Forum for Migration and Development, underlining that *"..international migration can spread prosperity if nurtured with the right policies"* to the 2010-2015 development plan of Burkina Faso that merely attempts to « *mettre en place un mécanisme en vue de juguler la crise migratoire* », mainly referring to the forced return of Burkinabe from Côte d'Ivoire due to the politico-military crises.

One might provocatively present the hypothesis that while we empirically might live in an 'age of migration', the so-called 'migration and development nexus' might be a mere ideological construct due to videspread policy discourse. Massey et al (1998: 288) underlined that *"elected leaders and bureacrats increasingly have turned to symbolic policy instruments to create an appearance of control."* With this in mind, we will nonetheless in the following add to the analytical and scholarly debate on migration and development through providing new

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[77] The implementation gap between the 'global approach on the question of migration' (e.g. the projects under UE-UN Migration4development)and 'The European pact on immigration and Asylum'

perspectives from discourse analysis. This thesis offers the first discourse analysis from a sending state perspective which adds to our understanding of how migration plays into national politics and policy agendas, power relations within and across borders and the role of migration and more generally to a broader and more complete understanding of how to improve the link between migration and development.

In continuation of the theoretical foundation of social constructivism as described above through the works of post-structuralists such as Bourdieu and Foucault, we will hence also apply this to the methodological approach through discourse analysis[78]. In viewing the power and ideology in the world as dependent on social, historical and political constructs, we accept the standpoint that power is culturally and symbolically created, and constantly re-legitimized through an interplay of agency and structure. Dicourse hence plays a role in shaping power relations, as further underlined in critical discouse analysis as developed by Norman Faircloud[79](1995). As mentioned, according to Bourdieu (1991) the cultural values might be represented as universal but which are in fact politically and historically determined. Discourse analysis is thus very useful as a methodological support to this theoretical foundation seeing that most discourse analysis draws on social constructivism as described by Burr (1995) and Gergen (1985) which includes: a critical approach to taken-for-granted knowledge; historical and cultural specificity; link between knowledge and social processes and between knowledge and social interaction.

What critical discourse analysis shares in scope and range with Faucoult's approach to discourse analysis is the analytical focus being concerned with overarching patterns and general trends in society. Furthermore, critical discourse analysis and Foucoults initial development of discourse analysis share a perspective on the role of discourse in the constitution of our world – in between the perspective of discourse being pertrayed as fully constitutive of the social (such as Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory) and on the opposite discourse being seen as a mere reflection of other social mechanisms. Nonetheless, as opposed to Foucaoult's theory of power and knowledge where agents and structures have less influence, critical discourse analysis provides an opportunity to see power beyond the productive and constraining forces. This perception of power appears to be more appropriate in a theoretical

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[78] For an overview of Faucouldian discourse analysis see, for example, Howarth (2000)
[79] One might note that in other approaches to discourse analysis, such as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's discourse theory (1985/2001), discourse rather constructs the entire social world of meaning.

framework of an African context with Limited Access Orders of untransparent implementation of regulatory and policy schemes and gray zones of political power through interpersonal relationships and constantly shifting governments.

As mentioned, discourse analysis has been widely used by migration scholars to establish the 'discourse gap' between the policy language and the policy itself from the North-South normative perspective. The methodology of discourse analysis, which has become an interdisciplinary field of inquiry (Van Dijk, 1990), involves a focus on the sociocultural and political context in which text and talk occurs. Discourse analysis can therefore add understanding to the relationship between language, ideology and power. While discourse analysis can range from the purely linguistic research to the broader historicophilosophical approach used by Foucault, I use the term 'discourse' as referring to the manner in which individuals and particularly insitutions communicate through written texts and spoken interactions in regards to migration management[80]. Below, we will look at the textual elements of resolutions and recommendations in order to inform the contextual elements of social, political and cultural realities. Through focusing on the contextual aspects and to a lesser extent on the message itself (as is characheristic of traditional content analysis) the emphasis will be on the influences in the discourse process as a whole (Wolf, 1988). It allows us to extend the analysis to include the production of ideology and the link between discourse structures and social situations, in this case policy making. I will do so by analyzing discourse on both the international, inter-continental, African regional, sub-regional and national levels.

Since 2003, when the UN Secretary-General and a number of governments launched the Global Commission on International Migration which led to the first High-Level dialogue on International Migration and Development in 2006 which again resulted in the annual Global Forum for Migration on Development, policy discourse has mainly been constructed around the idea of how well-managed migration can benefit development. Hence, most of the policy discourses in resolutions and recommendations point to migration policy as the way forward for countries to successfully manage migrations to their benefit. Countries of origin are strongly encouraged to include migration in their poverty reduction strategies, to facilitate legal migration, to elaborate migration policies and to undertake bilateral and multilateral

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[80] We will focus on the changes in socitety's 'large-scale discourses' and not how people use them such as underlined in discoursive psychology (19).

cooperation for labor mobility. Remittances and the benefits of diaspora is on being pertrayed as being on top of the policy agenda's[81]. Nonetheless, this chapter will outline the large gap between policy discourses echoed at the UN, African Union and ECOWAS to the low level of policy attention towards migration at the national level in Burkina Faso.

Table 9 – International discourse on migration management

Organisation	Framework	Date
United Nations	Resolutions:	49/127 December 1994; 50/123 December 1995; 52/189 December 1997; 54/212 December 1999; 56/203 December 2001; 58/208 December 2003; 59/241 December 2004; 60/227 December 2005; 60/206 December 2005; 61/208 March 2007
	Global Commission on International Migration	Final report 2005
	High-Level dialogue	A/61/515 October 2006
	Global Forum for Migration and Development	Brussels 2007 Manila October 2008 Athens 2009 Puerto Vallarta 2010 Geneva 2011 Port Louis 2012 Stockholm 2014 Istanbul 2015 Dhaka 2016
	Human Development Report	2009
	Report of the UN-Secretary General	A/67/xxxx31 July 2012
African Union	Common position on migration and development	EX.CL/277 2006
	Framework for migration policies	EX.CL/276 2006
ECOWAS	Treaty and Protocols	ECOWAS Treaty, Article 27; 1075 A/P.1/5/79 May 1979 A/P.3/5/82 May 1979, A/P.1/11/84 1984; A/SP.1/7/85 July 1985 A/SP.2/5/90 May 1990
	West Africa Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper	December 2006
	Common Approach on Migration	January 2008

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[81] mainly of European governments, development agencies and organizations such as the UN, the EU, as well as financial institutions such as the WB, the IMF, ILO, IOM, and the UNDP

European Union	Global Approach to Migration	European Council, 2005
	Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development: Rabat Action Plan	10-11 July 2006
	Joint Africa-EU Declaration on Migration and Development	22-23 November 2006
	European Pact on Immigration and Asylum	European Council, 2008
	A Common Immigration policy for Europe	17 June 2008
	Strengthening the Global Approach to Migration	08 October 2008
	Second Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development	25 November 2008
	EU 2011-2015 action plan in the area of Justice and Home Affairs	European Council, 2010
	Action Plan implementing the Stockholm Programme	20 April 2010
Burkina Faso	La stratégie de croissance accélérée et de développement durable (SCADD). 2010-2015.	March 2010.
	Burkina Faso Politique Nationale Population (PNP)	From 1991, revised in 2000,

While research is hesitant about the effect of migration policies, all international migration and development resolutions highly recommend migration policies as the solution to ensuring development benefits of migration. Most contemporary policy discourses are hence based on the firm link between state intervention/facilitation and development results. When examining policy discourses regarding migration and development, one finds that countries of origin are strongly encouraged to include migration in their poverty reduction strategies. This viewpoint has been consistently present from the special report of the Secretary General of the United Nations in 2003, to the Global Commission on International Migration, whose report was followed by a document on international migration and development by the General Assembly of the United Nations. This served as background for the High Level Dialogue on migration at the United Nations in 2006, and the subsequent meetings of the Global Forum on Migration and Development. The report of the Global Commission on International Migration argues that migration should be an integral part of every country's economic and development plan (Adepujo, 2006a). This includes facilitating legal migration, developing migration policies and undertaking bilateral and multilateral cooperation for labor mobility. Policy advisor to the Global Forum for Migration and Development, Anja Klug, mentioned that: *"Political will, migration management, migration policies, bilateral and multilateral collaboration and shared responsibility underpin all of the above, with a clear message that well-managed*

migration can benefit development, while poorly managed migration can have the opposite effect" (Interview 42).

Table 10 - UN discourse on migration management and development

"Bearing in mind that orderly international migration can have positive impacts upon development".	(49/127)
"*Acknowledging* the important nexus between international migration and development".	(61/208)
"Most participants considered that national strategies to address the impact of international migration on development should be complemented by strengthened bilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation".	(61/515).
".. sharing responsibilities between developed and developing countries can make migration work better for development and vice versa";	(GFMD 1).
"We can work to strengthen the positive impact of migration on the development of migrants' home countries."	(UN SG Address to inaugural GFMD. 10 July 2007, Brussels.)
"Political will needs to be exercised in both origin and destination countries to make shared responsibility operational in terms of tangible policies and programs on protecting migrants' rights."	(GFMD 2)
"The Forum could stimulate assessment and evaluation of the array of new policies and initiatives, including the integration of migration into poverty reduction strategy papers and donor development policies".	(GFMD 2)
"Human mobility also helps redress the enormous imbalances that have led to harsh economic inequality… This inequality, both within and across borders, is one of the most dangerous realities we need to confront. International migration can be a force for good in this respect".	(UN SG Address to 2nd GFMD. 29 October 2008, Manila)
"Together, our goal is to harness the power of migration to reduce poverty and inequality – to help more people share in the world's prosperity—and to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.	(UN SG Address to 3rd GFMD, 4 November 2009, Athens)
"When managed well, international migration greatly improves human welfare and development…".(	UN SG Address to 3rd GFMD, 4 November 2009, Athens)
"Like so many of today's global challenges, migrations cannot be addressed unilaterally…	UN SG Address to 3rd GFMD, 4 November 2009, Athens)
"As we look to this challenge, we recognize that in many ways, migration is not just a journey of people – it is a journey of policy…Let us never forget that, in the end, policies and laws are really about people and values."	(UN SG Address to 3rd GFMD, 4 November 2009, Athens)
"Countries need to have a comprehensive policy and programs for returning migrants, both in the voluntary cases and in the forced	(GFMD 4)

cases. In the latter cases, it is especially important for countries of origin and destination to work together"	
"..highlights the need to reach mutually agreeable arrangements among stakeholders to maximize the developmental benefits of international migration"	(UN SG Address to 4th GFMD, 8 November 2010, Puerto Vallarta.)
"Migration is more likely to benefit all stakeholders when it is safe, legal and orderly…These efforts and many others show that international migration can spread prosperity if nurtured with the right policies".	(UN SG Address to 4th GFMD, 8 November 2010, Puerto Vallarta.)
"Practical and results-oriented partnerships, shared responsibility, enhanced policy coherence and mutual cooperation between countries of origin and of destination are the key foundations for addressing the multiple aspects of irregular migration and its linkages with development	".(GFMD 5)
"To be successful, these processes require strong political will by implementing Governments..	" (GFMD 5)
"With the right set of policies, the benefits of international migration for countries of origin and destination as well as for migrants and their families can be harnessed, while its negative impacts may be reduced."	(A/67/xxxx31. Report of the UN Secretary-General. International migration and development.)

In 2003, the UN Secretary-General and a number of governments launched the Global Commission on International Migration that presented its final report in 2005. In September 2006, the UN held the first High-Level dialogue on International Migration and Development (A/61/515 13 October 2006 Summary), which resulted in the Global Forum for Migration on Development since 2007[82]. The UNDP Human Development Report 2009 also had as a key theme migration and development. All of the above are non-binding and contribute to the large sum of policy discourse on migration and development, including the declarations of the United Nations Secretary General, summary reports and position papers included in this framework.

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[82] 1) Brussels 9-11 July 2007; 2) Manila 27-30 October 2008 "Protecting and empowering migrants for development"; 3) Athens 11 October 2010. 65/499 "Integrating migration policies into development strategies"; 4) Puerto Vallarta 8-11 November 2010 "Partnerships for migration and human development: shared prosperity — shared Responsibility"; 5) Geneva 2 December 2011 "Taking Action on Migration and Development — Coherence, Capacity and Cooperation") 6) Port Louis 19-22 November 2012 with the theme Ënhancing Development of Migrants and their Contribution to the Development of Communities and States". 7) Stockholm 14-16 May 2014 with the theme: Unlocking the potential of migration for inclusive development". 8) Istanbul 14-16 October 2015 "Strenghtening Partnerships: Human Mobility for Sustainable Development". 9) Dhaka, 10-12 December 2016 "Migration that works for Sustainable Development for All: Towards a transformative migration agenda".

The Chair of the Swedish GFMD in 2013-2014, Ambassador Eva Aakerman Borje, underlined that "*the priority of the Swedish GFMD Chair is captured in the title 'Unlocking the potential of migration for inclusive development'. We basically agree that policies matter a great deal, however this year we wish to underline that the benefits of migration do not come automatically and want to substantially focus on the development part of the migration-development nexus".* (Interview 44) One of the key questions asked during the forum was*: "What policy frameworks, legal basis and sources of funding are efficient in the process of mainstreaming migration into development-related policy-areas"?*

The EU-Africa discourse on migration management is similarly very ambitious and optimistic, and completely aligned with the international discourse on migration and development that has developed since early 2000:

Table 11 - EU-African messages on migration management

EU- Africa messages on migration management	Declarations
"Convinced that international migration has a positive effect on the host country and on the country of origin when such flows are well managed ;"	(Rabat declaration)
"Promoting migration as a positive factor for development by encouraging concrete measures contributing to the reduction of poverty. Integrating such measures, as well as other measures linked to migration, to development policies and programs, in partnership with partners concerned ;"	(Rabat Action Plan)
" RECOGNISING that the fundamental causes of migration within and from Africa are poverty and underdevelopment, aggravated by demographic and economic imbalances, unequal terms of global trade, conflicts, environmental factors, poor governance, uneven impact of globalization and humanitarian disasters;	(Joint Africa-EU Declaration)
"AGREEING that well-managed migration can promote closer ties between countries of origin, transit and destination, help meet existing and future labor needs and contribute to the development of all countries;	(Joint Africa-EU Declaration)
"UNDERSCORING that African inter-state cooperation and dialogue can strengthen the capacity of States in migration management including the development of common approaches towards harmonization of policies, laws and strategies on migration;)	(Joint Africa-EU Declaration
"Considering how migration issues can be made an essential part of poverty reduction strategies (PRSPs) or other national development and co-development strategies of African countries;	(Joint Africa-EU Declaration)

"Agreeing that well-managed migration can have a positive development impact for countries of origin, transit and destination;"	(Joint Africa-EU Declaration)
"Addressing possibilities of generating policy coherence at international, regional and national levels, e.g. through promoting better integration of the impact of migration into development policies in respect of developing countries, and developmental aspects into migration strategies."	(Joint Africa-EU Declaration)
"Assisting African states to build capacity to develop national policies on mobility and migration, including measures regarding the employment of migrants and the implementation of regional free movement arrangements;"	(Joint Africa-EU Declaration)
"AGREE to strengthen our cooperation concerning migration policies and their links with development"	(Second Euro-African Ministerial Conference)
"Linking migration management more closely with employment and human resources policies, in both countries of origin and destination."	(Second Euro-African (Ministerial Conference)
"Promoting the definition and ownership of national migration profiles and their use, in particular in the framework of poverty reduction strategies, as instruments for drawing up development projects".	(Second Euro-African Ministerial Conference)
"Encouraging the establishment in each country of a national framework for the management of migration in order to optimize the benefits for development".	(Second Euro-African Ministerial Conference)

From an African perspective, it is interesting to first and foremore note that the same optimistic policy discourse on migration and development is replicated. Following the international focus on migration and development, the African Union elaborated a Common position on migration and development, and a Framework for migration policies in 2006. This global framework has influenced the pan-African governance framework for migration and development by the African Union. The framework was preceded by the report of the Global Commission on Migration and Development in 2005, developed in the context of the first High Level Forum on Migration and Development in 2006 and succeeded by the first Global Forum for Migration and Development in 2007. At the regional and sub-regional level, migration is increasingly mentioned on the political agenda. For example, in the West African poverty reduction strategy paper, also from 2006, one of the priority action plans is also the development of national labor mobility policies and increased migration management (ECOWAS, 2006; African Union, 2006a; 2006b). ECOWAS also outlined a Common Approach on Migration in January 2008. The African Union common framework for migration is currently being implemented, while

in 2012 the Global Forum for Migration and Development was hosted by an African country, Mauritius, for the first time.

"In Africa, the years of 2012 was a year where one could encounter a broad discourse on the nexus between migration and development" (Interview 51) noted Sarah Rosengartner, Project Coordinator in UNDP. After almost a decade of increased international focus, and subsequent integration on the African multilateral policy agenda from 2006, the year of 2012 marked the first African-led Global Forum for Migration and Development in Mauritius[83]. The Forum was led by Mauritius, which is one of the most liberal countries in Africa when it comes to migration. During the Forum, I met with the main team of government organizers, under the leadership of Ali Mansour, Secretary General of the Ministry of Finance, and it became clear that Mauritius perceived mobility as an opportunity to increase economic benefits and led a strong regional integration agenda in order to ensure skilled work-force for its construction while buyers from neighboring African countries for locally produced items. "*In an African context, the link between migration and development must be improved. Migration is mainly linked to human development when countries ensure opportunities for their citizens abroad and again when these individuals come back and provide benefits to their communities*", (Interview 21) stated Ali Mansour, Chair of the first African Global Forum for Migration and Development in Mauritius 2012.

Table 12 - African union frameworks for migration and development

AU: African common position on migration and development, June, 2006.	AU: The migration policy framework for Africa. 25 – 29 June 2006.
"Whereas well-managed migration may have a substantial positive impact for the development of countries of origin and yield significant benefits to destination States, mismanaged or unmanaged migration can have serious negative consequences for States' and migrants' welfare, including potential destabilizing effect on national and regional security."	"The realities of migration in Africa, including its increasing importance and untapped potential, underscore the need for States to develop comprehensive policies on migration."
"Establishing regular, transparent and comprehensive labor migration policies, legislation and structures at the national and	"It is of fundamental importance that African States develop and institute migration management policies that address this

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[83] Mauritius is one of the best performes in Africa and constantly scores high on human development, economic and governance indexes. The OIM migration profile for Mauritius notes that: "Organized in 2012, the GFMD outlined the key international role played by Mauritius as both a "sender" and "receiver" country in the area of migration Mauritius" (OIM, 2013).

regional levels can result in significant benefits for States of origin and destination."	phenomenon in order to prevent the negative effects associated with migration, such as the exodus of skilled labor. "
THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL: "URGES Member States to mainstream migration in development strategies and implementation especially in the area of human resource development"	"A clear and vivid example of the developmental impact of migration is the contribution of the Diaspora to their State of origin. … These benefits however are derived only if appropriate policies are in place to create conducive environments in the States of origin ".

"*As a component of African Union initiatives on regional integration, ECOWAS is currently revising its 1979 Protocol on Free Movement, and drafting a common migration policy*" (Interview 12) underlined mr Sanoh N'Faly, Director for free circulation at ECOWAS in 2014. This interview, along with other interviews with policy makers across the continent, shows a clear trend towards an aligned policy discourse linking migration with development. In the West African poverty reduction strategy paper, also from 2006, one of the priority action plans is also the development of national labor mobility policies and increased migration management (ECOWAS, 2006; African Union, 2006a; 2006b). It should be noted that the regional poverty reduction strategy paper is a complement to the National Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP). It was prepared jointly by the WAEMU and ECOWAS Commissions, with technical assistance from the World Bank and the African Development Bank. ECOWAS also outlined a Common Approach on Migration in January 2008. The West Africa Poverty reduction strategy paper represents Member States' recognition of shortcomings in their national policies on poverty reduction, especially the transnational aspects of most sustainable development issues and difficulties. While the regional frameworks echo the importance of elaborating national migration policies (African Union, 2006), the development of national labor mobility policies is also one of the priority action plans at the sub-regional level in West Africa (ECOWAS, 2006).

The West Africa Poverty reduction strategy paper from 2006 is similarly underlining the important link between policies and development:

Table 13 - West Africa PRSP

West Africa Poverty reduction Strategy paper. December 2006.
"In general, "voluntary" migration (that is, the search for better economic opportunities) leads to the concentration of labor in development "hubs"….Hence, migration is a factor of economic transformation, growth and poverty reduction."
"Considering its positive effects on economic transformation, growth and redistribution of growth dividends, and in mitigating the risk of tension and conflict, more consistent management of migration is a priority for the West Africa regional poverty reduction strategy."
"The challenge lies in reaffirming these fundamentals, strengthening the protocol, and above all, ensuring scrupulous implementation by member states. "
"Priority action plan: Labor market policies"

The same policy discourse is reflected at the national level in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) describe a country's macroeconomic, structural and social policies and programs to promote growth and reduce poverty, as well as associated external financing needs. From 1999 till 2014, lending from Bretten Woods institutions was conditioned by the development of poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, especially linked with the Highly Indepted Poor Countries Initiave (HIPC). Since 2014, a more flexible approach has been adopted for countries to develop Povert Reduction strategies in order to access financing from the World Bank and IMF. For example, when a national development document exists this will be used as the framework for the collaboration. If a national strategy does not exist it will be development by Governments through a participatory process that involves civil society and development partners, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

In the first generation of PRSPs, for example in Burkina Faso's PRSP of 2010-2015, the perception was largely dominated by the return of Burkinabe migrants from Cote d'Ivoire, and only refers to migration as a 'crisis'. The sub-regional and international environments are perceived as 'major risks'. Mali's PRSP from 2006 can to some extent be compared to that of Burkina Faso, in viewing migration flows as a 'crucial problem' and with the objective of 'reducing rural exodus and migration'. By way of comparison, Senegal developed a PRSP in 2006 - as part of the second generation of African PRSPs – which addressed root causes to migration, while underlining the possible benefits from further migration management. In the

third and final generation of PRSPs most are based on the concept of inclusive growth, while many have also started incorporating migration.

The same holistic discourse on migration and development is pertrayed in the Senegalese Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), which also calls for the development of a national migration policy. *"Senegal is a country with an approach to migration and development that are very close to what we aspire to implement throughout the West African sub-region"* (Interview 12) explains Sanoh N'Fally from the ECOWAS Secretariat. The PRSP provides a mapping of both internal and international migration, and addresses root causes to migration, while underlining the possible benefits from further migration management. Senegal applies a holistic approach to migration, looking at rural-urban migration, urban poverty, societal and religious effects, risk and vulnerability of migrants, health and HIV issues related to migration as well as the gaps in the current migration efforts presenting a roadmap for initiatives to manage migration.

Table 14 - Senegal's PRSP

SENEGAL: Second poverty reduction strategy paper. December 20,2006.
"Another determinant of poverty is the vulnerability o f the rural population to external shocks (such as climatic conditions), which affect their income negatively, leading to increased migration toward cities, in particular Dakar."
"Senegal has one of the lowest HIV prevalence rates in Sub-Saharan Africa . Risk factors include work and seasonal migration by men and the conflicts in the Casamance region.."
"It is worth stressing that the informal sector and emigration (whose contribution to growth needs no further demonstration) are firmly based on this social capital, anchored in strong values o f solidarity and sharing."
"More suitable education, training, and employment, should also make it possible to upgrade human resources as a means to the socioeconomic advancement o f young people, and thus discourage emigration and exodus driven by despair..."
Managing and promoting Senegalese expatriates:
"Senegal has a very sizeable colony of persons residing outside the country and playing an important role by making financial transfers and private and collective investments, thereby contributing to the fight against hunger, access to social services, and the fight against poverty within the country".

"However, Senegal continues to take limited advantage of the resources and potential of this diaspora, owing to multiple constraints, including: (i) lack of accurate knowledge regarding the socio-geographic, socio professional and socioeconomic characteristics of the diaspora; (ii) lack of organization both on the part of Senegal's authorities and on the part of the migrants, except for efforts made by expatriate associations and members o f fraternities in the host countries; (iii) lack of information on the part of Senegalese living abroad regarding business organizations, procedures and opportunities."

"With a view to lifting these constraints and involving expatriate Senegalese in socioeconomic
development, the following priority objectives will be pursued: (i) put in place a high-performance
system to manage and track the Senegalese population living abroad; (ii) establish a policy of
involving expatriate Senegalese in development efforts. To those ends, the government will draw up a sectorial policy letter and programs concerned with: (i) in formation on profitable niche markets, housing, financing possibilities, etc.; (ii) training, support, assistance and follow-up; and (iii) social security."

Development of secondary hubs:

" This heavy concentration of the population is explained by the persistence of migration toward the capital, where six out of ten migrants live. "

".. it is not rural-urban migration that is driving up the population of the national capital, but rather migration from other urban areas, from the communes in the interior. "

"..the Senegalese capital is characterized by a sizable share of migration known as "permanent migration", which affects men more than women".

"..the most frequently cited reasons for migration are: (i) the desire to bring families back together; (ii) seeking employment; and (iii) the pursuit o f education and training. These reasons to migrate are explained by the job and training opportunities in Dakar. "

"To continue along this path would increase the risk of urban poverty in Dakar, as well as the
problems of housing, urban mobility, urban unemployment, and social integration. "

While Mali's PRSP from 2008 to some extent could be compared to the one of Burkina Faso from 2010, viewing migration flows as a "crucial problem" and with the objective of "reducing rural exodus and migration", the new PRSP from 2013 followed the same discourse as we have seen above. *"Mali has progressively moved towards migration occupying a more important place in public policy"* (Interview 20) says Abdoulaye Konate Director of Centre for Information and Management of Migration in Bamako.

MALI Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. 2007-2011. April 2008.
" The major causes of the epidemic in Mali are risky sexual behavior, high migration flows.."
"The objectives sought in PRSP II as regards the youths are better integration of youths into social life and development of job-seeking aptitudes…These objectives should contribute to:.. consequently reducing rural exodus and migrations.."
"PRSP II provides for better mainstreaming of:.. the crucial problem of external and internal migratory flows, as well as transfers of funds by Malians from abroad.."
"Despite these difficulties, the major political choice of regional integration is constantly reaffirmed by the creation of a Ministry responsible for African integration."
"The major conclusions of a study on integration policies show that: … advocacy for the effective implementation of the free movement of people and goods, as well as the right of establishment should be strengthened.."

In the Mali PRSP from 2013, Migration is given a strategic role in development. The Long-term vision for the sector is to "*Ensure better management of migrations (international and internal) and promote the participation of Malians abroad in the socio-economic development of their home country"*. While the strategy is to : "*Promote the implementation of the National Migration Policy for good migration management (international and internal), protection of Malians abroad, and promotion of their participation in the socio-economic development of the country."*

2012–2017 PRSP/Mali. 2013
Expected outcome: Strategy Indicators: to better manage the migratory flows
Strategic objective: to improve the social well-being of the people. **Specific objectives**: (i) to control demographic growth and manage migratory flows more efficiently Promote the implementation of the National Policy on Migration, for better management of migration (international and domestic), the protection of Malians abroad, and the promotion of their participation in the country's socio-economic development
The effects of migration (within Mali and to the rest of the world) are still little known in Mali, but the breadth of the situation is clear, considering the number of Malians living abroad (over 2,600,000 in 2001) and that of persons leaving rural areas for Malian towns (flight from the land). Although remittances from migrants represent one of the principal

sources of income for their family members, the human cost of migration should not be overlooked.

Apart from historical and cultural considerations, Mali's population flows are caused by poverty and the lack of job opportunities.

Whereas Mali has long been a land from which young Malian men and women departed and where foreigners transited, it is becoming increasingly a land of refuge. Urban areas are now spreading because of internal migration but also of return migration. Mali's urban population, according to the Administration, thus increased from 17 percent of the total population in 1976 to 22 percent in 1987, then to 27 percent in 1998, and finally to 35 percent in 2009. These flows, which cannot be stemmed and must be managed as best as possible, have consequences on the management of towns (infrastructure, security, health, hygiene/sanitation). Veritable camps of migrants exist, especially in towns such as Sikasso, Timbuktu, and Gao (transit and refugee camps). In these camps, the promotion of hygiene and health is essential, especially as regards reproductive health, STDs, and HIV/AIDS. Migration and poverty are mutually supportive in these cases.

The relative stabilization of emigration, on the one hand, and the presumed rise of immigration, on the other hand: Mali seems to be becoming a land of transition and increasingly a place of refuge for thousands of persons fleeing instability and conflicts in countries of the subregion.

(i) Reinforcement of actions to protect migrant girls (information on the consequences and dangers of uncontrolled migration); (ii) Strategy for keeping girls in school; (iii) Reinforcement of the economic capacities of rural women/girls (the main migration factor is to find material resources); (iv) Promotion of activities of associations in the host territories; (v) Reinforcement of the fight against human trafficking, especially that involving women/girls and children; (vi) Promotion of reproductive health in emergency situations (forced migrations, displaced persons).

The context is marked by the development of the National Migration Policy.

The causes of migrations are numerous, but economic reasons are preponderant. It is widely accepted that economic conditions are an essential determinant of migrations. However, it would be simplistic to look at the relationship between migrations and poverty as one solely of causality.

While the level of socio-economic development is one migration factor, migratory movements can

also affect the poverty level in the source region.

Emigration can be a major lever in the development process and contribute to improving the socio-economic situation in the source region by the funds sent home by migrants. But it can also

contribute to maintaining or even worsening living conditions when the workforce captured by

emigration unbalances the organization of the local production system

Given the above, the Malian authorities have always shown great interest in managing the migration phenomenon as well as a real desire to be aligned with sub-regional, regional, continental and international organizations (UEMOA, ECOWAS, AU, IOM, UN) on the issue. However, the scale and size of the problem in Mali requires its being taken into account in development strategies.

> **Challenges:**
> The main challenges are:
> - coordination between the various Ministries of Mali involved in aspects of migration;
> - the sharing of information between the various structures;
> - ratification and application of agreements, treaties and conventions governing migration;
> - better cooperation between home and host countries with regard to transfers of funds;
> - promotion of legal migration (in particular, circular migration) so that it is a lever for reducing poverty and contributing to economic growth.

Mali's example, a case where migration has traditionally been 'high politics', confirms that there is not necessarily a discourse gap between policy discourse about the nexus on migration and development from a sending state perspective. While Mali's PRSP from 2006 can to some extent be compared to Burkina Faso's, Mali's subsequent PRSP had migration as a key theme for development. Mali at the same time developed a draft National Migration Policy in 2012 (obtained by sources) with a progressive view to promoting and managing migration. The policy intends to put in place programs fom legal professional migration, including an information system on international job offers, registration of migrants and student exchange.

Table 17 - Mali's draft migration policy

AVANT- PROJET DE DOCUMENT DE POLITIQUE NATIONALE DE MIGRATION DU MALI. mars 2012.
« L'importance de la diaspora malienne est telle que le pays doit se doter d'une politique migratoire. Cette diaspora, forte d'environ 4 millions de Maliens, est organisée en un Haut Conseil des Maliens de l'Extérieur qui se structure en Conseils[84] des Maliens de l'Extérieur (CME). «
« Les flux d'émigration ne sont pas organisés : ce qui se traduit par des reconduites aux frontières, des rapatriements et des expulsions à la fois fréquentes et importantes : au total 54 719 migrants Maliens ont été reconduits de 2002 à 2010, (DGME, 2010).
« Divers partenaires techniques et financiers (dont l'Union Européenne, le PNUD, l'OIM, le BIT, la France, l'Espagne, le Danemark..) interviennent sur le champ migratoire et leurs actions et initiatives méritent d'être mieux coordonnées. »
« Dans l'espace CEDEAO, le faible niveau d'application des textes de libre circulation des personnes à l'intérieur de l'espace CEDEAO au niveau de certains pays constitue une contrainte majeure à la mobilité et à l'intégration sous-régionale. »
« Le coût des transferts de fonds reste toujours élevé à cause des clauses d'exclusivité qui par ailleurs expliquent l'importance des transferts informels ».

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[84] Actuellement, 64 Conseils de Maliens de l'Extérieur (CME) sont enregistrés à travers le monde. Ce chiffre pourrait sans doute augmenter avec le temps.

> « Les orientations stratégiques de la présente politique s'inspirent des objectifs stratégiques formulés par l'Etude Nationale Prospective (Mali 2025), le Cadre Stratégique pour la Croissance et la Réduction de la Pauvreté (2012-2017), les Objectifs du Millénaire pour le Développement »

> « La vision partagée par les différents acteurs est de faire de la migration un véritable « atout pour le développement du pays », «

> « L'objectif global consiste à mieux gérer la migration afin qu'elle contribue à la réduction de la pauvreté et à favoriser le développement durable du pays ».

> « Les axes stratégiques :

> (i) la protection et la sécurisation des Maliens de l'extérieur et de leurs biens, (ii) la mise en place d'un dispositif performant de veille, de réglementation et de gestion des flux d'émigration et d'immigration, d'accueil et de réinsertion des migrants de retour, d'amélioration des connaissances sur les migrations, (iii) la valorisation du capital humain (social, culturel, technique), économique et financier des migrants, (iv) le renforcement du dialogue (technique et politique), de la coopération bilatérale et multilatérale, (v) la facilitation de l'émergence d'un cadre institutionnel national adapté, (vi) l'intégration de la dimension migration dans les stratégies et politiques de développement. «

> « Objectifs spécifiques :..
> - Négocier des opportunités et des accords de migration de travail adaptés et profitables. »
> - « Concevoir et mettre en œuvre un programme de migration légale professionnelle :
> - Mise en place d'un système d'information sur les offres d'emploi à l'international ;
> - Mise en place d'un système d'identification et d'enregistrement des migrants au départ et au retour au niveau local et régional ;
> - Appui-conseils à la présélection des candidats. »
> - « Négocier des accords de migration professionnelle et estudiantine. »

Below we will see that the same discourse is pertrayed related to the elaboration of a migration policy in Burkina Faso. At the first glance, one might conclude that there is a discourse gap in Burkina Faso. When comparing international discourse to Burkina Faso's National Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), there is a gap between the international, regional and sub-regional discourse to the consideration of migration. Since migration was perceived as 'low politics', the PRSP from 2010 (somewhat similar to the initial PRSP of Mali) perceived migration flows as a "crucial problem" and with the objective of "reducing rural exodus and migration". The perception in Burkina Faso was largely dominated by the return of Burkinabe migrants from Cote d'Ivoire, and only refers to migration as a "crisis". The sub-regional and international environment is perceived as "major risks".

My interviews nonetheless show that policy discourse in Burkina Faso was changing, in alignment with the international trend. From the Prime Ministers office, to the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the High Council of Migrations Abroad, there was a clear trend of discussing migration as part of development efforts. Sub-Saharan African countries are abiding by the global trend that the elaboration of migration policies is the silver bullet to ensuring the link between migration and development. Only one West African country – Cape Verde – currently has a finalized and approved migration policy, while 9 countries in the sub-region - Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Niger and Nigeria - are in the midst of drafting policies (sources note that Senegal is also looking to develop a migration policy). Furthermore, in the case of West Africa, countries such as Benin, Cape Verde, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal have created ministries for nationals abroad (Agunias, 2009; Ratha et al, 2011) – while Burkina Faso has created a High Council for Burkinabe Abroad.

In Burkina Faso, with the elaboration of an upcoming migration policy, which was commissioned from the presidency, there was a general change in the way migration is discussed and perceived. While in 2007, the approach to migration was described as 'laissez-faire' (Broekhuis, 2007), my research reveals that migration was subsequently considered as a means to development. For example, the development of Burkina Faso's migration policy is described as *"a renewed acknowledgement of the importance of migration in improving the lives of citizens"*, (Interview 2) notes Adeline Viviane Zoure, Director of the promotion of regional integration at the Burkinabe Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When enquiring as to why Burkina Faso started developing a national policy of migration, Burkina Faso's Ambassador in Denmark, Mrs Ilboudo stated that *"this is the most important advance made in the area of migration for decades"*, and that it will *"help bring about opportunities and prosperity"*. (Interview 5) This being said, one would need to pay particular attention to a possible 'discourse gap' between the stated intent and the actual policy. The following chapter will look at the role of migration in policy discourse and policy making over the years.

5.2 Migration in between 'high' and 'low' politics in Burkina Faso

Burkinabe migrants have found themselves in between 'high' and 'low' politics at home and abroad since independence (Hollifield, 2007). From 1960 until 1993, during the rule of Ivoirian President Felix Houphouet-Boigny– and during the so-called 'Ivorian miracle' - the policy of increased agricultural production particularly encouraged the migration of low-skilled Burkinabe citizens - as well as Ghanaians, Liberians and Malians - who found employment in cocoa plantations. Houphouet-Boigny's famous slogan of '*the land belongs to those who cultivates it*' accelerated labor migration into the cocoa growing regions (Boone, 1998). Between 1960 and 1989, the Ivorian cocoa production grew thirteen-fold, making Côte d'Ivoire the leading producer of cocoa (Mitchell, 2011). While in 1960, 56.6 percent of the emigrants from Burkina Faso moved to Côte d'Ivoire (and 31.3% to Ghana, 3.9% to Mali) (Somé, 1991), it is estimated that Cote d'Ivoire was the destination for 90% of international Burkinabe migrations between 1970 and 2000 (UNDESA, 2008; RGPH, 2009). Even though Burkinabe migrants are increasingly reaching new destinations (Ratha et al, 2011), a south-south mindset - dominated by the relationship with Cote d'Ivoire - has to a large extent dictated migration policy initiatives from Burkina Faso during the last decade and has created a delay in placing international migration on the development agenda in Burkina Faso (Broekhuis, 2007). The question remains whether the current elaboration of a migration policy implies a shift toward migration becoming high politics in Burkina Faso?

Table 18 - Migration policy overview 1960-2010, Burkina Faso-Cote d'Ivoire

	1960's	1980's	1990's	2010's
Burkina Faso Emigration	High politics *Encouraging emigration*	High politics *Anti-migration policy*	Low politics *Laissez faire*	Low politics? *Migration policy under elaboration*
Cote d'Ivoire Immigration	Low politics *Encouraging immigration*	Low politics *Encouraging immigration*	High politics *Ivoirité*	High politics *Restrictive immigration law*

Following independence in 1960, Burkina Faso was one of the first Sub-Saharan African states that attempted to pursue a proactive policy on labor mobility in order to ensure the link between migration and development. The Burkinabe government tried to regulate labor mobility by bilateral conventions and multilateral agreements. During the period where immigration was welcomed by the Ivorian state, migration was 'high politics' in Burkina Faso. The country

attempted through two opposite methods to manage migration for the benefit of its migrants, however they were both similarly unsuccessful. An agreement with Côte d'Ivoire on migration was signed at a meeting of the Council of the Entente in Bobo-Dioulasso on 9 March 1960[85] (RGPH, 2009). An accord with Mali was signed on September 30, 1969, however the two wars (1974 and 1985) between Burkina Faso and Mali contributed to the non-application of this agreement. Upper Volta subsequently signed an agreement with Gabon on August 13th 1973[86] (RGPH, 2009). These initiatives were set in a south-south context, as opposed to the similar efforts of managing south-north migration that for example spurred in the Philippines during the same period (Martin et al, 2004). None of the Burkinabe agreements were ratified by national parliaments or translated into national laws in the neighboring African countries (Soulama, 2005). These unsuccessful agreements have led to a lack of structures in place to guide and manage migration. Migration is thus not organized through government agencies but is rather an aleatory process of people crossing the porous borders in the blind search for opportunities elsewhere.

From the late 1970's, regional integration initiatives under the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) largely substituted bilateral agreements for labor mobility. In the 1975 treaty of the regional body of ECOWAS, rules for free movement and residence of nationals between their member states were introduced, while not immediately implemented. The 1979 Protocol on Free Movement was similarly violated on several occasions by member countries, for example through expulsions. Immigration policies introduced in Ghana in the 1960s led to some people instead passing the porous borders without papers, and others changing destinations and migrating towards Nigeria during the petrol boom. Nigeria subsequently attempted to reduce immigration and conducted expulsions during economic crises in the early 1980s. This redirected one part of the migration flow towards cocoa plantations in Côte d'Ivoire, which then undertook expulsions in the 1990s in an attempt to reduce immigration.

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[85] By this agreement, only the Upper Volta authorities should recruit and that the transportation, accommodation, food and other amenities (soap, blankets, etc.) were paid by the employer. It was also stated that a deduction from the wages of the workers should be returned to Upper Volta. This agreement was never implemented by the Ivoirian authorities.

[86] This new agreement was substantially identical to the previous, while it also considering medical care for workers and their families as well as centralization of applications and recruitment. Like the previous agreement, the equality of workers' rights between the two countries was discussed. This cooperation also led to mixed results mainly due to the violation of the terms of the convention by Gabon through the recruitment of illegal immigrants.

In South Africa, for example, there were five times more deportations in 2008 than in 1990, with more than 3 million migrants deported in 2008. The main measure of enforcement of such national strategies is expulsion, which is costly for both the receiving countries and for the migrants, and not necessarily a useful strategy for development or for balancing regional labor markets.

While none of the government-officials that were part of Blaise Compaore's government would go into details with migration policies prior to the reign of the long-sitting president, I did get a lot of valuable insights into the topic from the King of Fada N'Gourma. Fada is located relatively close to the borders of Ghana, Togo, Benin and Niger, and it is also an area that benefitted from rural development projects during the Presidency of iconic Thomas Sanakara. The King of Fada N'Gourma explains that *"Our children were encouraged to stay home instead of leaving to become slaves of rulers in neighboring countries"* (Interview 7). Migration was indeed high on the political agenda in the 1980's and during the Presidency of Thomas Sankara when the country instead attempted to establish an "anti-migration policy" (Broekhuis, 2007). For Sankara, who was a Marxist, poverty was essentially a consequence of two factors: The state system and bureaucracy brought by the French and the forced-labor phenomenon which he perceived as draining the country's work-force to Côte d'Ivoire and other more prosperous nations (Wilkins, 1989).

In Thomas Sanakara's memorable speech at the UN in October 1984 he noted: *« Nul ne s'étonnera de nous voir associer l'ex Haute-Volta, aujourd'hui le Burkina Faso, à ce fourre-tout méprisé, le Tiers Monde, que les autres mondes ont inventé au moment des indépendances formelles pour mieux assurer notre aliénation culturelle, économique et politique. Nous voulons nous y insérer sans pour autant justifier cette gigantesque escroquerie de l'Histoire". "Cette crainte se justifie d'autant plus que la petite bourgeoisie africaine diplômée, sinon celle du Tiers Monde, soit par paresse intellectuelle, soit plus simplement parce qu'ayant goûté au mode de vie occidental, n'est pas prête à renoncer à ses privilèges....Nos professeurs, nos ingénieurs et nos économistes se contentent d'y adjoindre des colorants parce que, des universités européennes dont ils sont les produits, ils n'ont ramené souvent que leurs diplômes et le velours des adjectifs ou des superlatifs. ...."D'autres avant moi ont dit, d'autres après moi diront à quel point s'est élargi le fossé entre les peuples nantis et ceux qui n'aspirent qu'à manger à leur faim, boire à leur soif, survivre et conserver leur dignité. Mais nul n'imaginera à quel point " le grain du pauvre a nourri chez nous la vache*

du riche". « La Patrie ou la mort, nous vaincrons ». He also noted that : *« L'esprit de liberté, de dignité, de compter sur ses propres forces, d'indépendance et de lutte anti-impérialiste doit souffler du Nord au Sud, du Sud au Nord et franchir allègrement les frontières. D'autant plus que les peuples africains pâtissent des mêmes misères, nourrissent les mêmes sentiments, rêvent des mêmes lendemains meilleurs ".*

Former President Sanaka was hence of the general belief that migration led to more inequality. Such views are shared by theoretical "structuralist" of social theory, neo-Marxists, and believers in dependency and World Systems Theory (Frank, 1966; 1969; Wallerstein, 1974; 1980). Sankara believed that unequal access to resources was reinforced by migration and that the exploitative labor migration to Côte d'Ivoire was at the very root of poverty. With the majority of emigrants providing low-skilled labor in the plantations in Côte d'Ivoire, one might compare these efforts to the restrictions imposed by the Italian government on emigration to the coffee plantations in Brazil in 1902 and toward Belgian mines in 1956 as a response to poor treatment and low wages (Cometti, 1958). A similar suspension was used by the Philippines for domestic workers directed towards Singapore in the 1990s (Hugo and Stahl, 2004). These policy measures – of both increasing exit control combined with rural development efforts - were nonetheless unable to eliminate migration to Côte d'Ivoire, and instead developed a form of illegal migration whose magnitude is difficult to measure due to lack of statistical data. In 1985, it was estimated that 91 percent of migrants went to Côte d'Ivoire and 8.8 percent to Ghana (Zourkaléni, 2005).

The research on Burkina Faso's migration policies would not be complete without understanding migration policies in Cote d'Ivoire. I therefore amongst other interviewed Siaka Kone from the Ivorian Ministry of African Integration. He noted that a turning-point in migration policy was around the death of the iconic first President Houphouet-Boigny.*"A lot changed regarding the approach to immigration after the death of president Houphouet-Boigny",* (Interview 11) explains Siaka Kone from the Ivorian Ministry of African Integration. Indeed, immigration moved from low politics to high politics in Côte d'Ivoire after the death of Houphouet-Boigny in 1993 and the decline of the country's cocoa industry on which the economy was built (Crook, 1997 and 2001). The vibrant economy of Cote d'Ivoire until the 1990's had partially concealed the fractious relations that existed between so-called *étrangères*, typically of Burkinabe and Malian heritage, and those of 'pure-blooded' *Ivoirité*, beyond societal friction based on class, religion and region of origin (Mitchell, 2011; Toungara, 2001).

Following the death of Houphouet-Boigny, the succeeding president Henri Konan Bedié largely politicized the concept of Ivoirité, and the subsequent redrafting of the electoral code in 1994 made it obligatory that a presidential candidate be Ivoirian of birth and that his/her parents should be Ivoirian of birth as well (Crook, 1997). This was an attempt to block the candidature of the north's most viable candidate, the current President Alassane Dramane Ouattara, who was originally from Burkina Faso. In 1998, 56 % of foreigners in Côte d'Ivoire were Burkinabe, representing 14% of the total population, and was therefore a group that was difficult to politically marginalize (Kirwin, 2006; Broekhuis, 2007). The introduction of the concept of Ivoirité became a powerful discourse for asserting the primordial form of belonging to the land (Berry, 2002; Yéré, 2007) by taking away the rights of migrants (Boas, 2009; Dunn, 2009; Geschiere, 2009). Furthermore, in November 1999, in the region of Tabou, violence erupted between the Baoulés et Burkinabe. Almost 20,000 Burkinabe workers and their families were chased out of the before mentioned region within the period of one week (Kirwin, 2006; RGPH, 2009).

While these changes were to some extent taken under consideration in Burkina Faso's revised Politique Nationale Population (PNP) from 2000 (Ministere de l'ènomie, 2000), Côte d'Ivoire was still the main preoccupation in terms of international migration : *« Comme de par le passé, le Burkina Faso continue d'être ce "réservoir de main d'oeuvre" pour les pays voisins notamment la Côte d'Ivoire.»* Migration was conceived as a 'problem', both in terms of family relations and social cohesion related to returns. However, the National Population Policy underlines the urgency and necessity to define a national migration policy. Among the intermediary objectives, the policy insists on the rehabilitation of the Superiour Council of Burkinabe abroad, creation of a documentation center on migration, facilitating return and investment of the diaspora. It also insists on more studies in order to better address migration problems. Beyond the elaboration of a national migration policy, the Population policy even insists on a national observatory for migration while underlining the urgency of better linking migration and development through sub-regional collaboration.

Table 19 - Burkina Faso's National Population Policy, 1991/2000

Burkina Faso Politique Nationale Population (PNP) revised in 2000, from 1991.
« L'effritement de la famille africaine en général et burkinabé en particulier, amorcé depuis la période coloniale par des facteurs tels que les migrations, les travaux forcés et autres déportations, s'est poursuivi après 1960 par des éléments récurrents ou aggravés de ces

facteurs (la migration extérieure et l'exode rural par exemple) et a sérieusement affecté les valeurs qui s'enseignaient dans ce cadre social de base et qui soutenaient et entretenaient la cohésion sociale. »
« Les migrations constituent un phénomène ancien au Burkina Faso. »
« Comme de par le passé, le Burkina Faso continue d'être ce "réservoir de main d'oeuvre" pour les pays voisins notamment la Côte d'Ivoire.»
« Il ressort toutefois des récentes études et enquêtes sur la migration qu'une inversion des tendances migratoires avec la Côte d'Ivoire est en train de s'opérer ces dernières années même si le solde migratoire avec ce pays reste négatif. Cette situation s'explique par l'importance des migrations de retour engendrées par la situation économique difficile de la Côte-d'Ivoire et davantage par les conflits sociaux auxquels sont confrontés les ressortissants burkinabé dans ce pays. «
« Il devient urgent d'envisager dorénavant la gestion des migrations dans le cadre régional (CEDEAO/UEMOA) en définissant une politique plus efficace d'intégration des migrations au processus de développement national. »
«Une telle perspective se justifie d'autant plus que la tendance des migrations internationales est difficilement prévisible, elle dépend des conditions socio-économiques des pays d'accueil et de la politique nationale en la matière. »
« Les constats que suscite la désertification par rapport aux problèmes de population se situent à plusieurs niveaux. »
« Le second constat réside dans les liens entre désertification, pauvreté, insécurité alimentaire et migration. De ce point de vue, on note au Burkina Faso que les migrations internes se font des zones aux sols pauvres, et de surcroît densément peuplées, vers les régions les moins densément peuplées où les terres sont disponibles et fertiles. »
« ... les migrations tant internes qu'externes sont d'une très grande ampleur. Leur non maîtrise et leurs effets, y compris l'urbanisation rapide, constituent un handicap pour l'aménagement du territoire et la bonne gestion des établissements humains et des ressources naturelles. Cette situation tient à la faible connaissance de ces phénomènes dans un contexte marqué par une répartition spatiale déséquilibrée de la population sur le territoire national."
« Objectif général 3 : Favoriser une répartition spatiale mieux équilibrée de la population

dans le cadre de la politique d'aménagement du territoire prenant en compte le phénomène migratoire. »

a) Objectif intermédiaire 3.1 *: Favoriser la réinsertion des migrants internationaux de retour.*
3.1.1. Amélioration des connaissances sur les migrants de retour en vue de mieux cerner les conditions de leur retour, le capital acquis, les intentions de réinstallation et les formes de valorisation de leur capital ;
3.1.2. Prise de mesures incitatives facilitant l'insertion et l'investissement des migrants de retour ;
3.1.3. Création d'un centre de documentation et d'information à l'adresse des migrants ;
3.1.4. Réhabilitation du Conseil Supérieur des Burkinabé de l'Etranger dans la plénitude de ses missions.

b) Objectif intermédiaire 3.2 : *Promouvoir une meilleure prise en compte des problèmes de migration.*
3.2.1. Promotion et coordination des études et des recherches sur la migration pour en connaître davantage les caractéristiques et les incidences sur la situation sociale, économique et environnementale du pays ;
3.2.2. Diffusion large des résultats des grandes études et recherches nationales et régionales, auprès des décideurs, des leaders d'opinions et du grand public aux fins de sensibilisation sur les grands enjeux en cause ;
3.2.3. Soutien des actions et des cadres de concertation régionale dans le domaine des migrations, pour une meilleure gestion régionale du phénomène ;
3.2.4. Création de cadres d'insertion harmonieuse des migrants internes comme de retour dans leur milieu d'accueil ;
3.2.5. Définition d'une politique nationale de gestion du phénomène migratoire, dans ses dimensions interne et internationale ;
3.2.6. Mise en place d'un observatoire national sur les migrations ;
3.2.7. Création des conditions favorables au respect et à l'application des textes sur la Réorganisation Agraire et Foncière.

In September 2002, the largest organized return movement of Burkinabe migrants occurred due to the outbreak of civil war in Côte d'Ivoire (RGPH, 2009). The local consequences of this separation-process, mainly through massive returns, have to a large extent dominated migration policy initiatives from Burkina Faso during the last decade (Broekhuis, 2007). Former Burkinabe President Blaise Compaore was appointed regional mediator to the Ivorian crisis by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and consequently led a reduced diplomacy of influence in terms of migration which had become a highly controversial topic. In some instances, the political dimensions of international migration are also blurring the boundaries between internal and international political order (Zolberg et al, 1989): "*In order not to strain bilateral relations or, indeed, put their nationals abroad in a vulnerable position, sending countries may hold back on their mobilizing efforts*" (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003:220).

"Unfortunately, politics often override policy" (Interview 10) said journalist Moustapha Thiombiano in April 2012 when discussing the approach to migration taken during the presidency of Blaise Compaore.

In 2006, the policy agenda for international migration in Burkina Faso was nonetheless still dominated by the southern neighbor without a global view on emigration. This was in spite of it being only four years after the large expulsions of Burkinabe in Cote d'Ivoire due to armed conflict and a so-called 'divorce' between Presidents Laurent Gbagbo and Blaise Compaore (Jeune Afrique, 2011) that led to disagreement between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire in terms of migration (Broekhuis, 2007). "*However, a key issue resolved between the two countries was the reinstatement of the portability of pension schemes, which had been repealed during the crises"* (Interview 8) stated Mr Ouedraogo from the High Council of Burkinabe abroad.

Not much had changed in 2010, where the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper from 2010-2015 was presented (Ministere de l'économie, 2010). More than ten years after the crisis, Côte d'Ivoire has remained the main destination country for the Burkinabe, while this migration has reduced (Ratha et al, 2011). Migration patterns are described as 'turbulent' in the period from 2000 till 2009 due to the political-military crises in Côte d'Ivoire and the development axis for consolidating human capital and social protection are confined to 'curbing the migration crisis'. The perception of being at the mercy of Côte d'Ivoire was thus still present. On November 18th 2011, Presidents Blaise Compaore and Ivorian President Alassane Ouattara led a joint Council of Ministers with the hope of restoring *"business as usual"*[87], mainly focusing on diplomacy, security, infrastructure, mining, energy and rural land. Migration was not on the agenda.

Table 20- Burkina Faso's Poverty Reducation Strategy paper (PRSP), 2010

La stratégie de croissance accélérée et de développement durable (SCADD). 2010-2015. March 2010.
« ..la migration demeure un fait social important au Burkina Faso, en raison de la tradition migratoire qui constitue un trait caractéristique de la démographie burkinabè. La période 2000-2009 a été marquée par une forte turbulence migratoire, suite à la crise politico-militaire survenue en Côte d'Ivoire ».
AXE 2 : CONSOLIDATION DU CAPITAL HUMAIN ET PROMOTION DE LA PROTECTION SOCIALE : mettre en place un mécanisme en vue de juguler la crise migratoire

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[87] http://www.lefaso.net/spip.php?article44950

> « En outre, la forte colonie de burkinabè vivant à l'étranger, en particulier en Côte d'Ivoire, constitue, par ses transferts sans contrepartie un appoint déterminant de consommation nationale. …. Aussi, la crise politico-militaire ivoirienne qui a entraîné des retours massifs de Burkinabè émigrés, a-t-elle eu des conséquences graves sur les transferts de fonds des émigrés, l'approvisionnement et les exportations du pays. »
>
> « Il en ressort donc que les turbulences des environnements international et régional, notamment sous régional, constituent des risques majeurs, pouvant remettre en cause les choix stratégiques dedéveloppement du pays et partant entraver une bonne mise en œuvre de la SCADD ».

While migration is a key livelihood strategy for the Burkinabe, policies and projects have not kept pace to support its developmental effects. In spite of the resurgence of optimism in the international community regarding the benefits of migration on development, *"there were previously few actual policy measures in Burkina Faso to support this endeavor",* (Interview 2) notes Adeline Viviane Zoure, Director of Promotion of Regional Integration at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The main effort undertaken in Burkina Faso was the creation of the High Council for Burkinabe Abroad. The Council was created by Presidential decree in 2007, however apparently already in 1998 there had been working sessions on the Council. The council is constituted by a rather heavy organizational structure and with a very ambitious range of activities and objectives. It has a permanent secretariat in charge of organizing general assemblies, and three permanent working groups in charge of respectively economic affairs, protection of citizens and general matters. Members are voted for a 3-year mandate to participate in a General Assembly that takes place every 3 years in Ouagadougou. It should be noted that members should themselves pay for transport back to Burkina Faso. The mandate, as stated in the Presidential decree 2007-308/PRES/PM/MAECR ranges from social and economic development of Burkina Faso, to gathering all Burkinabe abroad, integration through information on laws and rules, to cultural and sports activities. While the mandate of the Council to protect and serve Burkinabe citizens abroad is very ambitious to ensure that Burkinabe abroad are well integrated in national contexts and improving their conditions, the means to do this are limited. *"The budget put aside to the work of the council is limited"* (Interview 8) states Mr Ouedraogo from the Burkinabe Ministry of Foreign Affairs in charge of the High Council for Burkinabe Abroad.

In reality, it seems difficult for the Government in Burkina Faso to implement policies that either protect low-skilled Burkinabe abroad or attract the high-skilled nationals back home.

"While the Burkinabe Minister for Youth and Employment on his promotional tour to France in 2009 recruited two members of the Diaspora, no policy or politics of attracting nationals to state positions exists" (Interview 3) confirmed Luc Tiao, former Ambassador to France and subsequent Prime Minister of Burkina Faso.

Burkina Faso's only migration agreement with the EU to speak of is; the *"Accord relatif à la gestion concertée des flux migratoires et au développement solidaire"* with France*,* which is also based on facilitating return migration and which does not have the same features and benefits as the agreement between Mali and France. One year after Mali started developing a draft migration policy in 2012, Burkina Faso also began to elaborate a migration policy, similar to the process engaged in several other neighboring countries, in order to support developmental effects of the social practice of migration.

The Population division of the Ministry of Finance - in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – was put in charge of developing the draft policy that encompasses both immigration and emigration. *"A first draft has been developed and a proposal has been made for the establishment of a High Commission for Migration, attached to a relevant ministry",* (Interview 2) explained Adeline Viviane Zoure, Director of the promotion of regional integration at the Burkinabe Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 2013. The fact that the migration policy is jointly housed in the Ministry of Finance could portray a renewed interest in improving migration management and facilitate the implementation of such a policy. This is different from most other West African countries, which have created separate ministries for this matter. The most efficient example is Senegal, with the co-development portfolio directly attached to the Presidency.

In Burkina Faso, the development of a migration policy began in 2013, and the content of the draft migration policy of Burkina Faso was not finalized before long-sitting President Compaore left. An informed guess, based on what ECOWAS and neighboring countries are developing (mainly Mali, Guinea, Ghana and Nigeria), and drawing on discussions with the government of Burkina Faso, is that the new Burkinabe migration policy would encompass strategic guidelines mainly in regard to diaspora involvement, remittances, return migration, regional initiatives and border management. *"The policy could draw inspiration from Mali's*

draft National Migration Policy from 2012[88] *with a progressive view as to promoting and managing migration",* (Interview 20) suggests Mr Abdoulaye Konate, Director of the Malian Center for Information and Management of Migration (funded initially by the EU) which is housed at the Ministry of Malians abroad and African Integration. The strategic axis is around: i) protection and security of Malians abroad, ii) updated data collection and knowledge on flows, iii) leveraging human capital of migrants, iv) strengthen technical dialogue (bilateral and multilateral), v) institutional framework put in place, vi) integration of migration into development policies. The specific objectives include: i) Negotiate opportunities and work agreements, ii) information system for job postings abroad, iii) identification of migration flows. It also underlines the high costs of remittances and the lack of implementation of regional protocols in ECOWAS. Burkina Faso would need to pay specific attention to optimizing remittances since it is one of the few countries in the world where remittances have declined, and where a lack of government initiatives in reducing the costs of remittances have significantly affected the financial benefits of national development. Furthermore, a multiplication of bilateral agreements is necessary since Burkina Faso only has one bilateral agreement on migration. This agreement is with France, and it could be upgraded to at least match the one with neighboring Mali. These elements of migration and mobility should naturally also be integrated in the broader developmental approach and strategy in Burkina Faso.

With migration being 'low politics' in Burkina Faso and considering the limited discourse on the benefits of migration and development, the development of a migration policy to some extent represents a reversed discourse gap. One might question why a migration policy was not developed a decade ago, when migration changes arose and which coincided with the resurge of optimism in the international community regarding the benefits of migration on development. While migration was part of the PRSPs of neighboring Senegal and Mali, the topic was not integrated in the broader developmental approach of the latest PRSP of Burkina Faso for 2010-2015. With the large gap between the UN Secretary General's statement at the 2010 Global Forum for Migration and Development, underlining that: *"...international migration can spread prosperity if nurtured with the right policies"* to the 2010-2015 development plan of Burkina Faso that merely attempts to control migration by: « *mettre en place un mécanisme en vue de juguler la crise migratoire* », one would need to look closer at

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[88] Not yet approved by parliament; draft acquired by contacts

internal and external factors that might drive the development of a migration policy in Burkina Faso, in order to understand if there is political capital to ensure its implementation. With this progress of moving from policy discourse to actual policies, the next step to examine is their actual implementation.

In Burkina Faso, there is nonetheless a long way from the elaboration of a migration policy to migration being "high" politics as it was from independence in 1960 to the outbreak of civil war in Cote d'Ivoire in 2001. Even though migrants are increasingly reaching new destinations (Ratha et al, 2011), the relationship with Côte d'Ivoire has to a large extent dominated migration policy initiatives from Burkina Faso during the last decade, and has created a delay in placing international migration on the development agenda in Burkina Faso (Broekhuis, 2007). This is reflected in the low number of bilateral agreements, while simultaneously low donor implications and migration project support, with aid generally directed towards south-north issues. Burkinabe migrants thus fare into the world without much support and protection from the state in which they were born, which hinders the development potential from migration. Migration might be "*at the heart of the nation*" (Carling & Åkesson, 2009:123), but is currently not at the hearth of development policy in Burkina Faso. A possible 'failure' could be related to internal politics and elite interests in Burkina Faso (Olsen, 2014), since intercontinental migration represents a resource for the wealthier sections of society to maintain a limited access order (North, 2007).

We have seen that there is often a gap between actual objectives of receiving/sending states and of the way in which concepts are used (or not) for other real-political goals. In the case of Burkina Faso, former President Blaise Compaore was appointed regional mediator to the Ivorian crisis by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and consequently led a reduced diplomacy of influence in terms of migration which had become a highly controversial topic. In some instances, the political dimensions of international migration are hence blurring the boundaries between internal and international political order (Zolberg et al, 1989): "*In order not to strain bilateral relations or, indeed, put their nationals abroad in a vulnerable position, sending countries may hold back on their mobilizing efforts*" (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003:220). Indeed, the converging of the two worlds of practice and analysis has meant that concepts can be used for real-political goals and as justification in contexts they were not necessarily intended to. This has for example been the case with concepts such as "migration management", which is often interpreted as control or restrictions

of immigration to the global north, and "brain drain/gain", which often implies return of migrants.

In late October 2014, a popular uprising led to the fall of President Blaise Compaore and the instauration of a transitional government. Paradoxically, the final communication of Blaise Compaore while he was still in office, on October 29th 2014, was an outreach to the Burkinabe diaspora, which according to his statement *"supported his presidency"*. The President that had during the majority of his 27-year reign considered migration as "low politics", - especially since the diaspora was generally opposed to his regime - now reached out to the group that was finally beginning to be heard. Migration policy, migrant's rights and opportunities, has since the 1990's been considered as little more than a card to play on the international arena in order to legitimize national politics. The diaspora, on November 2nd 2014, made an official statement *"supporting the peaceful transition"* in Burkina Faso. Unfortunately, the development of a migration policy – as in the case of Mali's migration policy developed in 2012 before the civil unrest started – was put on hold indefinitely due to the transition following the reign of Blaise Compaore. In the National Development Plan (PNDES) 2016-2020, the only referral to migration states that *"Burkina Faso is also confronted with migratory movements resulting in rural exodus and international migration towards countries of the sub-region"*.

While we looked at policy discourse and the related policy making in the previous section, we will in the following section look at the subsequent phase of policy making; the implementation of policies. In that regard it should be noted that even if the policy is accepted by parliament under the current Burkinabe government, its implementation is precarious. One of the reasons why we might not observe a large discourse gap in regards sending countries policies in Africa is the fact that there is less accountability towards actual implementation of written guidelines. With off-stage policy making and rent-seeking in many sending countries, which are also characterized by being limited access orders, simply developing a policy is no assurance for its implementation. Formal frameworks governing regional migration and integrating labor markets exist – based on international conventions and resolutions, regional treaties and protocols, as well as bilateral agreements and partnerships – although with large implementation gaps. This leads to contested and informal de facto regional free movement in Africa. This led me to elaborate upon the status of free movement of persons and the implementation level of protocols and policies in African sub-regions. *"A lot of development*

potential lays in regional collaboration, regional integration and regional mobility, however it remains unexploited in most sub-regions of the continent", (Interview 36) adds Mthuli Ncube, former Chief Econmist and Vice President of the African Developmenk Bank.

While in Europe we might see a large discourse gap between political discourse and actual policy measures, the main gap in Africa is seen in regard to applying the rules and regularions agreed to. Scholars have widely covered the gap between the stated goals of European migration policy (which aim to match labor needs across the regions), versus actual implementation in development programs (that rather focus on readmission and return). However, scholars have not analyzed the implementation gap of policies in Africa in detail. In the context of African countries, the *implementation gap* demands more attention, since an abundance of formal conventions and protocols exist on migration that is not implemented. There is slow ratification of protocols in most of the Regional Economic Communities in Africa or relatively modest commitments toward free movement by member states. In the following section, I will hence compare policies with their actual implementation through an approach of policy review combined with interviews with policymakers, practitioners and migrants.

5.3 The implementation gap of emigration policies

The question of the enforcement of rules is the central point in the relationship between institutions and development (Khan, 2006). What is an institution? North (1990) defines an institution as the "*rules of the game.*" Institutions, however, involve more than explicit written rules. They also include informal norms and behavior, the mechanisms by which the rules are enforced and individual beliefs and expectations about how the institution, and other individuals, will behave (Greif, 2006). In numerous developing countries, the forced march to the adoption of formal rules takes place without any significant effect on reality. After independence, the departing colonial lords put in place mechanisms or institutions such as a constitution, parliament and responsible/independent judiciary, a government and opposition, and a civil service structure, amongst others (Meisel, 2004). For the past 50 years in developing countries, decolonization, the virtual disappearance of socialist regimes, and participation in international organizations and development assistance programs have left a set of formal rules and institutions in the political field (constitution, parliament, etc.), the economic field (trade code, investment code, banking code), and the social field (labor law, civil and family law, etc.). Therefore, the vast majority of these countries today have a body of written rules that has been perfected—at least on paper.

The resistance of the elites and of societies takes the form of bypassing of these written rules and institutions (Meisel and Ould-Audia, 2007): Bypassing of democratic processes (for example, the role of parliaments and audit bodies); Bypassing of the rules of good governance (for example, adopting anticorruption schemes that are not applied); Bypassing of trade liberalization measures and privatization; etc. Scholars describe this as "instrumentalization of disorder" or "ethnic power-sharing". With blurred lines between politics and public governance, Africa has not built the foundations for de-politicized states that are indispensable to consolidate democratic governance and promote equal opportunities for all (Kaufmann, 2005). Thus, few African states, if any, can stand the test of political legitimacy. Many theories exist that attempt to explain the weak African states. One theory underlines the fact that a weak state is created through the instrumentalization of disorder, which is in turn profitable to African political elites (Chabal, 1994; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Reno, 1999). The lack of legitimacy is thus not due to artificial state colonial constructs, but because the leaders have created internal conflicts that challenge and undermine their political base and legitimacy. What exists is indeed "ethnic power-sharing" or dominance, which has intensified the reasons

and basis for the deliberate promotion of tribalism and regionalism by government and other influential individuals (Potholm, 1976; Gurr and Harff, 1994; Ossaghae, 1994; Kaufman, 1996; Saideman, 1998).

While sixteen African countries are currently developing migration policies, this chapter will take a look at the success and failures of migration policies across Africa. By looking at past experiences, this chapter will analyze weaknesses and strengths in West African policies and assess ECOWAS institutional governance. By doing so, this thesis builds on research that focuses on the role of sending states in facilitating development from migration, while attempting to bring policy-making center stage and shed new light on the role of migration policies. This would allow us to evaluate pitfalls and learn from experience when determining the usefulness of upcoming policies. The Parliament of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) underlined four major problems regarding the implementation of migration policies: i) lack of financial resources, ii) inadequate structures, iii) inadequately trained personnel and iv) lack of political will. These four points could generally serve as outline for improving policy coordination in West Africa. Currently, both ECOWAS and SADC are developing regional migration policies along with those under elaboration in Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe.

Shortfalls in implementing policies on free movement of people at the REC level have resulted in a trend towards restrictive skilled-migration policies and bilateral arrangements governing labor mobility in Africa. These trends partly reflect the widespread notion that migration is a national security issue, that there are diverging interests between sending and receiving countries, and a lack of consensus in Africa on the costs and benefits of migration for both sets of countries. This trend towards bilateralism and skilled-migration policies has had numerous concequences; 1) mainly that it does not facilitate free intra-regional movement of workers; 2) that it only protects the rights of high-skilled workers; and 3) it increases motivation to migrate beyond the continent. In the following, we will look closer at the current state of implementation of protocols, and the consequences this might have on development.

Migration has been on the agenda of the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communties (RECs) for many years. Article 71 of the Abuja Treaty, which created the African Economic Community, urges member states to adopt policies that allow free movement of persons within the community. This would involve facilitating employment for skilled human

resources from one member state to another where there are shortages, as an essential component for promoting regional cooperation and integration. Free movement is a vision articulated in all the founding treaties of African RECs; with the implied goal of common or single markets, migration constitutes one of four freedoms: movement of goods, services, capital, and persons.

The free movement of persons in Africa remains the least developed policy area of regional integration – with large implementation gaps between visions in protocols and their level of ratification and implementation. While RECs have established formal conventions and protocols on migration, based on international conventions and resolutions (see Table 21 below), my research reveals a large implementation gap between existing policies and their utilization. This research shonws the lack of transposition of regional treaty provisions and protocols into national legislation/regulations across Africa, and a majority of immigration laws have not been amended to reflect national commitments made at the regional level. In RECs such as COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS and SADC, formal protocols on free movement of persons exist but are insufficiently implemented. With written agreements not fully implemented, regional free movement of people is *de facto*, informal, and contested. Hence, regional migration protocols often remain a low priority across Africa. "*Migration is most times perceived as the last point in a linear process toward complete regional integration",* (Interview 39) underlines Ryszard Chelewinski, Director at the International Labor Organisation in Africa.

In periods of rapid growth, African governments have welcomed labor migrants, but during economic crises they have also expelled them en masse. In the following, we will also show that the basic guidelines of the 2006 Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA) are not yet in force. *"While member states are strongly encouraged to adopt the recommendations of the MPFA pertaining to the various categories of labor migration, border management/integrity, irregular migration, national/regional security and human rights etc., the level of implementation is poor across the African regions"* (Interview 33) explains Olumide Abimbola Trade and Regional Integration Officer at the African Development Bank. The first phase of the African Union's Programme on Minimum Integration (2009–2012) is thus lagging behind since it aimed for the '*total free movement of persons in the regions and partial free movement between the regions'* (African Union, 2009), which is the main objective underlined in the AU's Common Position on Migration, NEPAD's vision on migration, as well

as in the Migration Policy Framework for Africa. The non-ratification and implementation of global conventions, policies and regulations also remains an issue in Africa[89].

Table 21 - Legal provisions on free movement of persons in African RECs

RECs[90]	Primary law provisions on Free Movement of Persons (founding treaties, protocols etc.)	Implementation of Protocols of Free Movement
AMU	"work towards the **progressive realization for the free movement of persons**, services, goods and capital" (AMU Treaty 1989, Art. 2)	No policy
CEN-SAD	"the removal of all restrictions hampering the integration of the member countries through the adoption of necessary measures to **ensure (a) free movement of persons**, capitals and interests of nationals of member States (…)"(CEN-SAD treaty)	No policy
COMESA	"**removal of obstacles to the free movement of persons, labor** and services, **right of establishment for investors and right of residence** within the Common Market"(COMESA Treaty Art. 4(6e) and Art. 164)	*Not yet in force (Protocol on gradual visa-relaxation in force)*
EAC	"**measures to achieve the free movement of persons, labor** and services and to ensure the enjoyment of the **right of establishment and residence** of their citizens within the Community" (Art. 104 EAC Treaty) (EAC, 2006)	**6 months visa-free entry (renewable)**
ECCAS	"progressive abolition between Member States of obstacles to the **free movement of people**, goods, services, capital and to **the right of establishment**" (ECCAS Treaty, art. 4(e))	*Not yet in force*
ECOWAS	"Establishment of a common market through the **removal of obstacles to the free movement of persons**, goods, services and capital and **the right of residence and establishment** (Revised ECOWAS Treaty of 1993, Art. 3)	**90 days visa-free entry**
IGAD	"**promote free movement of goods, services, and people and the establishment of residence**" (Agreement establishing IGAD, Art. 7(b))	No policy
SADC	"the progressive elimination of obstacles to **the free movement of** capital and **labor**, goods and services, and	*Not yet in force*

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[89] Many of the global conventions regarding migration are not yet ratified or respected by African States. These include: the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, 1990; the Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949; the Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975; and the Regional Convention on the Recognition of Studies, Certificates and Diplomas, Degrees and other Academic Qualification in Higher Education in African States, 1981.

[90] Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Communauté des États sahélo-sahariens (CEN-SAD), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Inter- governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Southern African Development Community (SADC)

| | **of the people of the Region generally, among Member States**" (SADC Founding Treaty of 1992, Art. 5 (2) (d)) | |

Source: Author

"This blatant absence of migration regimes that support regional integration has amongst other left Africa with some of the world's most onerous visa restrictions, especially for people wishing to enter another African country", (Interview 46) states Acha Leke, Director of McKinsey Africa and head of the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Africa. African countries have some of the highest visa requirements in the world, even though intra-African destinations are increasing fast as a source of flight arrivals (IATA, 2010). *"When we started this work, only 5 African countries offered liberal access to all Africans; this number has grown over the past three years. We are making progress, but need to accelerate the pace"* (Interview 46) said Acha Lekein 2016. *It has been a long process involving numerous actors including governments but also private sector actors pushing for change in order to, amongst other, improve facilitate business exchange on the continent"*. (Interview 46) All regions except East Africa have visa-requirements above the world average with the number of visas on arrival below the world average in all African subregions except East Africa (see Figure 11), and paradoxically North Americans and Europeans face fewer visa requirements to enter African countries than Africans do [91]. Most ECOWAS countries impose stricter visa requirements on external visitors than other countries impose on them. In spite of regional collaboration through formal protocols, such visa policies - combined with restrictive immigration laws - have led to high numbers of irregular migrants.

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[91] North Americans and Europeans face fewer visa requirements to enter African countries than Africans do. African Union (AU) citizens need visas for 76% of AU member states. On average, Africans need visas to visit 60% of African countries, from a low of 41% for The Gambia and a high of 84% for Somalia. Only Comoros, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, and the Seychelles offer visa-free access or visa-on-arrival to citizens of all African countries. By contrast, the DRC, Equatorial Guinea, São Tomé & Principe and Sudan require all African entrants to apply for a visa before arrival. Reciprocal agreements are limited, since citizens of countries with relaxed visa policies still require visas to visit 50-80% of other African countries, and

Figure 13 - Visa requirements in African countries

(Share of countries with visas required prior to arrival in African sub-regions)
Source: WEF, 2013.

In the following, we will look closer at the implementation gap of existing policies in the different African sub-regions, with a specific focus on West Africa. Africa's Regional Economic Communities (RECs) include eight sub regional bodies which are the building blocks of the African Economic Community established in the 1991 Abuja Treaty which provides the overarching framework for continental economic integration. While the Economic Community of West African states (ECOWAS) might have initially started the process of formal integration measures through the signing of regional protocols, it is currently the East African Community that is advancing more rapidly in the actual implementation of free mobility for its citizens.

When comparing advances in national legislation across East Africa, it is striking that East African Community (EAC) citizens can move freely without charge in the Member countries. Kenya and Rwanda have entirely abolished work permit requirements for all EAC citizens, however implementation challenges remain. The EAC Common Market Protocol (Article 10) from 2009 - enforced from 2010 - guarantees free movement for citizens to work and reside within the 5 partner states using a common passport. My field work shows that free movement commitments were phased up to 2015, while negotiations continue on the harmonization and liberalization of labor markets and services providers. There is different progress made in Partner countries; Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya are lagging behind schedule on implementation of the Protocol. The EAC Secretariat has weak capacity to monitor the implementation of the Common Market Protocol, it seems. This is mainly due to conflicting

legal interpretation of the provisions on free movement of workers. To facilitate entry into the countries, discussions are also on-going for a machine-readable and electronic (e-identity) National Identity Card in all partner states that can serve as a travel document. *"The Protocol furthermore commits partner states to recognize academic and professional qualifications granted in other partner states. To this end, two annexes on mutual recognition are being negotiated, which will open markets for workers across the region",* (Interview 27) explains Leonard Rugwabiza, Director of General Planning in the Ministry of Finance in Rwanda. Partner states are also exploring the regional portability and harmonization of social security benefits. Finally, the establishment of an EAC single tourist visa was implemented starting 1st January 2014 at a fee of 100 USD, in order to spur tourism and free movement in the region.

In Central Africa, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) – which is one of the eight Regional Economic Communities recognised by the African Union - provisions on free mobility were first introduced in 1983; however the implementation of free movement without visa has been delayed in key countries. The Communauté Economique et Monetaire de l'Afrique Centrale (CEMAC), built on the post-colonial configuration of l'Afrique Equatoriale Française – has similar origins, overlapping memberships and comparable mandates as ECCAS and due to its historical legacy, CEMAC appears more established with more political legitimacy (Byiers, 2017). Nonetheless, *"Community regulations are needed to ensure harmonization of immigration laws and a common understanding of the modalities for operationalizing free movement of persons in CEMAC"* (Interview 27) underlines Leonard Rugwabiza, Director of General Planning in the Ministry of Finance in Rwanda. In April 2009, the CEMAC biometric passport came into effect but for the time being is recognized only in Africa. Under the Protocol on Freedom of Movement and Rights of Establishment, implementation was to be phased over 12 years to provide for ECCAS nationals to move and reside freely in any ECCAS member state. The bloc has a common travel document for intra-regional travel, the CEPGL card, but fees for obtaining the card differ among member states (US$80 in the DRC compared with US$10 and US$5 in Rwanda and Burundi, respectively).

"In the absence of a formalized SADC Protocol on Free movement, countries have variously moved to grant visa free entry on a selective basis – which has resulted in an uneven free movement regime within SADC", (Interview 21) outlines Ali Mansour from the Ministry of Finance of Mauritius and former chair of the Global Forum for Migration and Development. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) first produced a Draft Protocol on

Free Movement of Persons in 1995, which was opposed by countries that face high immigration flows. A new Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons (2005) was also rejected. The Protocol would oblige state parties to facilitate visa free entry for all SADC citizens for a maximum of 90 days in accordance with the laws of the State Party concerned, and also makes provisions for establishment, permanent and temporary residence. The SADC Secretariat then drafted its own SADC Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of People, which was approved in 2005. However, only six member states (Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland) have signed while nine signatures are required before the Protocol comes into effect. *"It is still unclear whether states are obliged to comply and whether the Protocol be enforced"* (Interview 41) notes Gervais Appave, Director of the International Organization for Migration. Instead, several countries have signed bilateral agreements on this matter, such as South Africa.

There is uneven compliance to the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) protocols on Free Movement of persons among member states, even though free movement of services and labor are critical to realizing the stated goals of integration. COMESA has several legal instruments dealing with free movement of persons: (i) Protocol on the Gradual Relaxation and Eventual Elimination of Visa Requirements (1984)– which is in force and at various stages of implementation by Member States; (ii) Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Labour Services and the Right of Establishment and Residence (2001) – which is not in force until it is fully ratified. The latter has so far only been ratified by Burundi, while only four of 19 member states have signed (Kenya, Burundi, Rwanda and Zimbabwe); (iii) Model Immigration Law - not in force. Member countries have agreed to introduce visa free entry for a maximum period of 90 days per year subject to various requirements. *"While COMESA has pioneered the one-stop-border post concept in Africa, the lack of harmonization of immigration and labor legislation among COMESA member states has impeded the implementation of the different Protocols' objectives"(*Interview 35*)* underlines Olumbide Abimbola, Trade and Regional Integration Officer at the African Development Bank.

The free movement of persons without visa is in effect in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) region; however the second and third phases of right to residence (ratified in 1986) and establishment (not ratified) remain unimplemented (Adepujo, 2011). The Treaty of ECOWAS (1975) aims to eliminate all obstacles to the free movement of people, goods, capital and services and to guarantee the right of entry, residence and establishment

among the 15 member states. The Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and the Right of Residence and Establishment was ratified in 1980, and member states agreed to free entry of Community citizens without a visa for 90 days as a first phase. The second and third phases would give community citizens right to settle or establish, set up enterprises and access economic activities as well as enjoy the same conditions as host country nationals. However, current agreements by the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and ECOWAS include a national treatment obligation clause that applies to all service activities covered by these agreements. Furthermore, mutual recognition of qualifications is not yet in force in ECOWAS. There has been a harmonization of travel document, with the introduction of the ECOWAS Travel Certificate, the ECOWAS common passport and National Identity Cards as well as the ECOWAS Brown Card for insurance policy. Nonetheless, many ECOWAS nationals do not possess any travel documents or birth certificates. *"In most cases, the general population are not even aware of the existance of these documents",* (Interview 17) underlines Adam Osman, border patrol commander at Ghana's immigration service. In general, language differences, lack of harmonization of community immigration procedures, documents and fees have impeded the implementation of treaties and protocols. *"ECOWAS is currently undertaking a number of activities aimed at further enhancing movement of persons within the region: This includes plans for biometric identify card for community citizens, common regional migration policy, and a review/update of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movements and the Rights of Residency and Establishment"* (Interview 12) explains Sanoh N'Fally from the ECOWAS Commissariat.

The Economic Community of West African States was created on May 28 1975. The preamble to the treaty outlined the key objective of removing obstacles to the movement of goods, capital and people in the sub-region. The 1979 protocol on free movement of persons (ratified 1980), the right of residence (ratified 1986) and of establishment (not yet ratified) further underlined the free mobility of labor, and was an attempt to recreate a borderless sub-region (ECOWAS, 2006). Member states can nonetheless refuse admission of so-called inadmissible immigrants, and countries have on several occasions – both before and after ratifications of protocols – expelled large numbers of immigrants in irregular situations.

Table 19 – ECOWAS treaties/protocols and their relationship with migration [92]

ECOWAS treaties	Mobility/Migration aspects	Labour/Migration aspects
Treaty of 24 July 1993	Citizens of the community shall have the right of entry, residence and establishment and Member States undertake to recognize these rights of Community citizens in their territories in accordance with the provisions of the Protocols relating thereto. **Article 22**: Creation of Political, Judicial and Legal Affairs, Regional Security and Immigration Commission; **Article 35:** Quota, quantitative or like restrictions or prohibitions and administrative obstacles to trade among the Member States shall also be removed.	**Area of migrants rights** Creation of 2 Court of Justice", Article 15 of this Treaty. **Area of Social dialogue** Economic and Social Council which shall have an advisory role and whose composition shall include representatives of the various categories of economic and social activity, Article 14.
ECOWAS Protocols The 1979 Protocol A/P1/5/79 adopted on 29 May 1979	GENERAL PRINCIPLES ON MOVEMENT OF PERSONS, RESIDENCE AND ESTABLISHMENT **Article 2** The Community citizens have the right to enter, reside and establish in the territory of Member States.	General Principles on movement of persons residence and establishment**,** Article 2 right of residence
Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/7/86	**Article 5** Citizens of the Community who are nationals of Member States admitted without visa into the territory of one Member State, and desiring to reside in the territory of that Member State, shall be obliged to obtain an ECOWAS RESIDENCE CARD or a RESIDENCE PERMIT	Definition of a nomenclature of migrants
Supplementary Protocol A/SP.2/590	**"Right of Establishment"** means the right granted to a citizen who is a national of the Member State to settle or establish in another Member State other than his State of origin, and to have access to economic activities, to carry out these activities as well as to set up and manage enterprises, and in particular companies, under the same conditions as defined by the legislation of the host Member State for its own nationals;	**Article 2** The right of establishment as defined in Article 1 above shall include access to non-salaried activities / Non formal sector and right to protection

Source: Silvere, Y. K and Ndiaye, B. (August 2014)

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[92] With regards to the high number of intra-regional refugee flows, the Protocol relating to the Mechanism on Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security signed in 1999 which was a first for regional organizations in Africa. Emphasis is placed on early warning and prevention, while subsequently on addressing root causes of conflict and building peace. The ECOWAS treaty is nonetheless not a refugee instrument, and this problem was underlined in the Common Approach on Migration from 2008 by encouraging Member States to "put in place mechanisms for granting rights of residence and establishment to refugees from ECOWAS countries" (ECOWAS, 2008).

Despite of this progress documented on paper, ECOWAS still faces challenges in implementing free mobility. *"While national legislation aims at immigration control, regional collaboration aim for the liberal legal basis for inter-state movement, stipulating that citizens with valid travel documents and health certificates were free to enter, remain and work in member states"*, (Interview 32) underlines Inye Briggs, Civil Servant of the Nigerian Government. The national legislation generally antedates the regional protocols. They often appear to directly contradict the qualification in article 3 of the 1986 Supplementary Protocol (on Right of Residence), purporting to limit restrictions on the right of residence to those "justifiable by reasons of public order, public security and public health." Member states, in that regard, tried to ensure regional integration through, amongst other: the Revised 1993 ECOWAS Treaty; the1994 ECOWAS Convention on Extradition specified procedures for migrant admission and expulsion consistent with international human rights standards; the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. However, it seems these instruments leave the door open to a variety of interpretations. Moreover, not all the ECOWAS countries are party to the 1990 Migrants Convention.[93]

Lacking implementation of migration management is apparent, as noted in the Draft ECOWAS migration policy (Silvere and Ndiaya, 2015), when it comes to:

a) **Domestic laws:** Article 4 of the Protocol reserved the right to refuse admission to any Community citizen within the category of inadmissible immigrant under their domestic laws, and these criteria have not been harmonized while implementation is not transparent.

b) **National Committees:** Only half of the ECOWAS member states have created national committees to monitor the implementation of protocols, and even where monitoring committees exist, success is not guaranteed.[94]

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[93] State Parties: Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal.
Signed, but not (yet) ratified: Benin, Guinea Bissau, Liberia Sierra Leone, Equatorial Guinea, and Togo.
Not signed, not a party: Cote d'ivoire, Gambia.
[94] Much of this introductory chapter is based on the UNHCR paper *Promoting integration through mobility: Free movement under ECOWAS*, prepared by Aderanti Adepoju, Alistair Boulton and Mariah Levin (no year of publication indicated).

c) **Travel documents:** There seems to be confusion regarding which documents are required to cross borders. Harmonized regional migration documents foreseen by the ECOWAS Council of Ministers in 1992 do not yet exist. In 1985, a standardized ECOWAS Travel Certificate was adopted. These certificates are available in seven countries in the region and are valid for two years, renewable for a further two years. Passports should give automatic entry; however, they are more expensive to produce and acquire than the travel certificates. The sub-region not fully embarked on issuing travel documents (passports or travel certificates) which contain biometric safety features. In 2000, the Authority of Heads of State and Government adopted at its meeting in Abuja a uniform ECOWAS passport with the ECOWAS emblem on the front cover. This is not fully in place.

d) **Fees:** ECOWAS member states are not supposed to charge fees for Community citizens' right to visa-free entry for stays of up to 90 days. Fees for ECOWAS residence permits are not streamlined in the protocols and all member states appear charge from USD $10 annually to more than USD $500. Additionally, corruption at border points is another issue in spite of training of immigration officials and citizens.

e) **Expulsions:** The Protocols stipulate wide-ranging protection against expulsion, however this has not been the case. The 1979 Protocol underlines the reasons: 1) national security, public order, morality and public health; 2) non-fulfilment of an essential condition for the issuance or the validity of residence or work permits; 3) laws and regulations applicable in the host Member State. It also outlines the general requirements of notification (to the individual concerned and the state of origin); the responsibility for the costs of the expulsion and the need to ensure the safety of the persons concerned and the protection of their property. The 1985 Supplementary Protocol confirms that expulsion orders be carried out humanely without injuring a person's rights or property and giving them a reasonable time to leave. The 1986 Supplementary Protocol explicitly forbids mass or collective expulsion and guarantees to all individuals subject to expulsion the right to contest such order through an appeal that has suspensive effect. (we have seen that this questionable implementation of current ECOWAS mobility policies has led to numerous expulsions throughout West Africa: The largest expulsions have been from Côte d'Ivoire in 1964 and from Ghana in 1969 but continued after the signing of the protocols, for example in Nigeria in 1983

and 1985, Mauritania and Senegal in 1989, Benin 1998 as well as the massive fleeing of threatened foreign populations in Côte d'Ivoire since 1999).

Paradoxically, history shows that one of the aspects that led to the formation of ECOWAS was the existing "undocumented" migration across borders and within the sub-region, including migration of cross-border workers, commuters, professionals, female traders, clandestine workers and refugees (Afolayan et al., 2009). Furthermore, due to the poor state of civil registration in Africa, undocumented migration within the continent is hard to number and map. In most cases it is only when the respective states undertake expulsions that one might start gathering statistics on this issue. Additionally, very few countries have adequate data to compile national migration profiles, and census of populations are not undertaken regularly. *"The Secretariat but also the officials implementing ECOWAS protocols, such as customs, immigration or security officials are in need of capacity building for an improved management of migratory flows",* (Interview 13) explains Ibrahim Ba, Responsible for Macro-economic economy at ECOWAS. It has been suggested that a West African Advisory Board on Migration Management should be created, since there is an urgent need for a mechanism to monitor the implementation of national laws and ECOWAS decisions related to migration (Adepujo, 2009). Indeed, during the first 25 years of ECOWAS' existence, its activities were largely based on state-to-state relations with an ineffective secretariat (Page and Bilal, 2001).

The abolition of visa requirements, of mandatory residence permits, as well as the introduction of brown cards/travel certificates/ECOWAS passports and the elimination of further formalities or border controls have aimed at facilitating the intra-regional movement of people (ECOWAS, 2000), and thereby attempting to stimulate regional integration. Since 2008, the ECOWAS Common Approach on Migration has recognized the free movement of persons as the fundamental priority of its integration policy. It takes into account the benefits of legal migration to the sub-region's development (migration and development action plans)[95]. However, this has been done with lacking means to implement comprehensive migration management schemes. Papa Demba Fall describes this situation as making migration "*the poor parent of regional integration*" (Fall, 2007: 11) referring to the economic prospects of regional integration while putting the minimal resources into sub-regional migration management.

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[95] The Common Approach on Migration also recognizes the need to harmonize migration policies and combat human trafficking, the gender dimension of migration, and the protection of the rights of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees.

Many studies attempt to explain migration phenomena *post factum* (Jonsson 2009). Nonetheless, guiding the hopeful young West Africans in their migration projects, and facilitating household strategies based on mobility will be among the key challenges of the region in the future. Migration is thus indeed the "poor parent" of a regional integration process in ECOWAS demanding much more than mere harmonization of policies that interlink trade, investment, transport, and movement of persons. Demographic growth, poverty and unemployment are factors that ensure that migration pressures are pervasive in the sub-region.

In the last decade, policy-makers have not considered it a priority to make progress in ratifying and implementing regional protocols, apart from in EAC. Even within the RECs, social cohesion and inclusion are thus challenged and migrants face numerous risks. Most RECs impose strict immigration rules, and onerous restrictions on visas and work permits, this is restricting potential benefits of inclusive regional integration. Only the East African Community (EAC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) offer visa-free movement. After analysis of existing policies, one can conclude that a general problem across all African sub regions is the lack of right to residence and establishment, the lack of regional recognition of qualifications and right of establishment; limited application of World Trade Organization (WTO)'s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Mode 4 on temporary movement to provide services; and restricted access to social services such as health and education. Therefore, a lack of inclusive regional migration management, combined with a trend towards bilateralism and high-skilled migration policies, benefits wealthy "formal" migrants and punishes poor "informal" migrants. When formal protocols are not implemented, migration serves less as an engine of inclusiveness and growth.

In conclusion, before asserting the 'failure' of emigration policies, we need to close the "sending-country gap" in migration policy research, which has tended to focus largely on controlling migration. As mentioned, in order to analyze the discourse and implementation gap I establish contact and built trust with West African and African policy makers, I then acquired and analyzed African (draft) migration policies and protocols, and subsequently measured their actual implementation, which required detailed qualitative fieldwork (Cf. Brachet, 2005; Infantino, 2010). International organizations and policy makers are currently navigating in this area without the support of migration policy research. Finally, in order to possibly explain the factors determining why they are not implemented it demands thorough analysis of financial and human resources, competing policy priorities and the investment by civil servants

(Boswell, 2007; Czaika and de Haas, 2011). We have previously established that in the case of Burkina Faso, the relationship between politics and policy is crucial to understand why a gap between stated objective and actual implementation might surge in regard to the upcoming emigration policy. Evaluating the effectiveness of policies (or the implementation of stated goals) also implies looking into the "aspirations" of the sending state. In the following, we will introduce policy recommendations and arguments based on both the "capabilities" and "aspirations" of policy-makers and with both short- to long-term perspectives in mind, considering that member states do not implement regionally agreed upon policies regarding migration even though regional migration management has the potential to reduce negative social effects for migrants as well as for those left behind. The following section will look at how to incentivice African policy makers to move from the current situation of unmanaged migration to proactively establishing structures that enhance development benefits of migrant agency.

6. Migration unmanaged

Porous borders and informal processes facilitate the act of mobilility within Africa, hence migrant agency might be enough to cross a border. We have established that migration can be a capability-enhancing act in the search for better or more secure livelihoods (De Haan, 1999; Ellis, 2000; Sen, 1999a) or a response to relative deprivation or stress factors. Migration – for many Africans - represents a livelihood strategy and an investment or insurance function for diversifying income (Quinn, 2006). Nonetheless, Africa's slow progress toward regional integration leaves space for improving dimensions that are important for human capital development, such as employment, health and social protection. African countries and RECs can do more to ensure development results from migration, from high- and low-skilled migrants. Intra-African migrants face the disadvantages of high formal restrictions and costly barriers to legal mobility and integration, they are often left in a situation of irregularity in neighboring countries hindering social mobility and inclusive growth.

We have throughout the thesis argued that development benefits of migration agency largely depend on the structures in place. However, policy makers are not necessarily considering it a priority to ensure the design and implementation of policies that limit constraints to mobility. "*Sub-Saharan migration policies have remained among the least-developed in the world, for example far behind Asian countries - such as the Philippines - which are proactively renegotiating, reviewing and renewing their migration policies as a means to compete in the global political economy",* (Interview 42) underlines Anja Klug from UNCHR and long-term advisor to the Global Forum for Migration and Development. This trend of limited policy development also applies to intra-African processes and affects south-south migrants to an even larger extent. In the least developed countries, with limited access orders, this is often not only the case for geographic mobility, but also for social mobility measures for the population in general. Poverty is a strong constraint to mobility – both geographic and social - and only people who have a combination of financial, human or social capital to migrate (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) at disposal would benefit from "*the expansion of 'capacities'.. to lead the kind of life they should value – and have reason to value"* (Sen, 1999; 18).

Inspite of increasing migratory flows in this 'age of migration', there are increasing restrictions to mobility. Policy-making is rather following a trend of increasingly closed borders for low-skilled migrants as a strategy to reassuring national constituents. During my interviews with

policy-makers, it became apparent that in some of the poorest countries on earth perceptions of priorities regarding people that have left the border might be difficult to understand considering the number of social problems within the national borders such as extreme poverty, starvation, maternal deaths, urban slumming, lack of basic services, crime and social tension. It was previously noted that Chief Thiombiano from the Burkinabe Parliament did not work on migration policies since this was considered secondary to addressing basic developmental issues, while it was confirmed during my interviews with both Prime Ministers in office as well as Ambassadors to Paris and Copenhagen that there were no attemps to introduce management and support schemes to further the conditions of the Burkinabe abroad. Prime Minister Tertius Zongo underlined that *"while migration could be a possibility for national development through opportunities for our citizens abroad, we have throughout time noted that there is hardly any return on such investment, and Burkina Faso's first priority remains national development through improving socio-economic conditions at home for those that chose to stay and those that have no other choice than to stay"* (Interview 4).

Indeed, the policy-makers interviewed during my field research did not perceive it as a national development priority to fix the problems of those that have had the opportunity to leave, often to escape poverty. This is unfortunate since policy-making at the national level to a large extent determines the opportunities of people on the other side of the border. De Haas (2009) has underlined that rather than applying classifications such as forced and voluntary migration, it is more appropriate to conceive of migration occurring along a continuum from low to high constraints along which all migrants deal with varying degrees of structural constraints. All are confronted by some structural constraints that limit opportunities for social mobility and for structural change in receiving and sending communities. But as this thesis shows, the constraints are higher for migrants that cannot afford to migrate beyond the continent.

"In Africa, closing doors to free movement of people has sent flows of undocumented people or irregular migrants through the windows", (Interview 21) notes Ali Mansour, Chair of the first African Global Forum on Migration and Development. In the short term, such constraints marginalize migrants and reduce their potential contributions to development and inclusive growth. Furthermore, the social costs of the ongoing marginalization of migrants at the micro-level include risks to health, human capital and social cohesions at the macro-level. *"Restrictions leave migrants in irregularity, which in turn marginalizes them and imposes socio-economic costs on both migrants and receiving countries"* (Interview 35) underlines

Mohamed Youssouf, head of the Social Protection Division and Migration Trust Fund at the African Development Bank. Constraints on labor mobility in African subregions and reduced opportunities to exercise agency thus have negative impacts on migrant well-being as well as on the poverty- and inequality-reducing potential of migration, instead migrants often find themselves in irregular situations. Indeed, *"many intra-African migrant workers remain trapped in low-income, low-productivity jobs that offer limited opportunities for upward mobility due to the difficulties of obtaining legal residence status or work permits",* (Interview 36) notes Mthuli Ncube, former Chief Economist and Vice President of the African Development Bank. Instead, *"The main measure of enforcement of African policies is expulsion, which is costly for both the receiving countries and for the migrants, and not necessarily a useful strategy for development or for balancing regional labor markets,"* (Interview 51) outlines Sarah Rosengartner from the United National Development Programme, during preliminary meetings to the first African-led Global Forum for Migration and Development in 2012.

In the case of Burkina Faso, people use migration as a livelihood strategy in the lack of other policies such as access to social, educational and health services, employment strategies and other developmental policies that should protect people from poverty, however they also remain without support and with limited opportunities abroad. "*Regional migration could positively affect development and poverty reduction, and we should support governments in building evidencebased policies to foster that migrants become agents of change both abroad and at home",* (Interview 34) noted Agnes Soucat, Director of the Human Development Department at the African Development Bank.

Policy-making is nonetheless a complex process, which is not necessarily always based on rational individual decisions nor on evidence, even in the most advanced open access orders of the world. Paul Cairney, in this book on "*The Politics of Evidencebased Policy-making*" (2016) argues that policy-makers use "bounded rationality" (Cairney, 2016) to make decisions since they can only gather limited information before they make decisions quickly. He basically finds that policy-makers use two short cuts: rational ways to gather *quickly* the best evidence on solutions to meet their goals; and irrational ways - including drawing on emotions and gut feeling - to identify problems *even more quickly.* One would assume that in limited access orders of sub-Saharan African, the process of decision-making is less so based on evidence, first due to the widespread lack of proper data and information and secondly due to the complex

system of informal and personal rent-seeking. Cairney (2016) agrees that for research to help improve policy it is important with evidence but just as important to invest the time to find out how to exert influence as part of a coalition of like-minded actors looking for opportunities to raise attention to problems and solutions.

It is noteworthy that in practice free movement of people is one of the least-integrated policy areas in African regional integration. This thesis has established that there is a large gap between the visions outlined in the founding treaties of the regional economic communities (RECs)—which consider movement of people to be one of four freedoms—and the current reality. Over the last decade, there has been almost no progress in ratification and implementation of regional protocols on free movement, except in the East African Community (EAC). The main question remains why member states do not implement regionally agreed upon policies regarding migration, and how to influence policy-making towards best practice policies. While there is 90-day visa-free movement within ECOWAS, a point of critique underlined by scholars in the 'open borders' scenario is the lack of access to basic social rights, health care and education, while issues of social security entitlements and access to social assistance by cross-border movers have largely been neglected (Deacon, 2011; Pecoud, 2013). The same is true for the mutual recognition of professional qualifications and diplomas (Hartmann, 2008). *"Welfare, for example, is often thought to imply a degree of national closure to be meaningful"* (Pecoud, 2015).

Having established that policy-makers in general use two shortcuts for making decision, under the complex constraints of time and context, the following sections will attempt to address each of them; first section will try to improve the understanding of what motivates policy-makers in order to find viable short-term solutions and low-hanging fruits. While migration studies have largely analyzed what motivates mobility from the migrant-perspective, it remains un-explored what motivates policy-makers in this field. We have established that migration research has moved from assuming that migration is motivated by individual-level rational-choice decision-making in the search for financial gain to a broader understanding of macro-level structural social elements or networks. This thesis suggests to also start looking at broader factors of possible motivation of what drives decision-making for policy-makers.

The second section, with a medium-term perspective, will try to advance the evidence-base for African policy-makers, mainly by having it in an available, accessible and understandable

format for policy-makers to use. We will present policy arguments constructed around macro- and micro-level costs and benefits that are easily understandable. Finally, with a long-term perspective, the section will on the basis of EU mobility partnership agreements suggest a similar-looking partnership with ECOWAS and Burkina Faso focusing mainly on migrants' rights.

6.1 Short-term solutions: understanding decision-making of policy makers

This thesis has addressed the *capabilities* of a poor landlocked sending country such as Burkina Faso in better managing migration for development. Nonetheless, in most West Africa states the mobility of skills remains unmanaged. Within Africa, the countries of the Maghreb and South Africa remain the precursor countries in this regard, while in the case of West Africa Senegal has taken the leading role. Burkina Faso, nonetheless, is not like neighboring Senegal which is leading the way in West Africa when it comes to diaspora initiatives and cooperation with Europe. The countries that already have a large number of migrants in the north both benefit from less restrictive policies and also have better bargaining positions (Adepujo, 2006; Adepujo et *al*, 2008). These countries can more easily negotiate projects, readmission or migrant quotas. This includes West African countries such as Cape Verde, Ghana and Senegal[96] that have benefited from support to migration for co-development, circular migration and other bi- or multilateral agreements. Burkina Faso has so far hardly benefitted from bilateral agreements or project support[97]. Indeed, countries with south-south migration appear to be increasingly faced with restrictions both in terms of access to northern countries as well as to funding (Adepoju, 2007). This is proliferated by the fact that migration and development projects, including EU mobility partnerships and bilateral labor or temporary work agreements, are often highly concentrated in south-north migration countries such as neighboring Mali and Senegal.

While sending states might to some extent have a structurally disadvantaged position in the international system (Levitt and de la Dehesa, 2003; and Fitzgerald, 2006), we have previously established that there are conditions under which 'weaker' states can overcome power asymmetries in the politics of migration, especially in regional contexts (Østergaard-Nielsen,

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[96] Senegal and Cape Verde are also the only African countries having been considered for EU Mobility Partnership Agreements, (which Cape Verde has signed) and are the only sub-Saharan African countries included on the list of approximately 180 former and current bilateral agreements with OECD member countries (OECD/Federal Office of Immigration, 2004).

[97] This includes projects such as TOKTEN and MIDA as well as French co-development. Burkina Faso has only been subject to funding of one migration project from IOM for 'Mobilizing the Diaspora of Burkina Faso and Identifying Priority Needs of Burkina Faso'. Due to its diaspora in Italy, Burkina Faso was additionally one of the target countries along with Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mali and Senegal of the programme 'Migrant Women for Development in Africa (WMIDA)'. Two additional regional projects including Burkina Faso focus on respectively trafficking and document fraud.

2003; Betts, 2011). This nonetheless demands *aspirations* of sending states and investments of political capital to facilitate legal migration.

Considering the very limited advances presented by policy-makers in Africa inspite of the global discourse and increasing evidencebase, it seems important to understand the reasons, behaviors or motivations in policymaking or "looking behind the façade" (North, 2007) and bringing policymaking center stage in the migration policy debate. This analysis would add to a research trend among international development agencies to "look behind the façade" in order to efficiently support their implementation (Meisel and Ould-Audia, 2007; North et al 2007; Unsworth, 2008; Institute of Development Studies, 2010). This has been expressed in studies undertaken by DFID (An Upside-Down View of Governance. Institute of Development Studies, 2010), AFD (Is Good Governance a Good Development Strategy? Meisel and Ould-Audia, 2007). Other donors such as the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Framework for Strategic Governance and Corruption Analysis. Unsworth, 2008) have also worked towards this trend of seeking to understand the underlying causes of bad governance instead of prioritizing reform of formal institutions upfront. In the theoretical analysis on policy-making we determined that in neopatrimonial limited access orders elites often resist reforms. Reforms threaten the rent-creation that holds the society together, and the elites often subvert such reforms in countries that are not ready for them. The main question is thus not "*how do we support democratization and governance in Africa…*" but rather "*…what is shaping interests of political elites*?" Meisel and Ould-Audia (2007) also echo that in non-converging countries, the priority remains building capacities for strategic vision and co-ordination among elites. The DFID-funded project (Institute of Development Studies, 2010) similarly comes to the conclusion that instead of prioritizing reform of formal institutions, donors should look at the structures, relationships, interests and incentives that underpin the causes of bad governance. At any rate, "*all the questions relate in one way or the other to the critical issue of how to get more effective collective action among societal groups, and more constructive bargaining between public and private actors*." (Institute of Development Studies, 2010: 73). It is thus important to understand 'why' policy-makers have not considered it priority to implement migration policies in order to determine 'what' might be the viable policy solutions.

"*A lot of our policy models traditionally are based on a rather naïve understanding of what drives behavior. But if you have a more intelligent, nuanced account of how people make decisions, you can design policy that is more effective, less costly, and makes life easier for*

most citizens.'' (Bell, 2013). This opens migration research to a broad field of behavioral economics and so-called 'nudging'[98] to more efficiently understand how to improve public policy. It is a current trend among governments to incorporate behavioral economics into the design of more effective policy solutions. However, this is currently focusing on change in behaviour for individuals, due to policies that 'nudge' wanted behaviour, for exampe in the case of automatic enrollment into saving-schemes instead of opt-in (Madrian & Shea, 2001; Thaler & Benarzi, 2004; Choi et al, 2004, 2006; Beshears et al, 2008; Vanguard Group 2013). While the implications of behavioral economics for the design of policy solutions has mainly been based on consumer behaviour, the following will attempt to instead understand how to apply behavioural assumptions to understand policy making itself.

For the last decade we have seen increasing African policy discourse on the benefits of migration management, however it's only during the last few years that we see a trend towards the elaboration of migration policies, and the level of implementation remains uncertain. The following section examines the extent to which it can be attributed to internal or external factors. It first outlines that the drive towards the elaboration of a migration policy in Burkina Faso can to some extent be attributed to an internal recognition of the importance of migration management led by a change in migration flows and in the relationship with the diaspora, as well as the decrease in remittances. However, one should not forget the external factors. The section secondly outlines that the international pressure towards devising emigration policies as part of national development plans – combined with the EU priorities through an increasing trend of tying aid to migration management – is, to a large extent, influencing the process of the development of a migration policy:

First, there are some internal factors that policy-makers might to some extent be considering when making decisions. Burkina Faso, as other countries, is for example experiencing a change in migration flows – both with increasing immigration (and return) – but also a dispersion and change in emigration flows. This change also implies an alternative list of countries to negotiate with. Those are (in order of total numbers of migrants) Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, France, Benin, Nigeria, Italy, Gabon, Germany and finally the United States. Hence, Burkina Faso is to a lesser extent dependent on immigration policy in Côte d'Ivoire, which enhances the

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[98] The best known initiative on this front is the Behavioural Insights Team in the United Kingdom, the so-called Nudge Unit which aims to use "insights from academic research in behavioural economics and psychology to public policy and services" (for more information on the UK Behavioral Insights Team, see https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/behavioural-insights-team).

"capabilities" of the Burkinabe state that have been limited by legal and economic constraints. (Délano, 2009). Furthermore, many initiatives are led by the diaspora itself, through voluntary participation in the High Counsel of Burkinabe abroad. It should be noted that except for during the revolution and the rule of iconic President Thomas Sankara, the Burkinabe diaspora has traditionally been mobilized against the regime since Blaise Compaore came to power in 1987 (after a coup that would kill Thomas Sankara), while since the years 2000 the diaspora has showed less resistance to the regime and was increasingly getting involved in the national development of Burkina Faso. Among the positive initiatives seen in Burkina Faso is the goal of reaching out to the Diaspora: "*Diaspora policies have previously been developed in Burkina Faso similar to efforts undertaken in other African countries*" (Interview 49) confirms Sonja Plaza who is Head of the Diaspora Initiative at the World Bank while recognizing that this is far from enough to generate development results. For example, through the creation of the 'conseil supérieur des Burkinabés à l'étranger', which is similar to the 'Haut Conseil des Maliens à l'étranger (HCME)' with representation in parliament. In Mali this has led to the creation of the 'Ministère des Maliens à l'étranger et de l'intégration africaine'[99]. Other efforts include efforts to expand the *jus sanguinis* with double nationality rights and the right to vote for nationals abroad. *"The National independent commission for elections tried to set up voting systems for the Burkinabe abroad already for the 2010 election, but administrative restraints led to a postponement until 2015"* (Interview 8) underlines Mr Ouedraogo from the High Council of Burkinabe abroad. Burkina Faso have joined the neighboring West African countries towards attempting to build support of associations and entrepreneurs of the Diaspora, facilitating remittances and favoring migrant investments, however so far without success.

Secondly, and most likely the key motivational factor for the introduction of migration policies across the continent, are the external factors: There is increasing awareness among the West African states that funding is available for migration issues with development partners. The discourse on migration and development is unified across multilateral organizations. The organizations that are particularly trying to structure the discourse of sending country governments include EU (through bilateral migration agreements and negociations for multilateral mobility partnerships), World Bank (amongst other through development of national strategies, previously of PRSPs) and OIM (through advocacy for development of

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[99] http://www.primature.gov.ml/

national migration policies). Indeed, since 2001, there is increasing awareness among West African states that funding is available for migration issues. At the international level, there is also more pressure on the individual states to devise migration policies and for example address the high costs of remittances. *"West African countries were openly encouraged to develop policies during a meeting on Migration for Development in West Africa organized by ECOWAS",* (Interview 1) confirmed Dr Blandine Wetohosou from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Benin. This meeting was financed by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and Director Mr Gervais Appave explained that *"the meeting gathered all member states' migration policy makers in Dakar in September 2012 in order to advance in the elaboration of policies"* (Interview 41). The process of the elaboration of national migration policies in Africa is to some extent also dictated by EU priorities through an increasing trend of tying aid to migration management (as well as return and expulsion). The research under the Global Migration Governance (Betts, 2011) has underlined the emerging formal and informal mechanisms through which Europe and others increasingly structuring the norms and practices of migration policy in Sub-Saharan Africa.

However, a mere transposition of a process of impersonal formalization of rules in low-income countries does not in itself create development. In West Africa, the shift to the formalization of rules has not actually occurred, and the system remains dominated by the social sphere based on personal ties and relationships, with unwritten norms and off-stage policymaking (Meisel and Ould-Audia, 2007). The pro-forma depersonalization of regulation systems has contributed to increasing the complexity of the system of economic, political and social regulation, but does not necessarily increase its effectiveness (Gyimah-Boadi, 2007). This has not spontaneously brought about a mode of separating institutions from people, thus a 'grey area' has emerged, where the confidence factor does not function. In the World Bank paper on limited access order, the concluding chapter explains *"why existing approaches to development often fail"* (North et al, 2007) as being the attempt to transposition elements of open access developed countries in societies where violence is latent and where political elites have divided the control of economy and politics. It is thus a social order of rent-sharing and limited access controlled by the latter. Limiting access and rent-creation is therefore a solution to violence – paradoxically, therefore, many who are in fact exploited by the policies in place will not push for reform as the risk of social disorder is eminent. Reforms thus often become window-dressing and donor evaluations often underline the lack of "political will".

We have established that in the case of Burkina Faso, the former Burkinabe President was criticized for paying more attention to foreign relations then national development (such as supporting the rights of Burkinabe migrants in neighboring countries). Indeed, the relationship between politics and policy is crucial to understand why a gap between stated objective and actual implementation might surge in regard to the upcoming emigration policy. For example, some critics underline that the strong foreign political stance of former President Compaore has been part of legitimizing his long regime. It is in that regard noteworthy how the administration that had during decades not facilitated diaspora-policies suddenly reached out to the diaspora in the last moments. "*Some problematics still remain unexplored, and gaps in the research include topics such as emigration policies (rules of exit), the "diplomacy of migration" led by emigration countries.."* (De Wenden, 2008*)*. The reasons for this discourse gap in Burkina Faso are equal to those in the EU: *"Without the interest and support of the broad spectrum of policymakers, parliamentarians and implementers, there is little chance that the upcoming migration policy will substantially benefit development in Burkina Faso"*, (Interview 10) confirmed Moustapha Thiombiano, journalist and owner of Horizon FM one of the first and main media-outlets in Burkina Faso. From a civil society standpoint, there did not seem to be high expectations to a possible policy. Experience shows, according to the head of the journalist association, that implementation of policies without priority for the Presidency are not easily implemented. Declarations and policies as well as other good intentions are more than often mixed with waivoring political will, lacking implementation and reduced budgets. In the words of Journalist Thiombiano, *"policy promises are easy to make, while even easier to break"* (Interview 10). There is indeed limited follow-up and monitoring of national policies and lack of accountable and transparent governance.

Considering the nature of African regimes, as explained above, it would not be enough to solely consider the capabilities of sending governments, but instead crucial to look at their aspirations when suggesting viable solutions to migration management. This chapter will suggest a hypothesis of motivations and aspirations of the governing elites. I will do so by building a paradigm through which, according to the theoretical and methodological findings above, policy-makers in sending states are constructing possible motivations/aspirations and their reactions to the four main migration and development approaches praised in research working on benefits for sending states (Skeldon, 2010):

- diaspora and skilled migration or the so-called brain drain;

- remittances;

- regional integration;

- co-development.

Before building the hypothesis below, it should be noted that both during my field-work and during my work-life in Africa, I encountered numerous very technical and honest policy-makers that were truly committed to improving the lives of people in their country. Every single person that I interviewed during my field-work, and everyone quoted in this paper are public servants with the best intentions in mind. The absolute majority of people I have worked with have very genuine interests in change, equality and poverty-reduction. Nonetheless, evidence shows that there are structural issues of governance in the majority of the least developed countries and corruption is a phenomenon that is wide-spread across the continent and within each sector in national settings. Again, the hypothesis is built on the many years of international recognition of the nexus between migration and development, which has clearly not affected national priorities for African sending countries. The hypothesis is built on reduced ambition as per experience of numerous projects that were developed to support this nexus and failed. Finally, the hypothesis is built on assuming the worst and expecting the least in order to understand where to start, and then go from there with more ambitious goals for supporting benefits for all fostered by migration.

The hypothesis will hence draw on the following suggested correlations as established throughout the thesis: First, in countries with limited access orders, such as Burkina Faso, elites are privileged as compared to the general population, they are few and often part of the authorities in charge of government (which is generally the biggest employer and without other strong partners such as civil society). Elites in these neo-patrimonial states, as per the often complicated economic context, have been known to seek to maintain status quo and thereby continuously ensure rents for themselves and their families. Secondly, at the same time, with the instauration of numerous formal international frameworks and procedures, even countries with off-stage policy-making and informal procedures follow election-cycles and governments and policy-makers can fall short of public support and lose all power. Again, it is generally in the interest of the elites to maintain status quo and ensure that constituents/voters are not in opposition. The third assumption as to what might hypothetically motivates governing elites is financial stability and relative improvement at the macro-level to mitigate further external

involvement from international organizations in case of fiscal crisis and again to avoid national opposition and conflict. All of the above would have to be considered in relation to the reality of political instability in Africa, which might imply that an additional point of motivation for governing elites could be short-term gains in regards to all of the points mentioned above.

With all the respect and admiration for the policy-makers that I met during this research, and for those that serve their country, and with acknowledgement that a simplified table of assumptions could contain numerous errors and mistakes and wrong estimations and not apply to all cases, below is an initial very general possible and hypothetical table of aspirations, motivations and decision-making that will be explicitly described in detail below:

Figure 14 - Hypothesis of aspirations of policy-makers in poor sending countries

	Rent-seeking	Political gain	Financial gains	Short-term
Skilled migration	÷	÷	+	÷
Remittances	+	+	+	+
Regional integration	(÷)	+	+	(+)
Co-development	(+)	+	+	÷

When starting with the example of high-skilled migration or what from a European perspective is called return policies[100], one might understand that the aspirations of policy-makers and elites to support this in an African context could not be a priority for several reasons: In particular, supporting schemes for either immigration or return of high-skilled migrants would not necessarily in the short-term provide more rent for those in power today, but rather more competition for the limited funds, and would not necessarily provide political gains with limited jobs in low-income countries and benefits would not necessarily be visible in the short-term.

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[100] Return policies have been implemented in Germany since 1972, the Netherlands since 1975 and in France since 1977. In France, reinsertion policies providing economic help for 'voluntary return' were led in 1977, 1983 and 1998. In the mid 1990's, a report by government advisor Sami Nair marked the beginning of a new strategy of co-development built on existing patterns of social transnational action. Today, co-development, or solidarity development, has been replicated by a multitude of international actors: By international organizations through UNDPs TOKTEN, IOM's MIDA, World banks D-MADE etc. The Co-Development Programme's concept (France-Mali) has been adopted by Germany (with Turkey), Italy (with Senegal) and Spain (with Ecuador). Co-development has been propagated by international soft law (Global Commission on International Migration (2005), by the International Agenda for Migration Management (2005) and the UN High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development (2006). It has been 'Communitarized' in EUs global approach to migration and EU mobility partnerships. Latest, and what has revealed to be a key development, it has been adopted by some source country governments.

Burkina Faso is lagging behind compared to the efforts of neighboring countries such as Senegal[101] and Ghana[102] when it comes to migration management, mainly avoiding brain drain and encouraging return migration. The situation in Burkina Faso remains one of low political and policy implication in the global "competition" for the international migration of skilled human capital. There is currently no *"tug-of-war"* (Zolberg, 2007) between Burkina Faso and the receiving destination countries for Burkinabe emigrants. When comparing the statistics of the OFII (Office Francais de l'Immigration et l'Intégration)[103] to the rest of Western Africa, Senegal seems to bear the fruits of this joint political/policy approach with the largest number of well-educated (Master, DESS, PhD) profiles returning to establish businesses[104]. Oumar Ngondo, Director of the Senegalese Student and Youth Travel organization, underlines that "*there is a rising interest of high skilled youth interested in starting businesses and contributing to development in their home country and beyond*" (Interview 29).

When looking at the interest groups for and against highly skilled return/immigration in developed countries, one might question who is left to pull high skilled migrants back/into to countries with limited access orders: First, native high-skilled workers will oppose open high-skilled immigration policies because of labor market competition (Cerna, 2010). Neo-classists such as George Borjas (2003) have elaborated the argument that with the immigration of high-skilled workers, the supply of qualified workers increases, which in turn decreases the wages in the sector. In Africa the consequences supersede this by actually pushing high skilled workers into low skilled positions with minimum wages or induce brain waste. In developed countries, native low-skilled labor organizations are moderately pro-high-skilled immigration due to complementarity effects. Barry R. Chiswick (2005) in *'High skilled immigration in the international arena'* explains that they may benefit from high-skilled immigration because of

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[101] The exception to the rule is Senegal with several policies coupled by an active political approach to attract highly skilled persons. One might underline that the portfolio is located at the cabinet of the president, thus surpassing singular ministerial priorities and certain budget restrictions. Senegal's unilateral co-development policies include mobilizing productive investments by the Diaspora and to broker private-public partnerships with host country firms, enterprises and government implemented amongst others by the Government Agency for Investment Promotion and Major Works (APIX), the Ministry of Women Entrepreneurship 'Caravane des PMEs and last but not least by the Ministry of Senegalese Abroad (internet portal since 2008 www.senex.sn with support from IOM). In addition to Senegal's bilateral agreements (france, Spain, Switzerland), Senegal's cooperation with international co-development programs include the UNDP TOKTEN, IOM MIDA, the UN Digital Diaspora Initiative and a memorandum with EU FRONTEX, Spain and IOM.
[102] Neighboring Ghana has for example been instituting measures to fill the skills gap in the health industry, which is largely attributed to the high emigration rates of its high skilled workers (Sagoe, 2005).
[103] www.ofii.fr
[104] 23 % of the projects were creation of consulting cabinets (for local development, training and environment etc). 32 % were in commerce, especially e-commerce, But also projects in housing, education, presse, health etc. A diversified range of investors, a large number of well-educated (Master, DESS, PhD) profiles. www.ofii.fr

greater productivity and wages through increased demand for labor services, which is indeed the case in Africa. However, their access to government and their integration in policy making is limited. As Georg Menz (2007) claims, organizational power is the result of representation of actors, organizational centralization, plus access/linkage to government. *"Overall, high-skilled workers will be represented and have influence in countries with a strong union movement, high unionization and a strong access of unions to government. The contrary will be the case in countries with a weak union movement, low high-skilled unionization and limited access to government."* (Cerna, 2010; 6) In Europe, the main interest group fighting for high-skilled immigration are the owners/employers in high-skilled sectors (e.g. high-tech, engineering), who will be strongly in favor since they may benefit from lower wages and the sustained ability for growth.

While I have evoked the political reasons for policy making throughout the paper, I have not underlined the possible political reasons for emigration. One should not rule out the possible political motives of the current outflows, e.g. a defiance towards the state system or towards the political regime in place. Consequently, keeping the Diaspora abroad might also be a political objective of the authorities in sending states. In that case, the dissociation between the elites abroad and the sending states will increase, and this phenomenon further complicates the implementation of common projects for the transfer of skills to Africa (Ellerman, 2003). This largely decreases the political will to lobby for specific brain exchange measures.

Secondly, the hypothesis above estimates that ensuring regulatory measures to reduce costs of transferring remittances as a win-win-win for the following reasons: As mentioned, most well-off families in Burkina Faso and other similar countries receive remittances from abroad, mainly from relatives in developed countries. Hence, there might be personal gains involved in improving the financial regulatory framework. Even when assuming the absolute worse level of corruption, such as policy-makers receiving direct payments from transfer firms from maintaining regulations, there might be increased macro-level financial results as well as possible indirect political gains since many constituents would have relatives in neighboring countries and therefore benefit from such a policy. Furthermore, even though there might not be direct personal interest in intra-african remittances by policy-makers, there are political gains of reaching poor or middle-class votes across the country with a policy that will most likely improve their lives.

Figure 15 - Cost of sending remittances to developing regions (%)

Source: Ratha and others 2011.

Figure 16 - Fees to open a savings account (% of GDP per capita)

Source: Ratha and others 2011.

While most African countries are also making policy efforts to ensure benefits from remittances, it is particularly troubling that official remittances to Burkina Faso have been declining since 2000. Razia Khan, Head of Research in Africa at the Standard Chartered Bank, noted the *"worrying stalemate in Burkina Faso compared to the general positive improvements in monetrary transfer mechanisms in Africa, particularly East Africa"* (Interview 47). The government has not taken any steps to address the underdeveloped financial infrastructure and a weak regulatory environment nor to eliminate exclusive partnerships between banks and international money transfer companies that keep the costs of formal remittances excessively high (Bambio, 2011; IFAD 2009; Irving et al,2010). A World Bank study of the Burkinabe money transfer sector shows that the entry barriers in the formal sector and the obstacles to

increasing the supply of formal remittance services are likely to support the emergence and the development of informal remittances (Bambio, 2011). Annual remittance flows into Burkina Faso from 1974 to 2010 reached a maximum of $192 million in 1986 and subsequently declined gradually after 2000, to about $43 million in 2010[105]. This was mainly related to the large return movements and declining economy in Côte d'Ivoire.

In Africa the high costs of sending remittances dilute the potential positive impact of migration on financial inclusion and poverty alleviation, as well as the possible benefits to the health and schooling of children in low-income households. Households receiving remittances from outside Africa were already wealthy relative to the general population before their family members migrated (Hampshire, 2002; Black, Natali and Skinner, 2005; Ratha et al, 2011). When poor households receive remittances, it can have a strong positive effect on social inclusion (Adams, 2004). Remittances from the African diaspora amounted to nearly USD40 billion in 2010, 2.6% of the continent's GDP; they provide vital funding for investment and household consumption (Ratha et al, 2011). In several fragile states, remittances may exceed 50% of GDP. Nonetheless, high costs of sending remittances within Africa hamper their positive impact on financial inclusion and poverty alleviation as well as possible benefits to the health and schooling of children in low-income households. Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest fees in the world, and intra-African charges are especially high. For example, the cost of sending USD200 between Burkina Faso and Ghana is 16% of GDP per capita, and between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire 9% (Ratha et al, 2011). Large amounts are therefore remitted through informal channels. Africa loses an estimated USD15 billion a year because of high fees, burdensome documentation requirements and lack of competition in the money transfer market (World Bank, 2011). Underdeveloped financial infrastructure and poor regulation are other factors. An underdeveloped financial infrastructure and weak regulatory environment exacerbate these problems.

Reducing the costs of remittances through regulation and innovation seems to be achievable and a low-hanging fruit for African Policy-makers, with something to gain for all. *"Reducing the cost of sending remittances, for example, through innovative mobile solutions, remains an important element in making growth more inclusive for sending countries"* (Interview 38) claims Duale Abdirashid who is the CEO of the money transfer company Dabishiil.

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[105] www.worldbank.org

Thirdly, we have established that that many of the legislative and policy building blocks for facilitated mobility of Africans around the continent are already in place, but they lack ratification and implementation. However, in order to circumvent longer political negociations, a possible approach could be for like-minded African states to borrow from the 'variable speed, variable geometry' approach adopted by European Union member states. One would assume that this would provide rather quick wins both politically and financially, and would be something policy-makers can rally around. *"A regional integration approach using a coalition of willing countries has had success in Africa, and could be promoted further", (Interview 37)* outlines Chuxwu-Emeka Chikezie who is Director of Africa Up and advisor to the Global Forum on Migration and Development. Constellations of African states that see the political and economic rationale for deepening their integration (though they may not necessarily share borders or be in the same RECs) can agree on common standards to facilitate movement of their citizens between their countries. *"Being pragmatic, states may opt to give access only to segments of the population—in other words, taking a phased approach to the "free movement" concept and initially allowing in some complementary categories of workers and businesspersons may generate broader support than an all-or-nothing approach",* (Interview 37) continues Chuxwu Emeka. For example, one of the pillars of the new Accelerated Program for Economic Integration brings together Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles and Zambia is to facilitate movement for professionals and businesspeople. Mr Ali Mansour, former Chair of the Global Forum for Migration and Development and representative of the Ministry of Finance in Mauritius, states ambitiously that *"if successful, countries elsewhere in the continent may wish to replicate or join it"* (Interview 21).

In the case of West Africa, progress on Protocol ratification and implementation has varied within ECOWAS due to wavering political support, political instability and inter-state border disputes and conflicts (ECOWAS, 2006). In comparison, The West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU/UEMOA) – comprising Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo – is a smaller, more coherent group of countries, with a common currency, colonial history and the French language. WAEMU includes nine states within ECOWAS and proposes visa-free travel, the right to establishment and standardized work and travel documents. *"Advancing free movement in the WAEMU has had an impact on unemployment through better allocation of the work force"(Interview 13)* states Ibrahim Ba head of macro-eoconomic policy in ECOWAS. *"It has been easier to implement*

joint programs in this setting", (Interview 24) corroborates Moussa Sidikou Gade The General Coordinator of the NGO Ecole Parainage et Actions de Développement (EPAD) in Niger.

Africa itself offers examples from which other countries can be inspired and motivated to follow. With Rwanda leading numerous initiatives in Africa, intra-African exchange of practices might be useful. *"Easing labor mobility in Rwanda has allowed the country to attract skills from Kenya and other countries that were unavailable locally",* (Interview 27) explains Mr Leonard Rugwabiz, Director of General Planning in the Rwandan Ministry of Finance. Rwanda's migration policy stands out in Africa: it has abolished work permit requirements for all EAC citizens and introduced entry visas for all Africans arriving at Rwandan borders, combined with biometric border management and e-visas. Rwanda also employs a liberal approach to the GATS Mode 4 cross-border services aspect, imposing no restrictions to the practice of foreign law and only a few on that of domestic law[106]. In the EAC, citizens of member states can move freely without charge for a six-month period, while Rwanda and Kenya have abolished work permit requirements for all EAC citizens. Rwanda and Uganda also automatically recognize academic and professional qualifications as well as licenses obtained in other jurisdictions, such as for engineering. Additionally, for harmonizing higher education, it will be interesting to follow the progress made by the 19-member African and Malagasy Council for Higher Education, which aims to certify university programs that will then be recognized in all the member states. Quick wins could in that regard also be generated through more specific networks; West Africa could draw from experience from its East African neighbors in promoting the creation of networks such as the Natural Product Research Network for Eastern and Central Africa (NAPRECA). Of from Eastern and Southern Africa's common approach to improving the maintenance of research equipment through the Network of Users of Scientific Equipment in Eastern and Southern Africa (NUSESA).

Finally, targeted cross-country co-development partnerships could increase the likelihood of specific short-term results for sending authorities to present to constituents. Decades of 'classic' co-development policies and projects, such as Diaspora mobilization and support of African entrepreneurs, have not been successful unless supported by source country government initiatives, such as has been the case for Senegal. Drawing from successful co-

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[106] Neighbouring Uganda, by contrast, imposes entry restrictions in engineering and legal services, while in Kenya and Tanzania de jure or de facto nationality requirements to practice domestic law exclude foreign professionals (even though Kenya for example lacks mid-level technicians on the national labour market) (World Bank, 2010).

development schemes between France and Morocco or Senegral, it might be possible for policy-makers in less developed countries to also benefit from Secondments, specific institutional partnerships, cooperation for Diaspora taxation, training partnerships etc. Ideally, in the case of Burkina Faso, it would be interesting to see concerted arrangements across ECOWAS for aligning the French-African pacts for migration, at least to resemble the pact between neighboring Mali. Other smaller co-development initiatives that do not demand a major investment political capital by policy-makers could be piloted, and subsequently scaled up: African countries could in that regard easily replicate some of the initiatives in the EU-Africa "*package of practical measures*"[107] that have had success in a south-north context such as codes of conduct or institutional partnerships:

When it comes to codes of conduct, the Memorandum of Understanding between the UK and South Africa, signed in October 2003, can serve as an example of establishing partnerships on recruitment issues that attend both to skills gaps in receiving countries as well as the needs of retaining nationals in sending country health systems. It was developed to train nurses in developing countries for temporary employment for a specified number of years in the UK National Health Service on the understanding that they would then return to their home country. These efforts could represent short-term solutions and viable policy-measures to introduce by sending states. Nonetheless in the longer term recruitment might be better regulated through international cooperation, and transformed from policy into international accords: Firstly due to the risk of simply diverting migrant streams to receiving countries which are not party to an agreement. Secondly because of the global proportions of the issues, which are not merely a south-north issues, but also north-north. Finally, the brain drain has to be tackled at both ends: Improving conditios in home countries is crucial so that skilled professionals have fewer incentives to migrate. Policies measures should ideally not remain isolated bilateral arrangements but be part of the context of a larger governance regime.

Institutional partnerships or inter-university collaboration is increasing in Africa, e.g. UK- or German-African inter-university collaboration with double diplomas. This is an interesting measure to perhaps introduce in some of the least developed countries. The policy framework in itself is already developed through the Tripoli EU-Africa Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development in November 2006, where Africa and the EU adopted a joint strategy (in the form of the Tripoli Declaration) to respond to the challenges and maximize the

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[107] http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/sectoral_development_policies/l14166_en.htm

benefits of international migration. Among the expected outcomes were: "*Support partnerships and twinning initiatives between institutions in Africa and the EU, such as hospitals and universities*".

(*http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/97496.pdf*). It would be encouraging to see policy-makers try and tackle of these issues through cross-country collaboration schemes in the short-term.

An African success-example is the Malaria Research Training Center (MRTC) in Mali, whose work has not only resulted in a significant drop in malaria but also in the return of 40 postgraduates to Mali, amounting to five generations of scientists since the Center opened. MRTC chooses the top graduates from Mali's university and medical schools and submits them for PhD and Masters qualifications abroad. The graduates of Mali's Malaria Research Training Center are obliged, through their contract, to return to Mali to work, not only at the end of their studies, but also during vacations. An increasing number of African countries have established or are establishing competitive research grant schemes at the national level. *"The Guinean government has experimented with a system of doctoral and post-doctoral education schemes that aims to keep researchers in Guinea where partner accords have been designed to limit the researchers time spent abroad (1/3 of the time)",* (interview 18) explains Mrs Raynato Khadyja Bangoura from the Guinean Ministry of International Cooperation. These local alternatives to counter the brain drain however seem to remain isolated initiatives on project level. For example, they don't include further investment in technological infrastructure and equipment agenda to retain the highly skilled after the completion of the program. In Mali, however, after the researchers return MRTC pledges to provide a suitable working environment for the scientists – including equipment and facilities they have worked with during their studies[108]. *"If a PhD student comes back and he is not able to perform molecular biology with PCR or genomics in Mali he won't stay here,[109]"* says Professor Ogobara K Doumbo, director and co-founder of MRTC. The Malian government has played a role in helping limit the brain drain for MRTC. In addition to guaranteeing positions at the university or medical school to returning

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[108] According to Tatum Anderson, the MRTC has state-of-the-art freezers, fume hoods, polymerase chain reaction machines and fully-networked computers that are linked to the National Library in the US
[109] http://www.tropika.net/svc/interview/Anderson-20090603-Profile-Doumbo Tatum Anderson, TropIKA net, july 3rd 2009. Tropical diseases research to foster Innovation and Knowledge Application

postgraduates, it helps facilitate the bureaucratic procedures that regularly delays drug and vaccine research in many countries[110].

In Mali, in order to retain the return migrants, the scheme strives to be one of career progression, personal fulfillment, job security and a stimulating work environment[111]. The Public sector should be a motor for attracting skilled nationals back to their countries of origin. Furthermore, the West African states generally don't guarantee substantial career opportunities to nationals that have chosen to stay put in their country of origin, neither to those wishing to return. MRTC's success is mainly due to political support by the government[112] underlining that a strong bargaining position is vital: MRTC manages the way the country's most promising scientists receive higher education around the world and relies on a mutual understanding between MRTC and Malian scientists that recognizes both the needs of Mali as well as those of individual scientists. The compact appears to be attractive, judging from the number of graduates who have returned to Mali. [113]

In conclusion, the thesis has revealed the current state of non-implementation of migration-schemes across Africa. This situation of structural constraints to movement within Africa signals a critical lack of coordination and collaboration on youth employment, labor market flexibility, innovative cross-border social safety nets and social policy reforms. While recognizing the difficulties of overcoming structural impediments, this chapter looks outside as well as inside the continent for best practices and then proposes practical measures that policymakers can take to maximize the benefits of intra-African migration for the continent.

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[110] When the French Senate evaluated the policy on *("immigration choisie versus immigration subie[110]"*the take-away was: *"discouraging landscape of administrative convolution, heavy taxes and inflexible labor legislation."*[110] One can thus assume that for developing countries these initiatives should serve as the absolute minimum common denominator for return of nationals, or for the arrival of new highly skilled persons. Nonetheless, in Africa strict and costly visa regulations coupled by heavy administrative paperwork are common. ECOWAS countries would need to implement reforms beyond the entry level, and might consider conducting spouse-politics, guarantying housing and jobs in for educated spouses. Additionally, opportunities of good schooling again become a key component to attracting highly skilled migrants with children.

[111] Many, for instance, are offered research groups and responsibility for research grants quite early on. Furthermore, the investment in technological infrastructure allows sites 800 km from Bamako to have access to the internet via satellite. That means scientists in the field have full access to journals and can continue their education through e-learning courses.

[112] *"We are always publishing science [in international journals], helped by the national malaria control programme and in our study areas where we have field [tested] we've reduced significantly the deaths due to malaria and people [in government] are seeing that,"* says Professor Ogobara K Doumbo, director and co-founder of MRTC.

[113] http://www.tropika.net/svc/interview/Anderson-20090603-Profile-Doumbo Tatum Anderson, TropIKA net, july 3rd 2009. Tropical diseases research to foster Innovation and Knowledge Application

Sending states might agree that the same efforts should be put into enhancing development from south-south migration as has been the case with south-north flows since the migration–development nexus moved to center stage in 2001. In the following section, we will look closer at policy arguments that might be useful to introduce to improve policies for the medium-term.

6.2 Medium-term measures: providing micro-and macro-level policy arguments

In Sub-saharan Africa, there is still a long way to go for regional migration management, with effective labor market integration and inclusive social policies, instead the tendency in policy-making is mainly one of national priorities and immigration control. Current policy is often reactive and focused on migrants already within borders, instead of being conducive to a coherent longer-term strategy of managing regional skills pooling and balancing labor markets. A lack of regional migration management reduces Africa's competitiveness, and broadly affects both macro- and micro-level economic development. However, it might not be entirely clear to policy-makers what the costs and benefits to be gained from improved regional migration management are in the short and long term (see Table below).

Table 22 - Factors influencing development impact of migration (short/long term)

	Short term	Long term
Micro	- Wages and (un)employment - Job search - Skills development - Effects on other consumption - Migrants' human capital investments, - savings - Access to services and housing - Social security	- Labor market flexibility - Business practices, right to establishment - Innovation, entrepreneurship - Migrant geographical & social clustering - Networks - Social mobility across generations - Remittances
	Short term	*Long term*
Macro	- Population size, composition - Labor market participation - Geographic distribution of human resources (urbanization) - Cost of travel documents (visas, work permits) - Health and education expenditures - Unemployment/wage levels/income distribution - Level of banking, costs and level of remittances - Harmonization of qualifications - Transfer of services (GATS Mode 4)	- Labor market demands and supply - Fertility and population aging - Sectorial composition of the economy - Public and private infrastructure - Technological change - International trade/migration patterns - Social inclusion - Cohesion, cross-border relations and crime - Environmental challenges - Migration management, skills pooling

Source: Author

Apart from the apparent data-problem compared to developed countries[114], key evidence that could be communicated regularly to policy-makers of what consequences intra-African migrants (micro-level) face due to the current situation of unmanaged migration is listed below. The list was elaborated based on extensive field research and interviews with policy-makers and based on what information/evidence seems to be less apparent:

First, **marginalization** is enhanced by:

- Systemic disadvantages due to migrants often irregular situation. This is particularly true for seasonal or temporary workers; for example, they often pay the same taxes in receiving communities as local residents but without access to basic services.

- Risks of deportation; for example, deportations from South Africa are rising with five times more deportations in 2008 than in 1990 (more than 3 million migrants deported in 2008). Migration has high upfront costs and gains take time to accrue. Irregular and involuntary forms of migration can severely dampen the human development capacities of migrants when the migration process is shortened involuntarily.

- Lack of rights to own land. Historically, in Côte d'Ivoire for example, agricultural migrants were given a share of land to cultivate their own crops as compensation for helping out on large farms. However, it is currently very difficult for any foreigner to own land across Africa.

- Limited possibilities for dual citizenship, which often have consequences for long-term integration in particular for family-members/children.

- Limited opportunities for family reunification, which can lead to isolation for the migrants and can have broad consequences for those left behind.

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[114] Countries such as Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom regularly publish reports on how much immigrants bring to the economy, tax system, innovation etc. Without country specific data and reports on the economic utility of returning migrants in Africa, political efforts for encouraging local openness will be very hard sought. In the case of France, studies have showed that France needed high-skilled immigrants because its education system had been inefficient for many years. The Economic and Social Council (ESC) stated that France did not produce enough graduates: *"less than 150,000 French individuals per year obtained a BA or a higher degree. This number of students would have to increase by 35,000 per year to balance the number of individuals retiring." (Kretzschmar, 2005).* Background information would be valuable for each West African country in terms of costs of education and migration. Data could also be linked to networks such as the example of the South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA). It allows the graduates to keep in touch with their universities and it allows data collection on the number and geographical location of expats and – most importantly - on circulating local job offers. This could facilitate policy making towards brain export measures.

Second, **personal risk** is enhanced by:

- Family breakdown;
- financial lossess;
- fragmentation of networks;
- discrimination;
- insecurity;
- stress.

For example, the lack of integration efforts in key receiving countries like Côte d'Ivoire and South Africa has allowed xenophobia and social factionalism to gain ground. The social costs of the lack of integration thus include risks to social cohesion and may lead to outbreaks of violence.

Third, **financial instability** is enhanced by:

- Limited access to work permits;
- Limited access to social security;
- Non-transferability of pension-schemes;
- Expensive remittances costs.

A lack of migration management therefore has a direct and substantial impact on the inclusion of migrants on the continent. Regional economic migration is on the rise, but policies dealing with the integration and inclusion of migrants are considered secondary (Gagnon and Khoudour-Castéras, 2012). With restrictions on immigration, high costs of travel documents and porous borders much of intra-African migration is undocumented, so large numbers of migrants remain marginalized in irregular situations. One of the few studies attending to this crucial topic notes that: *"Marginalization occurs when immigrants fail to integrate into the host society at the same time as they break links with fellow countrymen. This is precisely the situation that leads to increased vulnerability and generates high costs for society"* (Gagnon and Khoudour-Castéras, 2012; 22). Regional policies are instead needed to support micro-level resilience measures through migration, in order to reduce the vulnerability of migrants. This would mean encouraging skills development, labor market integration, regional skills pooling and transnationalism. Transnationalism *"refers to immigrants [being] perfectly incorporated*

into host society, while also maintaining strong links with their community of origin, both in sending and receiving countries." (Gagnon and Khoudour-Castéras, 2012; 22)

ECOWAS, having been a frontrunner for Africa in terms of facilitating mobility as well as implementing migration and development action plans, has not yet taken the lead in making integration a priority. While there is a large research gap on the process of integration of migrants in Africa, it is certain that with some countries using ethnicity and religion to re-classify long-standing residents as non-nationals (migration was for example part of the root causes to the Ivorian crisis (Kotoudi, 2004)), social pressures related to migration will increase. While the Senegalese mosque in Conakry is a classic example of the integration of a Diaspora group in Guinea, and in their preservation of their identity as a group, it would seem that xenophobia and inter-communitarian tensions have led migrants to apply new trans-ethnic strategies, such as "sponsors" or what one might describe as an "adoptive mother/father" from the local community (Fall, 2007). Senegalese migrants in Cameroun increasingly use other integration strategies than living in the traditional 'foyers' (migrants originating from connected villages sharing housing) (Ba, 1995). One study, undertaken by Meier in 2005, shows that migrants fear making friends with fellow migrants from the same ethnic background, and instead choose friends *"from amongst completely unrelated groups, preferably those from different ethnic backgrounds"* (Meier, 2005: 68). Marginalization of migrants can lead to segregation, resulting in the creation of ghettos, urban slums, crime, and the spread of diseases. A recent OECD study found that non-integration of immigrants in the global south has higher socio-economic costs than in the north (Gagnon and Khoudour-Castéras, 2012). Furthermore, the social costs of the ongoing marginalization of migrants include risks to health, human capital and social cohesions.

Finally, addressing the gender dimension at all stages of migration can help empower traditionally disadvantaged groups, socially and financially. When migrating, women are especially vulnerable; they are more exposed to risks during migration and in the destination country, and they face disproportionate risks to their safety, such as human trafficking. But migration can provide opportunities for demographic transition and empowerment of women. When fathers migrate, wives have new decisionmaking responsibilities. For example, male labor migration has thus opened opportunities for women in countries like Lesotho, where female representation in the workforce has gone up. *"But for those left behind, migration may in some cases also entrench traditional roles and inequalities in the origin countries and have*

negative social effects on children, inspite of recent studies on the benefits of remittances" (Interview 41) underlines Gervais Appave, Director of the International Organization for Migration.

Now, sometimes presenting arguments at the micro-level is not efficient for policy-makers that operate at the macro-level and consider national priorities. This trend reflects the fact that migration is a national security issue, that there are diverging interests between sending and receiving countries, and a lack of consensus on the costs and benefits of migration for both sets of countries. Hence, while the section above focused on the constraints that both low and high-skilled migrants face numerous constraints before they even enter another country or attempt to find a job, this section will focus on the macro-level constraints that could be highlighted as a consequence of lacking migration management combined with restrictive immigration schemes across Africa and introduced to policy-makers.

At the macro-level, capitalizing on intra-African labor mobility requires policy-makers to support moving from immigration control to migration management. We have seen that current policy is often reactive and focused on migrants already within borders, instead of being conducive to a coherent longer-term strategy of managing regional skills pooling and balancing labor markets. Moving from national immigration control to regional migration management, through effective labor market integration and inclusive social policies, would require shifts towards A) transfer of services (such as engineering, accounting, and legal professions); B) mutual recognition of qualifications (for example to facilitate the integration of health professionals, and teachers), and C) coordination of annual immigration quotas per skills gaps. Some of the arguments below might be introduced to policy-makers in order to further best practice policies:

First, **skills gaps** are enhanced by:

- Outdated or nonexistent information about job offers across borders, which means migrant flows are not guided and managed efficiently.
- Onerous visa requirements, high cost of travel documents and long procedures for work permits, which are often temporary, which means that sometimes skills are wasted. (The high costs of travel documents also hamper movement: 1 in 10 countries still have passport costs exceeding 10% of per capita income.) (UNDP, 2009)

- Lack of mutual recognition of qualifications, which means that even where skilled labor is needed, as in education and health, people often find it difficult to exercise their profession in another country.

- Restrictions on GATS Mode 4 transfer of services, even for key sectors with skills gaps, such as engineering, accounting and legal services.

- Restrictions on right to settle, which hinders, for example, Tunisian health professionals from practicing in Algeria even though the latter lacks doctors.

Second, **pressure on basic services** is enhanced by:

- Quality of services affected by large influx, including health and education
- Risk of disease and health threats, such as HIV/AIDS or Ebola, across borders (Crush and others 2010). The effects of migration on tuberculosis and pneumoconiosis have been documented in Lesotho, Mozambique, South Africa and Zambia.

African economies face skills shortages even amid entrenched unemployment and under-employment. "*To profit from emerging industries such as banking, extractive industries and ICT, African countries need highly skilled and innovative entrepreneurs*" (Interview 47) says Razia Khan, Head of African research at the Standard Chartered Bank. Skills shortages are major obstacles to economic growth and job creation, and the most important labor market obstacle for investors (Bhorat et al., 2002; Kraak, 2008; World Bank, 2008). Nonetheless, one in every nine Africans who holds a university qualification resides in an OECD country (UNDESA, 2013a). According to OECD statistics, 88 percent of migrants to countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development have at least a secondary education, whereas ca. 300.000 Africans are studying for a higher education (Campus France, 2008)[115]. Furthermore, approximately 20.000 highly educated people leave Africa annually. This skills exodus is among the largest in the world and is most acute amongst Africa's least developed countries. Brain drain is especially dramatic in particular sectors – such as health[116]

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[115] Campus France 2008. http://editions.campusfrance.org/chiffres_cles/brochure_campusfrance_chiffres_cles08.pdf

[116] In 2000 about 20% of African-born physicians and 10% of nurses were working outside Africa (figure 8.6). World Health Organization minimum standards for basic health care are one doctor for every 5,000 people (figure 8.7). In sub-Saharan Africa 38 countries fall below this standard. Five African sending countries—South Africa, Nigeria, Sudan, Ghana, and Ethiopia—accounted for the large majority of the doctors working elsewhere, with South Africa alone accounting for 60%. By 2005 some 13,000 South African doctors had relocated to OECD countries, together with more than 5,000 nurses, 1,372 dentists and 724 pharmacists (OECD, 2007). South Africa, Botswana, Gabon and Namibia are also attracting other high-skilled Africans, such as health professionals from Ghana, Kenya, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

and education –with for instance 60 to 70 percent of Ghana's health professionals emigrating[117] (Lowell et al, 2004). Furthermore, the worst brain drain occurs in the least developed countries and regions. Rising inequalities within and between countries creates a pull factor coupled with aging populations both in developed and developing countries creating heavy demand for labor[118]. Additionally, insufficient pull mechanisms in underserved areas are negatively affecting the human capital development of those left behind[119].

The South African example is very telling. The economy experienced accelerated growth after 2002. These structural changes contributed to skills shortages simultaneous with rising unemployment (Bhorat et al., 2002; Ellis, 2008). Together with structural change, new products, technology and workplace arrangements caused a change in skills needs (Richardson, 2007). The international mining industry is, for example, facing critical labour shortages at all levels, as an estimated 300 qualified engineers leave South Africa every year. In fact, approximately one-third of South Africa's engineers have left the country (Macartney, 2008). Problems with retaining skilled mining staff, combined with insufficient new graduates and an ageing workforce, are affecting the South African industry (Sward, 2009). In South Africa, the skills crisis led to a new immigration policy: The Immigration Act (2002) requires government to publish an annual list of skills in short supply. However, other initiatives to reduce the inflow of immigrants, due to the high level of general unemployment, have affected access to temporary work permits (Crush, 2011).

Taking the example of West Africa, skills gaps Sierra Leone's key sectors of agriculture, mining, tourism and banking also affect economic transformation and private sector growth of the country (AfDB, 2013). "*The existing education system does not have the capacity to meet the growing demands of the private sector. For example, no local institution offers specialized banking training*" (Interview 31) explains Saidu Conton Sesay, Commissioner of the National Commission for Social Action (NACSA) in Sierra Leone. Similarly, Sierra Leone's constitution authorizes discrimination against "non-native" citizens, even though regularizing

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[117] Several scholars have underlined that pull factors have, for example, led to the increasing feminization of African migration both within and beyond the continent, among them demands for domestic workers, teachers, nurses, doctors and other caring professions (Adepujo, 2005; Boserup, 2007).

[118] In Tanzania in 2007/08, Pwani, the best-served region, had twice the number of health workers per 10,000 persons than Kagera, the worst-off region (AfDB, 2008).

[119] For example, In Zimbabwe a large skills exodus, mainly to neighboring countries, reduced the medical workforce from 1,425 in 1991 to 751 in 2004, resulting in vacancy rates of 92% for pharmacists, 56% for doctors and 32% for nurses (IOM, 2009).

migration could represent a short-term solution to the skills gaps (Chua, 2003). Neighbouring Côte d'Ivoire also passed a law in 2004 that essentially gave Ivoirians priority over foreigners in all types of jobs, from qualified to manual labour (Gagnon and Khoudour-Castéras, 2012). Furthermore, the ECOWAS treaty also includes a national treatment obligation while there is no mutual recognition of qualifications in ECOWAS.

Figure 17 - Key industries in Sierra Leone facing shortages of skilled labour

Source: AfDB, 2013.

At a macro-level, it might be feasible to convince policy-makers to elaborate targeted immigration quotas, regional skills pooling, and educational reform in order to address skills shortages in national labor markets. Skilled labor is more important to development and global value chains than ever before, so the lack of effective regional migration management will increase skills gaps. The mismatch of demand and supply of skills in national labor markets across Africa, resulting from the brain drain, deepen these gaps. A skill shortage occurs whenever a particular occupation lacks enough workers, when labor demand exceeds availability of skills, or when workers lack appropriate qualifications (Barnow et al., 1998; Shah and Burke, 2003; Trendle, 2008). *"The skills shortages problem is often perceived only from the perspective of a weak education and training system. However, the high levels of brain drain in key sectors across Africa suggest that educational reform should not be the only resilience measure to address skills shortages"* (Interview 22) Salomon Samen, advisor to the Mauritian Chair of the Global Forum for Migration and Development.

African countries could benefit from liberalizing the transfer of services through the World Trade Organization's (WTO's) General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Mode 4. Skills gaps are among the key reasons for inadequate private sector growth in the continent, yet African countries have generally not been involved in negotiated market opening and rules

related to services trade (Sauvé and Ward, 2012). GATS Mode 4 is currently the only internationally agreed legal instrument with the potential to become a functioning multilateral labor migration regime (Broude, 2007). It is an international mechanism aimed at facilitating labor mobility on the basis of qualified negotiated commitments by states to accept non-permanent foreign labor migrants. At the Eighth WTO Ministerial Conference in 2011, trade ministers adopted a waiver, enabling WTO members to provide preferential treatment to services and service suppliers for least developed countries (LDCs), most of which are in Africa. Countries with more liberal regimes, such as Rwanda, may provide good examples. Data suggest that—except for accounting technicians in Kenya—East Africa also has a need for mid-level skills (World Bank, 2010). Currently, trade barriers, regulatory requirements and immigration policy make it hard for foreign professionals to supply services in Africa under the GATS Mode 4 on movement of natural persons.

African countries and regions thus stand to gain from harmonizing annual immigration quotas with skills gaps. Due to the character of migration it might be interesting to consider supporting schemes for support of return and seasonal migrants at the intra-African level, since for example in Burkina Faso this is a considerable percentage of the population and a subject that might get political support. To do so, it would be necessary for governments to invest political capital in for example improving work-permits for nationals abroad. "*A liberal approach to multiple-entry visas would prevent people from ending up in irregular situations, and a right to change employer under temporary work permits would facilitate movement from lower- to higher-wage jobs and thus from less to more productive employment*" (Interview 22) notes Salomon Samen, advisor to the Mauritian Chair of the Global Forum on Migration and Development. Further, evidence confirms the importance of regional integration in the efforts needed to diversify African economies and absorb 10 million new entrants to the labor force annually (World Economic Forum et al., 2013).

The harmonization of professional accreditation and mutual recognition could help narrow the large skills gap and support growth. Agreements by the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and ECOWAS include a national-treatment obligation clause that applies to all service activities covered by the agreements, but mutual recognition is not yet in force in ECOWAS. Further, heavily regulated professions, such as engineering, medicine and pharmacy, demand commonly accepted standard examinations before accreditation to practice. Beyond accreditation, those seeking self-employment through the right of establishment also

face a host of structural barriers and impediments, such as those of Tunisian doctors in Algeria. Since 2011, the EAC has been moving towards standardization of curricula at university level in health education, medical schools and dental schools. Efforts are also underway in the EAC for the mutual recognition of qualifications, while the African and Malagasy Council for Higher Education which includes 19 member states aims at certifying university programs for recognition in member states. To facilitate regional skills pooling, fast-tracking of curricula standardization is needed, or at least a mutual recognition of qualifications within RECs. In that regard, an example worthy of careful study and possible replication could be ERASMUS which facilitates student exchange across universities within Europe as well as EURES, the European Job Mobility Portal, that provides information, advice and job-matching services for both workers and employers.

Management and planning of migration flows remains limited, and hence affects the timely and necessary responses to ensure economic development potential and mitigate risks from migration. For example, the ECOWAS protocol stimulated the movement of people between neighboring countries and other ECOWAS countries. When looking at border towns - such as Aflao, Elubo and Sampa in Ghana for example - one can also conclude that the protocol has fueled cross-border activities, including trade (Awumbila et al., 2009). However, a further harmonization of policies interlinking trade, investment, transport and movement of persons is needed for the daily implementation of ECOWAS policies. At a meeting of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government, held in Abuja in 2000, it was recognized that the inadequate and poorly-maintained transport and communications facilities constituted major hindrances to cross-border trade, economic activities and movement of labor and goods (ECOWAS, 2000).

In conclusion, numerous negative effects are drawn from the current implementation gap of policies. A lack of regional migration management reduces Africa's competitiveness, and broadly affects both macro- and micro-level economic development. Restrictions leave migrants in irregularity, which in turn marginalizes them and imposes socio-economic costs on both migrants and receiving countries. The current trend towards bilateralism and selective skilled-migration policies offer little scope for the inclusion of low-skilled migrants, but instead the risk of generating negative socio-economic costs. With migration being 'low politics' in

Burkina Faso, it is unlikely that there will be EU focus on building a mobility partnership[120] with poor landlocked Burkina Faso. However, in preparation for a perfect world below is a suggestion of a similar-looking partnership led by Burkina Faso on the basis of regional integration and focusing mainly on migrants' rights.

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[120] The European Union has previously concluded Mobility Partnerships with Cape Verde in Sub-Saharan Africa , respectively Georgia and Moldova with the aim of facilitating mobility and including the states adjacent to the EU in governing migration.

6.3 Long-term ambitions: the 'right' mobility partnership for Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso was once a pioneer trying to create policies to encourage development from migration. The "*right*" Mobility Partnership as elaborated below in this sense refers to a rights-based approach based on human rights, migrants' rights, the right of the child as well as the right to asylum and mobility, and not least the right to self-determination. While using the exact same structure and wording as in the existing Mobility Partnerships between African countries and the EU, all statements below, on the contrary, underline what the ECOWAS and EU are currently *not* doing. The draft below is a suggested policy document for the use of policy makers in Burkina Faso.

Based on bilateral best practice multiplied by 27, subtracting Southern Mediterranean malpractice, and added values of an ECOWAS and EU common approach.

From a migrant perspective, the current policy proposes the following:

All members of ECOWAS and the European Union will be signatories and participate in the Partnership through shared responsibility and solidarity. First countries of arrival need help from other countries to discharge the responsibility for the rights of migrants and asylum seekers, while a common refugee system will be developed.

ACTING within the framework of the Geneva Convention, the Universal declaration of Human Rights, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, the Convention of the Rights of the Child as well as the Recommendations of the EU Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security and National Human Rights Commissions; and taking into account the support for rule of law, democracy and civic freedoms as well as the UN Settlement Plan for Western Sahara.

NOTING the benefits of Burkina Faso including all other ECOWAS countries in the dialogue for migration, mobility and security, since their people need opportunities, while the treatment of migrants in these countries poses concern for the signatories.

REMINDING FRONTEX that it should rescue migrants at sea while also surveying illegal European fisheries in African seas.

CONFIRMING their commitment to stop criminalizing the phenomena of migration both on land and on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea, and towards developing better asylum processes in Africa, while working for migrants' rights.

RECALLING the added value of public and formal readmission agreements, while developing common standards and procedures in Member states for voluntary or non-voluntary return of undocumented (and other) migrants, confirming the obligations of non-refoulement.

RECOGNISING the importance of the transferability of social security rights such as pension, health care and maternity leave as well as non-double taxation agreements and low transfer costs for remitting money.

REAFFIRMING the strong commitment to regime transparency, governance, security and democracy, while also confirming the commitment to alleviating the burden of the transit countries with migration pressures for Europe and thus fighting the root causes of migration through increased development aid and cooperation with third countries.

HAVE DECIDED on a Mobility Partnership that goes beyond new and planned bilateral activities. It will mainly focus on a common approach to Migration such as Common Visa Application centers in Burkina Faso, updated assessments of labor-marked needs in each of the member countries coupled with visa-arrangements. The incentives offered to the southern Mediterranean partner countries for cooperation, such as entry visa facilitation, preferential entry quotas for economic migrants, special trade concessions, technical cooperation, development aid and more, will not merely be conditioned to the partner country's cooperation in terms of managing migration flows and the EU external borders, but more particularly to the respect of migrants' rights. Cooperation on the control of migration flows will not constitute an overriding means of regime legitimacy on the international arena.

To this end, they will ENDEAVOUR to develop further their dialogue and cooperation on migration issues, and in particular along the following lines:

Mobility, visa facilitation, integration, asylum

1. To promote a better framework for documented mobility, not only including high-skilled migrants, but also labor migrants through updated labor-shortage lists coupled with visa-arrangements in ECOWAS and EU Member countries and pre-departure language courses. Workers who have stayed for a long period, and have developed strong ties within the receiving communities, and who risk falling out of legal status (such as is the case for long-term seasonal workers in Italy and Spain) will have their residency permit extended.

2. Young people will be targeted, with an extension of the ERASMUS programme to Burkina Faso as well as internships and young professional programs; this will also be accelerated through the recognition of Burkinabe qualifications, not to mention further cooperation and twining of universities/training centers for trans-Mediterranean double degrees. Scholarship programs and research cooperation will be further supported, based on local needs.

3. Secondments and internships will be offered for public servants on both sides of the Mediterranean in matters ranging from border control to governance.

4. To develop and facilitate visa issuance amongst other through Common Visa Application centers in Burkina Faso, both in the Capital and the regions. More categories of visas will be introduced to targeted groups, and these will not only be high-skilled migrants, while the length of stay will be increased. Re-entry visas will be issued in parallel with projects aiming at facilitating circular migration.

5. To facilitate the reception of asylum seekers, and share the responsibility among EU member states, an optimal mobility partnership would seek to prevent arbitrary geographical factors from affecting the responsibilities of member states in an unfair manner. For example, Denmark made 1,725 asylum decisions in 2008 compared to the 30,915 made in Greece, leading to the main responsibility of asylum being placed on the same states that fail to control the external borders. It is the combination of the 'country of first arrival' concept and countries' geographic location that causes this problem. Taking into account the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum and the Geneva Convention on Refugees in order to allow access to asylum both in EU member states and in Burkina Faso, all refugees should have access to asylum mechanisms in the latter countries, and not simply be categorized as economic migrants. Asylum processes in Africa should furthermore be coupled with resettlement arrangements to the EU.

Migration and development

6. To support the capacity to monitor migration, but especially the capacity to educate and employ the population.

7. To prevent brain drain and brain waste through actual voluntary return policies, with emphasis on the distinction between voluntary return and forced removal as noted in the April 2002 Green Paper on a Community Return Policy. A policy of voluntary return should be developed along the lines of what is proposed by the French Office for Immigration and Integration (OFII). Migrants will have the possibility to return at any time and with local financial and technical aid for reintegration at the migrants' disposal, this will be coordinated as a community issue extending OFII's work in the Maghreb.

8. To promote sustainable reintegration through respecting the time dimension and return process of migration in order to avoid a negative impact on the professional reintegration of the returnees to the Maghreb.

9. To engage diaspora groups in local initiatives, developing coordinated knowledge of migrants by enhancing cooperation with and among African communities, and streamlining bilateral pools of initiatives to the multilateral level.

10. To ensure low transfer costs for remitting money through the creation of a ECOWAS-EU common portal on remittances, while a review of the Payment Service Directorate (PSD) to extra-EU funds will be undertaken.

11. To alleviate the burden of the transit countries with migration pressures for Europe through increased development aid and cooperation with third countries. Migration will be integrated into development projects of ECOWAS and European Union, while development will be introduced into West African and European politics of migration. This should stop the implementation gap between the 'global approach on the question of migration' (e.g. the projects under EU-UN Migration4development) and 'The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum'.

Border management, high-risk migration and trafficking of human beings.

12. To strengthen cross-border cooperation, ECOWAS bordes agencies as well as FRONTEX should rescue migrants, in particular those at sea through increased cooperation with Spanish/Maltese/Italian/Greek authorities in order to avoid disasters in the Mediterranean due to the repeated disregard of distress calls, and people dead at

sea. FRONTEX should also fill the role of surveying illegal European fisheries in African Seas.

13. To sign and ratify the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families in the objective of improving migrants' rights, especially people living in transit and those exposed to violence and exploitation.

14. To stop the criminalization of migrants, regretting the fates of the 17 dead Tunisian migrants aboard the boat in the Mediterranean in June 2009, but especially condemning the six-year prison sentence for the six survivors on the boat. Furthermore, records of beating and exploitation in the detention facilities in Morocco have been underlined by Human Rights Watch, therefore implying a regular revision of the EU list of 'Safe third countries', while ensuring increased transparency in the fields related to the treatment of migrants. This matter will reflect on the readmission of third country nationals to 'Safe third countries' such as is for example underlined in the framework of the Spanish-Moroccan readmission agreement signed in 1992.

15. To enhance the security of people both crossing borders into ECOWAS and into the EU, and to avoid border-induced displacements and migrant's expulsions to desert areas without food, water and medicine, such as noted by Doctors Without Borders.

16. To improve joint operational measures for cross-border crimes, human smugglers and ensuring the rights-based operational management of outsourced matters by private security firms. Increased governance and monitoring will be introduced in the case of private outsourcing, such as should have been undertaken in the cases of the UK outsourcing to G4S that led to the death of an Angolan national during deportation in late 2010, and the Italian outsourcing to Finmeccanica with Human Rights Watch in 2009 characterizing the Libyan camps as corrupt and ranging from negligent to brutal. An ideal mobility partnership would furthermore ensure that all border technologies do not preempt migrants' access to asylum procedures.

17. To develop common standards and procedures in Member states for returning undocumented (and other) migrants, particularly avoiding swift repatriations or 'simplified procedures', thus not respecting their obligations of non-refoulement.

Implementation

The provisions of this joint declaration are designed to create legal rights and obligations under national and international law.

In conclusion, while some African countries and regions are leading the way for progressive migratory policies that ensure opportunities for a nexus between migration and development, we do not expect all African sub-regions to immediately apply best practices from Europe, Asia or even from Latin America, where Mercosur and the Andean Community have moved from operating narrow schemes that encourage labor mobility for high-skilled workers to reducing the constraints on migration more broadly in an attempt to enhance developmental benefits. However, it should be brought into sharper relief and rectified that intra-African migrants face disadvantages from higher restrictions and costly barriers to their mobility, and what the low-hanging fruits are for policy-making in some of the least developed countries. The recommendations above are based on the understanding of the current difficult political context, with off-stage policy-making and rent-seeking, and seek to build bridges between research and policy in the short, medium and long-term.

It should also be noted that, in the long term, targeted policies to improve migration are unlikely to succeed without a more general process of structural political and economic reform (De Haas, 2009). *"Policies to increase people's welfare, create functioning markets and improve social security and public services are likely to enhance the contribution that migration and remittances can make to development"* (Interview 35) explains Mouhamed Youssouf, Head of the Social Protection Union and Migration Trust Frund of the African Development Bank. The more restricted the access of the poor to social security, public services and markets in national contexts, the more difficult they find it to access nonexploitive forms of labor migration. de Haas (2012) argued that migration may reinforce inequality where international migration is restricted to wealthy elites. Investments in skills, information and communications technology, health and legal and social protection should thus be part of a comprehensive migration policy.

7. Conclusion

Globalization has led to the inclusion of some and the marginalization of others. While the initial overview of the so-called nexus between migration and development underlined that; "*Poverty reduction is not in itself a migration-reducing strategy*" (Nyberg-Sorensen, Van Hear, and Engberg-Pedersen, 2002; 2), this thesis rather focuses on whether *migration is in itself a poverty-reducing strategy?* With deepening inequalities and wage differentials both within and between countries - along with increasing restrictions to migration in the global north for poor Africans – one would need to question the role of economic migration as a means of and strategy for inclusive growth in some of the least developed countries of the world. More specifically, this thesis will question how "*migration – in particular intra-regional – is embedded into societal and development trends in (West) Africa?".* In the end, economic migration is about ordinary people who simply want to have the choice to cross a border to increase income diversification and their options for a better life with dignity and security.

In 1999, two hopeful African boys of respectively 14 and 15 years old, Yaguine Koïta and Fodé Tounkara, tried to migrate to Europe. Without the necessary resources to obtain legal options, they jumped onboard a plane by the landing wheels before take-off from Guinea to Belgium. The two Guinean boys left a letter saying: *"Au niveau des problèmes, nous avons : la guerre, la maladie, la nourriture, etc. Quant aux droits de l'enfant, c'est en Afrique, surtout en Guinée, nous avons des écoles, mais un grand manque d'éducation et d'enseignement ; sauf dans les écoles privées, qu'on peut avoir une bonne éducation et un bon enseignement, mais il faut une forte somme d'argent, et nous nos parents sont pauvres"* (Humanité, 1999). When linking *"migration theory to general trends in contemporary theory"* (Castles, 2009), we must consider the nature of contemporary social transformation, such as the trend towards neo-liberal globalization and the resulting growth of inequality and non-inclusive growth in basically all countries of the world.

Throughout this thesis, I argue why and how we could nuance our understanding of the concept 'the migration divide' (Carling and Åkesson, 2009): First, it was introduced to explain the increasing difficulty for the average African to migrate outside the continent. However, this does not always imply that people become victims of "involuntary immobility" (Carling, 2002), in fact the vast majority instead migrate to neighboring countries in the region (Ratha and others, 2011). Secondly, while most people migrate intra-regionally, most efforts to

leverage migration as a resource for development are made in a south-north context. Such attempts towards poverty reduction and development are unlikely to have broad implications since this would lead to a further divide between those with the necessary human, social and financial capital (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) to migrate to the global North versus those who stay in Africa – which again implies different opportunities for social mobility and therefore negatively affects inclusive growth. Thirdly, most research points to the responsibility of receiving states in generating the migration divide, however with a lack of efficient migration management from sending states – or without "bringing the (sending) state back in" (Skocpol, 1985) - migration constitutes less of a vector for inclusive growth.

As mentioned, the concept of a "migration divide" was initially introduced to explain the difficulty or "involuntary immobility" (Carling, 2002) for people in the global south to access the global north (Carling and Åkesson, 2009). One area of research that is being extensively looked at - in developed economies or Open Access Orders (North, 2007) such as North America, Australia, and Europe - is how immigration has indeed become 'high politics' (Hollifield, 2008), with increasing restrictions and entry barriers put in place. That research includes analyzing flows from the global south; such as from Mexico and central/south America to the United States or from Africa and the Middle East to Europe. However, for the average African migrant it is increasingly difficult to migrate to OECD countries, as shown in the Migration Without Borders Scenario (Pecoud & de Guchteneire, 2007). This thesis highlights the fact that access to migration is a privilege that is unevenly distributed globally, both between and within countries. Compared with most Africans, people from the global north enjoy opportunities to migrate legally without heavy visa restrictions.

Paradoxically - in spite of literature pointing out the "failure" of immigration policies - theories mainly describe the migration divide as a consequence of restrictive immigration policies in receiving countries (Pecoud and Guchteneire, 2007; Carling and Åkesson, 2009). In the powerful letter written before take-off by Yaguine Koïta and Fodé Tounkara it is noteworthy that they address it to the European authorities: *"Excellences, Messieurs les membres et responsables d'Europe.... Messieurs les membres et responsables d'Europe, c'est à votre solidarité et votre gentillesse que nous vous appelons au secours en Afrique. Aidez-nous, nous souffrons énormément en Afrique, aidez-nous, nous avons des problèmes et quelques manques de droits de l'enfant.... Et n'oubliez pas que c'est à vous que nous devons plaigner la faiblesse de notre force en Afrique"(Humanité, 1999).* With Limited Access Orders (North, 2007) across

Africa, the moral responsibility of migration management has also by migration scholars largely been placed on Europe. Nonetheless, the perspective of south-north migration management only shows part of the picture.

Academic research looking at the nexus between migration and development should increasingly broaden the understanding of the concept of the migration divide. This means we would carefully need to reexamine whether those suffering from "involuntary immobility" towards the global north are not instead migrating south-south. Scholars have started looking at immigration policies in developing countries throughout East and Southeast Asia as well as the Gulf States or countries such as Bresil and Argentina which now attract workers from across the world. However, we would in that regard particularly also need to look at intra-regional flows, which has been largely overlooked. Most current research focus on international south-north migration while domestic - and intra-regional migration – which is generally done by poorer migrants, is much more prevalent (King and Skeldon, 2010). Intra-regional migration present opportunities for impacting poverty reduction and equality, more so than intercontinental migration (Adams and Page, 2005; Wouterse, 2008).

It should be brought into sharper relief that intra-African migrants face disadvantages from higher restrictions and costly barriers to their mobility. In Africa, migration is often a necessity or a *"consolidation or survival strategy"* (Broekhuis, 2007), also known as *"eat away"* migration (Wouterse, 2008). Without structures in place, the majority of migrants within Africa are undocumented or irregular, and such constraints marginalize migrants (Gagnon and Khoudour-Castéras, 2012). Migrants generally face civil and human rights violations and are subject to a wide range of abuse. Luc Adolfe Tiao, former Prime Minister of Burkina Faso, noted that: "*For our young to instead leave Burkina Faso to go work with our neighbors, many of them being treated like slaves and foreigners without papers or rights, this will never resolve the problems of inequality and poverty"* (Interview 3). Unequal rights for migrants exacerbate social exclusion, and such protracted vulnerability can have broad socio-economic costs. This leads to conclude that the agency of migrants is not enough to leverage migration for inclusive growth, and more effort should be spent resolving the *"structure-agency impasse"* (Bakewell, 2010).

Within Africa, the current lack of migration management reduces the potential contributions to development from migration, or the structures in place do not sufficiently facilitate the agency

of migrants. My research has underlined structural constraints on human development for intra-African migrants, looking at access to employment, health care and hence social mobility and inclusion. For Yaguine Koïta and Fodé Tounkara it would have been easier to cross a border into a neighboring African country, but they saw no other alternative than inter-continental migration in order to obtain opportunities for a better life: *"Donc, si vous voyez que nous nous sacrifions et exposons notre vie, c'est parce qu'on souffre trop en Afrique et qu'on a besoin de vous pour lutter contre la pauvreté et mettre fin à la guerre en Afrique."* (Humanité, 1999). Reducing systemic disadvantages for intra-african migrants would improve their chances of becoming 'agents of change' rather than threats to social cohesion.

My research shows that there are both discourse and implementation gaps when it comes to migration policy in Africa. While formal conventions and protocols on migration exist in the Regional Economic Commities, based on international conventions and resolutions, the free movement of persons in Africa remains the least developed policy area of regional integration – with large implementation gaps between visions in protocols and their level of ratification and implementation. This distinction between "resources" (what possibilities people have on paper – or the current policies) and "functionings" (what the reality presents – the implementation of these policies) is central to Sen's (1991) capability approach, thus looking beyond the resource of migration itself and instead understanding the conditions or constraints – such as policy – that determine whether movement is in fact a possibility.

With the current situation of unmanaged migration, at the macro-level countries are not reaping the possible benefits of labor market coordination, while at the micro level migrants are not able to profit from access to improved opportunities since a lack of legal protection and access to publicly provided goods and services hinders social mobility and inclusion. When narrowing down the objective of emigration policies, it basically comes down to finding and improving opportunities for citizens in neighboring countries and all over world. For a person born in one of the worlds least developed countries, which are also often characterized by limited access order (North, 2007), chances of benefiting from inclusive growth at home are limited. However, even the possibilities to migrate are again – to a large extent - defined by internal as well as external factors of the state in which you are born. One can perceive migration as a key element of class domination (Bourdieu, 1984). For those that have the capital to migrate (Van Hear, 2004), the state negotiates your fate abroad through international, regional, and bilateral

agreements. Your passport, managed by local authorities, defines your rights to mobility and your access to opportunities.

In this thesis, I explore *"to what extent migration is a vector of inclusive growth in Burkina Faso?"*, with a focus on studying the consequences of policies for poorer migrants. This thesis hence fills a gap in research through focusing on countries with south-south or regional flows, and most importantly through including some of the world's poorest countries that do not have easy access to south-north migration. More research is needed in countries with similar profiles to understand the link between migration and inclusive growth and to understand the dimensions of the migration divide. Examples of countries characterized by high intra-regional or bilateral flows to neighboring countries include African countries like Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique. In Latin America, this would include countries such as Paraguay and Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Honduras, and in Asia, Indonesia, and Myanmar.

There are lessons to be learnt from the case of Burkina Faso - one of the poorest countries on earth – which has the highest bilateral migration flows within Africa and is a country that has tried to leverage south-south flows for development**.** The empirical work - which encompasses historical, social, developmental, political and policy aspects and build on the theoretical framework combined with literature/policy review and interviews with policy makers – shows that migration changes between 'high' and 'low' (Hollifield, 2008) politics during different political phases. Most Burkinabe are poor and only have access to migrate to neighboring countries. The data gathered during this research shows that migration is no longer an element of institutionalizing open access for citizens of poor countries of the global south. The migration divide implies that intercontinental migration is a resource and a strategy for the wealthiest and most powerful sections of the population. Intercontinental migration additionally yields greater increases in income and livelihood security, and thus tends to exacerbate household inequalities (Wouterse, 2008; De Haas, 2009). With limited and unequal access to the resource of intercontinental migration, it in fact enhances elite monopolization. The Burkinabe receiving remittances from outside Africa are, for example, in the top consumption quintiles, and were already wealthy to a degree relative to the general population before the migration of someone in the household (Hampshire, 2002; Black et al., 2005; Ratha et al, 2011). At the same time, intra-regional migration of the average Burkinabe - which is often done under poor conditions and with limited choice - has not historically led to the social

mobility of low-skilled workers. There is in fact a *'breakdown of the social elevator'* (Dia, 2010) via migration, and poverty is a strong deterrent of geographic and social mobility.

The inclusive growth approach should be further introduced when looking at the nexus between migration and 'development'. *"A focus on phenomena that are consequences rather than causes of the process, such as the diaspora, remittances, or skilled migrants, without addressing the causes of a lack of development in the first place, is unlikely to bring success"* (Skeldon, 2008; 16). Furthermore, structural barriers to mobility and development are higher for intra-regional migrants (who are often the poorest). This is amplified by the fact that poorer migrants are also more likely to suffer from restrictive policies. In many cases, sending states have not invested the necessary political capital to ensure structures are in place to leverage migration for development for their citizens abroad.

Before examining policy efficiency or failure, one would need to question the 'capabilities' and 'aspirations' (de Haas and Vezzoli, 2011) of the sending state in reducing the migration divide by looking at *"whether migration policymaking interacts with development processes?"*. While sending states might to some extent have a structurally disadvantaged position in the international system, one must nonetheless question the classic perspective of scholars that consider African states as quasi non-existent actors. Sending states are not just 'pawns' (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003;209) at the weaker end of an asymmetrical relationship: There are conditions under which 'weaker' states can overcome power asymmetries in the politics of migration (Betts, 2011). Migration is not merely a uni- or bilateral-matter but ranges from the regional to multilateral. Sending countries can in particular explore possibilities in a regional context when bilateral relations do not pan out (Delano, 2009). However, this demands investments of political capital by sending states to facilitate legal migration. This amongst other includes elaborating migration policies and proactively negotiating bilateral and multilateral cooperation for labor mobility, such as in the case of the Philippines where migration policy is equal to development policy and with national legislation focused on labor export.

My research reveals a general change in the policy landscape in Africa, both regarding the new trends of integrating migration in national poverty-reduction strategies but also the ongoing process of devising migration policies in 16 countries across the continent, plus in 2 Regional Economic Communities. In 2002, scholars such as Skeldon, de Haan and Kothari suggested

that migration issues and their link with poverty reduction should be incorporated into Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), while as recently as in 2009, Black and Sward underlined the lack of attention given to migration in PRSPs of sub-Saharan African countries. My research shows that this has changed.

Nonetheless, several internal political challenges lie ahead for the implementation of such policymaking. Considering the limited advances championed by policy-makers in Africa, it seems important to understand 'aspirations' in policymaking or "looking behind the façade" (North, 2007) and bringing decision- and policy-making center stage in the migration policy debate. While migration studies have largely analyzed what motivates mobility from the migrant-perspective, it remains un-explored what motivates policy-makers in this field. Research has expanded the understanding of what motivates migration from individual-level rational-choice to include broader social factors as part of the decision-making. This thesis adds to the understanding of what motivates decision-making of policy-makers by constructing a hypothesis of aspirations of the governing elites, built on the paradigm of the theoretical and methodological findings above. By doing so, the thesis attemps to introduce possible explanations to the reactions of African sending countries to the main migration and development approaches led by developed countries and development agencies during the last decade; the return of skilled migrants, co-development and remittances. This opens migration research to a broad field of behavioral economics in order to more efficiently understand how to improve public policy and suggest viable solutions to migration management in the short- medium- and long-term.

While this research has adopted a positive view on how sending countries can theoretically leverage migration for development through efficient migration management, one might note that negotiating opportunities (for internships, scholarships, secondments etc.), jobs, and rights for citizens abroad will demand a certain amount of political capital. One can furthermore question the internal support from policymakers and elites, when history shows that reforms often become window-dressing, and donor evaluations over time generally underline the lacking 'political will' (Caritas Internationalis, 2004). In non-converging countries, the priority remains building capacities for strategic vision and coordination among elites (Meisel and Ould-Audia, 2007), since reforms threaten the rent-creation that holds the society together, and the elites often subvert such reforms in countries that are not ready for them (North et al., 2007). This is what Pierre Bourdieu describes as the perpetuation of status quo (Bourdieu, 1984 and

1991), and we have seen how migration has helped maintain the "social fields" of the current policy makers in Burkina Faso having themselves profited from international migration. The qualitative data gathered in this thesis points to the fact that without the interest and support of the broad spectrum of policymakers, parliamentarians and implementers, there is little chance that the upcoming migration policy will substantially benefit development in Burkina Faso. It follows that even though a migration policy is under development in Burkina Faso, this does not necessarily signify that migration will once again become 'high politics' (Hollifield, 2008) in Burkina Faso.

My work concludes that it will not be possible to move *beyond the migration divide* without an investment of political capital in migration management from sending states. There needs to be a closer link between policy discourse, policy making and policy implementation. While regional protocols exist on paper and while sending states have started including migration in their poverty reduction strategies, this is not enough. The numerous migration policies under development might have the potential to shift the agenda from immigration control to migration management, if implemented. However, effects towards inclusive growth and social mobility of the average citizen through migration can only be achieved by addressing the limited access to regular migration and the structural inequalities in regard to migration between rich and poor while reducing the constraints to intra-regional migration. Indeed, migration is a result and not a cause of social transformation (Castles, 2010; 2012), and preferential access to migration is merely a reflection of a broader societal context of limited access order (North et al., 2007) in low-income developing countries, such as Burkina Faso.

The real 'failure' of the restrictive immigration policies in place in Africa is thus that they enhance the migration divide since they do not offer scope for the inclusion of low-skilled migrants, who face structural constraints when left in irregular situations. This would demand a paradigm shift from migration control to migration management, and a shift towards "*accommodationist policies*" (Skeldon, 2008) to manage existing flows rather than trying to reduce them. Specific measures are thus needed to reduce the structural constraints that increasing economic, social, and spatial disparities, and instead offer migrants opportunities to break low career ceilings or reduce intergenerational poverty: such as access to education and ensuring mutual recognition of qualifications; access to health services; more relaxed visa systems including cross-border job opportunities and transferability of pensions; options for dual citizenship; right of establishment and land ownership; urban and territorial planning; and

cheaper remittance fees including mobile banking. Social, financial, and spatial inclusive growth depends heavily on the capability of the most disadvantaged social groups to participate in building wealth, and to receive in return a rewarding share, thus spurring social mobility. Through the implementation of such policies, migration policies become the driver to be managed and migration the outcome, rather than the migration tail wagging the development dog (Skeldon, 2008).

Advantages could accrue from well-managed intraregional migration in Africa since even modest gains can make a considerable difference to the poorest Africans, and sending states play a key role in facilitating development outcomes. Without structures in place – at the macro level - to govern migration flows and support developmental efforts produced by migrant agency, I question to what extent migration – at the micro level - is a vector of inclusive growth and if anyone can 'move beyond the migration divide'. Burkinabe migrants, for example, currently venture into the world without much support and protection from the state in which they were born, which reduces their possibilities for access to development-generating labor mobility. All migrants deal with varying degrees of structural barriers (De Haas, 2009); however, it is noteworthy that constraints are higher for migrants that cannot afford to migrate beyond the African continent. African Regional Economic Communities could draw lessons from South America's Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) and Andean Community (CAN), which have moved from narrow schemes to facilitate labor mobility for high-skilled workers toward improved human mobility across their regions. This shows an increased awareness at the regional level of the development opportunities offered by mobility.

Yaguine Koïta and Fodé Tounkara, the two Guinean boys, explained clearly their wish for development efforts within Africa. "*Donc dans ce cas, nous les Africains, surtout les enfants et jeunes Africains, nous vous demandons de faire une grande organisation efficace pour l'Afrique, pour qu'il soit progressé*". (Humanité, 1999). Unfortunately, the two poor African boys died trying to migrate to Europe, and millions of young boys and girls have followed their footsteps in the hope of obtaining better possibilities in life. De Haas (2012) argued that migration might reinforce inequality where international migration is restricted to wealthy elites. Indeed, this thesis shows that when the poor have limited access to social security, public services, and markets in their home countries, it becomes even more difficult to access this abroad. Targeted policies to improve migration are thus unlikely to succeed without a more general process towards structural political and economic reforms, and therefore the integration

of migration in Poverty Reduction Strategies is a good sign. Castles (2004) points out that migration policies would be more successful if they were explicitly linked to long-term political agendas concerned with trade, development, and conflict prevention. A migration policy risks remaining a mere piece of paper if not accompanied by far-reaching reforms in governance and social welfare and should include comprehensive investment packages in skills and social protection as well as information and technology.

Finally, while we have seen that structures affect the possibility of migrants to exercise agency, an unexplored subject is the role of migrant agency in influencing structure. This could be introduced into research agendas: Creative and bold use of technology for example makes it possible for policymakers and practitioners to ensure that citizens are actively involved in the design of new systems and can provide real-time feedback about what works and what does not. Ideally, policy should build on challenges faced by regular citizens and policy makers should do their best to attempt to address their concerns. In open access orders, where policy is influenced from numerous layers of society and by actors beyond government, this has been more successful. In limited access orders, on the other hand, work should go into supporting governance models that include community involvement and bottom-up procedures.

The King of King of Fada N'Gourma and Member of Parliament, Chief Thiombiano, told me - during one of our long discussions in his 'court' sitting in the sun on a broken plastic chair - that "*If the people and general public in Africa had the means to actually influence policy, migration would be a human right, a civilized action and done in a protected manner*", (Interview 7). Migration policy-making, nonetheless, often "*contradicts the ideal represented by freedom of movement*" (Pecoud, 2013;2), since at the global, regional, and national level there are different incentives and challenges that puts migrants in second position to peace/national security and prosperity/national employment. When moving down to the micro level, everyone should be able to agree that we all want one thing; a life in happiness and with opportunities not only for ourselves and our children, but also for our neighbors (whether close by or far away). At the macro-level, everyone should also be able to agree that, to move beyond the migration divide, one could reiterate the very last phrase of the chapter on migration and development in the trendsetting book 'The Age of Migration' by Stephen Castles and Mark Miller: "*Fairer forms of migration must be an integral part of comprehensive development strategies designed to reduce global inequality*" (Castles and Miller, 2009).

Annex - List of interviews

Code	Country	Last name	First Name	ORGANISATION	POSITION	Data/ Document	Date
1	Benin	WETOHO SSOU	Blandine	Ministere des Affaires Etangeres, Integration Africaine, Francophaine, Béninois de L'Extérieure	Conseiller Technique à la Siaspora et aux communaites	Benin policy guidelines	06/2013
2	Burkina Faso	ZOURE	Adeline Viviane	Minister des Affaires Etrangeres	Directrice de la promotion de l'integration Régionale	Burkina Faso draftpolicy guidelines	04/2013
3	Burkina Faso	Tiao	Luc Adolfe	Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres	Ambassadeur de Burkina Faso a Paris	Information on return policy and data	03/2010
4	Burkina Faso	Zongo	Tertius	Minister de Finances	Premier Ministre	Burkina Faso diaspora outreach paper	09/2009
5	Burkina Faso	Ilbiado		Minister des Affaires Etrangeres	Ambassadeur de Burkina Fsso a Copenhague	Burkina Faso data	12/2012
6	Burkina Faso	Ouadraogo		Minister des Affaires Etrangeres	Secretaire adjoint, Ambassador Burkina Faso a Copenhague	Burkina Faso research document	12/2012
7	Burkina Faso	Thiombian o		Burkina Faso Parliament	Member of Parliament and King of N'gourma	Burkina Faso draft policy	05/2009 09/2010
8	Burkina Faso	Ouadraogo		Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres	Civil servant	High Council for Burkinabe Abroad framework document	05/2009
9	Burkina Faso	Theophile	Serge	Universite de Ouagadougou	Professeur	Burkina Faso research document	09/2010
10	Burkina Faso	Thiombian o	Moustapha	Horizon FM	Directeur	Burkina Faso data	05/2009 09/2010 01/2018
11	Cote d'Ivoire	KONE	Siaka	Ministere de l'Integration Africiane et des Ivoiriens de l'exterieure	Chargé d'etudes Cabinet du Ministre	Cote d'Ivoire data	06/2013
12	ECOWA S	N'FALY	Sanoh	ECOWAS	Charge de libre circulation	draft ECOWAS migration policy	10/2011
13	ECOWA S	BA	IBRAHIM	ECOWAS	Charge de Economie macroeconom ic	ECOWAS policy guidelines	05/2013
14	France	Ould-Audia	Jacques	Ministry of Finance	Director	Governanc e database	09/2010

15	Gambia	JALLOW	Ajara Yamindeh	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Civil Servant	Gambia policy guidelines	06/2013
16	Ghana	Asima	Prosper	Civil Society group	Professor	Ghana draft migration policy	05/2012
17	Ghana	OSMAN	Adam	GHANA IMMIGRATION SERVICE	Border Patrol Commander AFLAO	Ghana data	05/2012
18	Guinea	BANGOURA	Raynato Khadyja	Minister de la cooperation Internationale	Expert	Guinea research ocument	06/2013
19	Liberia	NANGO	Peter K.	Bureau of Immegration a Naturalzation	Deputy Director	Liberia draft migration policy	04/2012
20	Mali	KONATE	Abdoulaye	CIGEM/ Minister des Maliens de l'Exteriur et de l'Integration Africiane	Directeur Regisseur Centre D'information et de Gestion des Migrations	Mali draft migration policy to be presented to Parliament	05/2012
21	Mauritius	MANSOUr	Ali	Ministy of Finance	Chair of GFMD	draft GFMD 2012 guidelines	11/2012
22	Mauritius	Samen	Salomon	Ministry of Finance	Consultant GFMD	Mauritius data	11/2012
23	Mauritius	Gooraj	Viraj	Ministry of Finance	Civil Servant	Mauritius policy guidelines	11/2012
24	Niger	SIDIKOU GADE	Moussa	OHG EPAD Niger	Coordonnateur National	Niger policy guidelines	
25	Nigeria	Dankano,	Abdulaziz	Ministere des affaires etrangeres	Ambassador , Director Consular affairs	Nigeria draft migration policy	
26	Nigeria	ANAELO	Charles Nwanelo	National Commision for Refugees Immigrants and internally displeased persons	Head Migration Division	Nigeria data	
27	Rwanda	Rugwabiza	Leonard	Ministry of Finance	Director, General Planning	Rwanda policy guidelines	
28	Togo	TSIGLO	Kossi	Agence Nationale Pour l'Emploi	Directeur de départment	Togo policy guidelines	
29	Senegal	NGONDO	Oumar	Student and Youth Travel Organization (SYTO)	Director	Senegal policy framework	
30	Senegal	FALL	Papa Demba	Universite de Senghor	Professeur	West Africa research document	11/2012
31	Sierra Leone	SESAY	Saidu Conton	National Commision for Social Action (NACSA)	Commisioner	Sierra Leone research document	
32	Senegal	BRIGGS	Inye Nathan	AFDB	Trade and Regional Integration Officer	AfDB policy guidelines	

33				AFDB	Trade and Regional Integration Officer	West Africa research ocument	
	Senegal	Abimbola	Olumide	AFDB	Trade and Regional Integration Officer	West Africa research ocument	
34	Tunisia	Soucat	Agnes	AFDB	Diretrice	Human Development policy guidelines	
35	Tunisia	Youssouf	Mohamed	AFDB	Manager, Migration Trust Fund	policy guidelines	
36	Tunisia	Ncube	Mthuli	AFDB	Vice President, Chief Economist	West Africa Migration Household data	
37	Mauritius	Chikezie	Chukwu-Emeka	Africa Up	Director	West Africa data	11/2012
38	Tanzania	Duale	Abdirashid	Dabishil	CEO	Remittances data	
39	Madagascar	Cholewinski	Ryszard	ILO	Director	ILO policy guidelines	
40	Egypt	Newson	Michael	IOM	Head of North Africa	IOM draft policy	
41	Mauritius	Appave	Gervais	IOM	Director	IOM policy guidelines	11/2012
42	Mauritius	Klug	Anja	GFMD	Advisor	GFMD policy guidelines	11/2012
43	Mauritius	Omelaniuk	Irena	GFMD	Advisor	GFM policy guidelines	11/2012
44	Belgium	Åkerman Börje	Eva	GFMD	Chair , Swedish Ambassador	GFMD policy guidelines	11/2012
45	Sweden	Kristof	Thomas	GFMD	assitant Chair, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs	policy guidelines	11/2012
46	Morocco	Leka	Acha	McKinsey	Director, Africa	African Visa data	
47	Morocco	Khan	Razia	Standard Chartered Bank	Head of research, Africa	Financial data	
48	Tanzania	Terry	Donald	University of Boston, Former IADB	Professor, Fm Manager of Multilateral Investment Fund	Remittances data	
49	USA	Plaza	Sonja	World Bank	Haed of Diaspora Initiative	Draft research document	11/2012
50	Switzerland	McGuy	Patrick	World Economic Forum	Head, Africa Outreach	Visa research document	
51	Mauritius	Rosengaertner	Sarah	UNDP	Project coordinator	UNDP policy guidelines	11/2012

Many of the interviews were conducted on the side-lines of workshops and seminars across Africa. The list below underlines the key events that I benefitted from in my research:

- On October 24 2011, I organized a DIIS seminar on: "*Recreating a Borderless West Africa: Migration Management by ECOWAS*". The speakers included myself, as well as Catherine Withol de Wenden, Professor at Sciences Politiques in Paris, and Sanoh N'Fally, the Director of Free Movement for ECOWAS under the Office of the Commissioner of Trade, Customs and Free Movement. This seminar looked closely at the functioning of the ECOWAS secretariat in a context of wavering political support, political instability, inter-state border disputes and increased migration pressure due to two decades of economic decline.

- On May 29 2012, during the AfDB Annual Meetings 2012 in Arusha, Tanzania, I organized a side-event on "*Remittances, Diaspora and Microfinance for Financial inclusion*"

- In November 21-22 2012, I participated in the first African-hosted Global Forum for Migration and Development, held in Mauritius. The forum on *"enhancing the human development of migrants and their contribution to the development of communities and states"* was held on. It focused on labor mobility and beyond-the-border skills as well as jobs for African youth. I had several bilateral meetings, mainly with the Burkinabe representatives in charge of migration policy. During two preparatory workshops in Mauritius in June and August 2012, I also had the chance to interview West African researcher Papa Demba Fall, whose research and input helped guide and inspire my thesis. I furthermore had working sessions with the representatives from the governments of Mali and Nigeria, as well as private sector actors.

- On May 31 2013, during the African Development Bank Annual Meetings in Marrakech, Morocco, I conducted a high-level panel organized jointly by the World Economic Forum and the African Development Bank discussing "*the benefits of relaxing visa restrictions throughout Africa*".

- Finally, on June 20-21 2013, in Dakar, Senegal I helped organize a workshop in collaboration with ECOWAS on "*the elaboration of a common ECOWAS migration policy*". Delegates from ECOWAS countries shared their experiences of managing migration, interacting with their diaspora and developing national migration policies. They also discussed efforts to make migration work for employment. I held detailed discussions with delegates responsible for migration policy in the following countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

Picture 5 - ECOWAS migration policy workshop, 2013

ECOWAS Migration policy workshop Dakar,Senegal 20-21 june 2013

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